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The Internet started as an experiment escaping the lab in the early 70s and in a few decades
time it has become a disrupting technology deeply changing our everyday lives. The founda-
tions upon today's Internet lay are the same ones set at the time of the original architecture
design. On the one hand, the targeted simplicity of the original layered Internet architecture has
fostered a smooth proliferation of services to be designed and integrated into it. On the other
hand, the easiness in the introduction of additional features has sometimes embedded point so-
lutions ignoring the overall architectural framework. The proliferation of such ad-hoc patches
has increased the complexity of the original Internet architecture. Because of the struggling de-
ployment of new features over the last decades (e.g., IPv6 or IP multicast), there is a widespread
fear that the evolutionary patch-work of the Internet has contributed to its ossiﬁcation. That
is, it has become hard or impossible to create any further innovation at the core of the Internet.
Innovation at the edge of the network works, but it constantly faces constraints imposed by the
core which remains untouched. However, current Internet's issues with security and mobility
models, network management, accounting, content distribution mandate infrastructural changes
to be properly addressed. Therefore, a clean-slate design of the Internet architecture is required,
that is, a redesign of the network based on a updated set of core principles. With that aim, a
considerable amount of clean-slate research on future Internet architectures has been pursued
since more than a decade.
Any future Internet design must acknowledge that today's Internet is largely dominated by
multimedia content consumption. Users produce and consume several exabytes of contents per-
month in a totally distributed and uncontrolled manner. The massive content distribution is
supported by the current Internet via ad-hoc infrastructure overprovisioning and overlay or-
chestration mechanisms. In fact, Content Distribution Networks (CDNs), which represent the
mainstream solution to the content distribution problem in the Internet, consist of dedicated
servers placed in geographical proximity of users meant to hold content replicas and improve
the users' download experience. Nevertheless, the widespread use of CDNs is a far from optimal
solution to the content distribution problem. CDNs require agreements with ISPs and DNS
redirections. Further, CDNs introduce considerable operational and capital costs which can only
be aﬀorded by a few big commercial players.
The need for a dedicated support to achieve eﬃcient content distribution in the Internet stems
from the absence in its original architecture design of content-oriented primitives at the network
core. Internet was originally designed as a host-to-host communication network. Bidirectional
data-exchanges in the Internet are achieved by explicitly including source and destination phys-
ical addresses in every IP datagram. Conversely, today's Internet usage is mainly focused on
retrieving speciﬁc contents rather than on reaching speciﬁc sources providing those contents.
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is a clean-slate research paradigm aiming to design a more
content-oriented future Internet. By introducing content-oriented routing primitives, widespread
in-network caching and asynchronous publish/subscribe-oriented communication models, ICN
aims to improve content retrieval and use of network resources in the Internet architecture.
Among the ICN instances, the Named-Data Networking (NDN) has generated a considerable
momentum since its original inception in 2006. The NDN architecture envisions to replace the
Internet hourglass model's tiny waist, i.e., the Internet Protocol, with a layer working on named-
data. Name-based anycast routing and opportunistic in-network storage are included in the
NDN layer-3 to ﬁnd and fetch closest replicas of the required contents in the network. NDN
implements an asynchronous communication model based on the exchange of two diﬀerent net-
work packets, one requesting a content, Interest, and the other one carrying back the content
itself, Data. Interests travel through the network without speciﬁc destination addresses rather
by following name-based forwarding tables' entries to any source of the speciﬁed content. For-
xi
warded Interests are recorded by routers in dedicated Pending Interest Tables. Trails are left by
Interests in traversed routers for potential Data packets to follow the reverse path to the original
requester of a content.
In this dissertation we address the security issues introduced by the forwarding mechanism fea-
tured by the NDN architecture. The Pending Interest Table (PIT) in NDN networks allows
ﬁnal users' Interests to create state in the network and achieve an asynchronous address-less
Interest-Data exchange. On one hand, the PIT stateful mechanism enables properties like In-
terests aggregation, multicast Data delivery and native hop-by-hop control ﬂow. On the other
hand, the PIT stateful forwarding behavior can be easily abused by malicious users to mount a
disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, called Interest Flooding Attacks (IFAs).
In IFAs, loosely coordinated botnets can ﬂood the network with a large amount of hard-to-satisfy
Interests with the aim to overload both the network infrastructure and the content producers.
Countermeasures against the IFA have been proposed since the early attack discovery. However,
a fair understanding of the defense mechanisms' real eﬃcacy is missing since those have been
tested under simplistic assumptions about the evaluation scenarios. Thus, overall, IFAs still ap-
pear easy to launch but hard to mitigate. This open security threat raises serious doubts about
the worthiness of the PIT stateful forwarding mechanism in NDN networks.
The work presented in this manuscript shapes a better understanding of both the implications
of IFAs and the possibilities of improving the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms against these
attacks. The contributions of this work include the deﬁnition of a more complete and realistic at-
tacker model for IFAs, the design of novel stealthy IFA attacks built upon the proposed attacker
model, a re-assessment of the most-eﬃcient state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures against the
novel proposed attacks, the theorization of novel class of IFA countermeasures, the design of an
instance of this new class of countermeasures which eﬃciently addresses the novel stealthy IFAs.
Finally, this work also proposes to leverage the latest programmable data-plane technologies to
design and test alternative forwarding mechanisms for the NDN which could be less vulnerable
to the IFA threat.
The content of this manuscript is organized as follows. Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the
research on future Internet architectures. Firstly, it summarizes some of the current Internet is-
sues and outlines the future requirements for a global inter-networking architecture. Secondly, it
provides an overview of the Information-Centric Networking (ICN) research paradigm. Finally, it
describes the main building blocks of the Named-Data Networking (NDN) architecture. Chapter
2 focuses on the Pending Interest Table (PIT) component of the NDN forwarding plane. Chapter
2 details the PIT component structure and operations, it explores the possible data-structures
for a PIT, it discusses the main design challenges for this component and ﬁnally it analyzes its
directly and indirectly enabled properties. Chapter 3 introduces the Interest Flooding Attack
(IFA), an NDN-speciﬁc Denial Of Service (DoS) attack exploiting the PIT stateful forwarding
mechanism. Chapter 3 identiﬁes ﬂaws in the state-of-the-art countermeasures against the IFA
and leverages those to deﬁne a steadier attacker model. Further, chapter 3 introduces a new set of
IFAs built upon the novel attacker model. Finally, chapter 3 presents a re-assessment of existing
IFA countermeasures against the novel IFAs. Results of the evaluation reported in chapter 3 shed
a totally diﬀerent light on the eﬃcacy of the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms against realistic
IFAs and so, call for a diﬀerent set of countermeasures to protect the NDN against this threat.
Chapter 4 deﬁnes proactive IFA countermeasures, which are novel defense mechanisms against
IFAs inspired by the issues with the state-of-the-art ones outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 intro-
duces Charon, a novel proactive IFA countermeasure. Chapter 4 illustrates Charon's design and
tests it against the novel IFA attacks. Chapter 4 shows Charon counteracts the latest stealthy
IFAs better than the state-of-the-art reactive countermeasures. Chapter 5 explores alternative
xii
forwarding mechanisms for the NDN architecture and illustrates the NDN.p4 design, that is,
the ﬁrst implementation of an ICN protocol written in P4. Firstly, chapter 5 classiﬁes existing
alternative forwarding mechanisms with respect to a set of PIT cardinal properties. Secondly,
chapter 5 proposes to leverage novel programmable-networks technologies to test and evaluate
diﬀerent NDN forwarding plane designs.
To conclude, the last section of this manuscript summarizes the contributions described in this
dissertation and outlines several research directions for future work. With regard to the future
work, ﬁrst, this dissertation paves the way for further improvements in the state-of-the-art de-
fense mechanisms against IFAs. More precisely, ﬁndings emerged throughout this work show
the potential for hybrid reactive/proactive and/or control-plane assisted countermeasures to be
designed and counteract IFAs more eﬀectively. Second, this dissertation proposes to leverage
the latest technologies in the ﬁeld of programmable data-planes for the design of NDN routers.
The NDN.p4 design was proposed shortly after the P4 language vision had emerged, so it was
somehow constrained by that technology's infancy. Since then, the P4 language ecosystem has
considerably evolved. Today, P4 features a richer language feature-set and is supported by many
hardware/software targets. Recent advances in P4 can be used to reﬁne the NDN.p4 design and
fairly compare it to the state-of-the-art NDN router designs.
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Chapter 1
Future Network Architectures
The design principles for today's Internet had been developed in the 60s and 70s as the main out-
come of a US defense research organization, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
project. Less than twenty years later, the rationale that had shaped the design of the early
Internet protocols was elegantly summarized in [1]. The ﬁrst Internet design mainly aimed to
interconnect existing packet switching networks to provide some larger services. On top of that,
some secondary requirements were set, like reliability under transient network disruptions, sup-
port for diﬀerent types of transport services, distributed network management tools, etc. The
main goal of that early design was to provide a general and ﬂexible infrastructure upon which to
easily implement and run diverse services. The realization of Internet built upon that original
abstract architecture has, over the years, surpassed the initial expectations. In fact, today's
Internet accommodates a much broader range of services.
Since the explosion of the World Wide Web, a new set of requirements and trends of use compro-
mise some of the Internet original design principles and strain the current network infrastructure.
Most of the time, additional features have been added to the architecture as point solutions to
meet speciﬁc, yet legitimate, requirements (e.g., mobility, security, IP addresses scarcity). Thus,
some sort of absence of a broader "architectural thinking" has often embodied patches which,
in the best case, have only broken some of the original design principles (e.g., several ﬂavors of
middlebox violate the end-to-end principle [2]), but which, in the worst case, have introduced
undesired and conﬂicting feature interactions [3] (e.g., intrinsic IPsec/NAT incompatibilities).
Indeed, this incremental reﬁnement process has increased the architecture complexity and com-
promised its ﬂexibility therefore harming the conception and the smooth deployment of any
future feature. Ideally, overturning this evolutionary path would imply to only develop and in-
troduce new features coherently with the existing architectural framework. Nevertheless, today's
really diﬀerent requirements would require to devise a completely new architecture. This latter
process is usually referred to as "clean-slate design" [4].
A clean-slate approach implies rethinking the basic assumptions and design principles of the
architecture to address simultaneously all the newly-emerged challenges that today's Internet is
facing with. Many scientists question clean-slate research in networking as "impractical" since
that does not lead to any short term deployment. Others think this intellectual exercise is ﬁrst
beneﬁcial to the ongoing incremental Internet evolution and then plants seeds that will enable
research experiments to consolidate in future networks [5]. For those reasons, several big research
frameworks [6] have been launched worldwide to encourage clean-slate research on the design of
future Internet architectures. Although the projects diﬀer from each other, there seems to be
a small set of common goals that they all pursue. Those goals raise from the Internet require-
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ments of security, support for mobility of terminals, cost-eﬀective and resource-eﬃcient massive
content-distribution, infrastructure scalability, need for ﬁne-grained and seamless accounting and
network management tools. Moreover, since the original design of Internet, many factors have
changed like advances in technologies, stakeholders, new application requirements, role of and
trust in involved parties, service diﬀerentiation at the network core. This produces a broader
perspective on the design of any internetworking architecture including end-users and economics
aspects too.
Beyond the peculiarities of each proposed design, there are a few core factors which any new
architecture design should consider. These factors could be gathered in ﬁve main categories
according to the domain of interest, although these domains are tightly interrelated:
• entities: at the beginning Internet was engineered for host-based communication between
expensive mainframes. Since then, network participants have increased and, just to name
a few, now include normal users, Internet Service Providers, government agencies, telco
carriers, large commercial players (e.g., Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple). More actors
bring more interests and so increase the conﬂict of interests space [7].
• communications models: there has been an evolution from the single original client-server
model to multiple communication models. The World Wide Web (WWW) and other
technologies like Email have dictated a usage trend based on content retrieval from speciﬁc
sources and access of services. Moreover, peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have boosted a
model where content can be fetched simultaneously by diﬀerent hosts found through some
middleware support. Yet, the emergence of platforms for sharing user generated content
(e.g., Youtube, Instagram, Flickr) has also considerably increased the daily quantity of
content produced and consumed via the global network. Finally, the adoption of the Cloud
Computing paradigm has generated yet another kind of traﬃc which ooads computation
and storage to resource pools distributed in the network.
• advances in technology: several technical challenges must be addressed when proposing
any new architecture realization. Therefore, it is important to know the current, and to
speculate on the foreseeable, hardware and software toolset which may be leveraged to
address those challenges. For example, the scalability of a proposed routing approach
or a new naming system may look unfeasible according to the state of art. However,
a combination of technology advances and new algorithmic solutions may overcome this
barrier in the short term (e.g., when IPv6 was proposed, there existed no algorithms to
compute preﬁx lookups in microsecond for those longer IP addresses, later on, a binary
search on preﬁx lengths algorithm was invented [8]).
• multi-requirements network: the conception of the original Internet architecture had en-
visioned a limited-size research network rather than a globally deployed one. Hence, a
unique list of requirements was considered for the whole network. However, the diversity
of today's Internet created by the multitude of actors and trends of use inevitably leads
to a scenario where no ﬁt-all list can be conceived. Some requirements will apply to some
portions of the network meanwhile they will strain in others.
• trends of information consumption: today's Internet traﬃc is dominated by the access of
contents. According to the latest Cisco's traﬃc forecast [9], the expected traﬃc growth
will increase threefold over the next 4 years, raising the bar to 127-fold from 2005 to
2021. The busy-hour Internet traﬃc grows more rapidly than the average one, bringing up
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the phantom of the ﬂash crowd eﬀect. By 2021, traﬃc from wireless and mobile devices
will account for more than 63% of the the total Internet traﬃc. When looking at the
consumer traﬃc by subsegment, "Internet Video" and "Web, email and data" largely drive
the consumption.
Among the above factors, two issues deserve a particular attention since these have to be con-
stantly addressed to keep the Internet alive and operational: i) the increase of the global traﬃc
and ii) the prominent use of mobile devices to consume/provide data. Both factors fear the In-
ternet collapse because of the poorly scalable and resource demanding solutions, namely, infras-
tructure over-provisioning (as done, for example, with Content Delivery Networks) and network
handover mechanisms (e.g., mobile IP), which have been so far devised to deal with them.
On one hand, the same forecast [9] says that 70% of all Internet traﬃc will cross Content Delivery
Networks (CDNs) by 2021. CDNs consist of strategically deployed data centers to serve users
in the geographical vicinity. The main aim of CDNs is the reduction of the latency experienced
by end-users by bringing content copies closer to them. However, the service is a complex over-
lay solution which brings additional capital and operational costs, requires an agreement with
a CDN provider and a DNS redirection mechanism. On the other hand, Mobile IP [10] is to-
day's de facto standard to guarantee continuous connectivity despite mobility of host terminals.
The Mobile IP protocol is based on multiple software agents which perform either tunneling or
address translation. Although mobility is provided transparently to end-users, this approach
has several security issues, introduces triangulation routing problems and, of course, additional
unpredictable latency.
Many of the clean-slate Internet research proposals use a holistic approach to deal with the above
factors. That is, their design aims to fulﬁll several of the requirements (security, mobility, relia-
bility and availability, problem analysis, scalability, quality of service, economics [11]) for a global
network at the same time. However, factors and requirements are variegated and so generate a
complex interaction space. Hence, research projects usually put the main focus on one speciﬁc
issue and then build around that to address some other primary requirements. For example, the
Mobility project [12], funded by the NSF Future Internet Architecture (FIA) program, envisions
a network design to ease the mobility of terminals. Then, as direct consequence of centering the
design on the mobility requirement, other factors deserve immediate attention, likewise security
and trust models for the open wireless access, name resolution and storage-aware routing proto-
cols. Or yet another FIA project, the Expressive Internet Architecture (XIA) [13], mainly targets
simultaneous support for diverse communication entities (e.g., users, services, content), called
principals, meanwhile it enforces other properties like intrinsic security and ﬂexible addressing.
According to the actual large deployment and consequent usage of CDNs, any future Internet
architecture will mainly need to deal with large-scale content distribution. Yet, this mainstream
usage trend is sometimes either neglected or treated as secondary by most of the related research
projects. Instead, a content-oriented approach is taken by another branch of clean-slate Internet
research, called Information-Centric Networking (ICN). The ICN paradigm promotes the fore-
most role of the information in future network architectures. Among other design principles, ICN
designs aim to empower directly the network architecture with mechanisms (e.g., ubiquitous in-
network caching, content-oriented routing primitives) to eﬃciently support massive information
distribution. The resulting content-oriented networks feature properties to promisingly address
future Internet requirements and factors. Therefore, throughout the last decade, research on
ICN has gained considerable traction and produced important scientiﬁc insights into the design
of future networks.
The motivation and the general idea behind the ICN vision is presented in Sec. 1.1 where related
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research projects, tenets and research challenges of this paradigm are also outlined. Next, in Sec.
1.2 a speciﬁc instance of ICN is illustrated since it has been extensively target of study in this
work. Finally, Sec. 1.3 explains how some other latest research on networking is (and will be)
used to ease the deployment of and further experimentation on ICNs.
1.1 Content as ﬁrst-class citizen of the future Internet
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is a clean-slate approach to networking which has emerged
to better support the most prominent content distribution models in the Internet. In fact, the
current Internet architecture and the related set-of-protocols struggle to serve eﬃciently today's
massive production and consumption of multimedia contents through the global network. The
key cause for such ineﬃciency can be better explained by looking at the architecture hourglass
model depicted in Fig. 1.1. The Internet Protocol (IP), which lays at the waist of the hour-
glass, oﬀers a basic connection-less best-eﬀort service to the upper layers and accommodates
many lower diﬀerent layer-2 technologies. The basic service oﬀered by IP was meant in the early
design to inter-connect a variety of existing packet switching networks. Thus, for simplicity,
the IP narrow waist constitutes a datagram network, where packets are routed independently
based on the destination address carried in their header. The basic IP packet processing logic
mainly deals with hop-by-hop datagram forwarding according to pre-populated routing tables
from one source address to a destination one. Therein, in its simplest form, a datagram header
is agnostic to the payload content and, by consequence, does not provide information to perform
any application-speciﬁc forwarding optimization.
At the dawn of the Internet, the intended simplicity of the original IP datagram did not seem
too constraining. Moreover, additional datagram labeling mechanisms had been later devised
to meet potential generic traﬃc classiﬁcation requirements (e.g., the DiﬀServ protocol [14] to
diﬀerentiate quality of service in network traﬃc). However, despite the further reﬁnements, the
original datagram unit design still implies that sometimes thousands or millions of identical (i.e.,
containing the same application layer payload) IP packets may be carried needlessly on the same
path. Moreover, transferred data are hardly reusable after the end of a transport session, since
they have not been stored anywhere on the path and their security, if any, was tied to the speciﬁc
recipient providing them. Further, if either one or both communication endpoints move during
the data transfer, the transport session has to be kept or re-established for the transfer not to
be disrupted (by no surprise, the intricacies of protocols to support host mobility, like MobileIP,
stem from this last requirement).
The above observations seem to represent solid arguments for the design of a diﬀerent Internet
whose main focus is information more than communication endpoints. As the deﬁnition may sug-
gest, the main goal of ICN is to shift the focus of the current Internet architecture from 'where'
a certain information is stored to "what" the information is actually about. Hence, content1
itself becomes the ﬁrst-class citizen of the network. This would imply a shift in the semantics of
the datagram unit because that would need to convey some sort of indication about the packet
payload. This shift mainly aims at more eﬃcient content localization and distribution at the
network-level. Nevertheless, decoupling contents from speciﬁc sources also opens novel promis-
ing perspectives to rethink solutions to deal with other collateral issues: mobility of terminals,
IP addresses scarcity, security of data-exchanges and fast recovery mechanisms from network
disruptions.
1The terms Content, Information, Data are often used as synonyms in related literature, so we do that here
too.
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Figure 1.1  The hourglass model of today's Internet and the IP datagram structure.
A network architecture describes a "set of abstract principles for the technical design of proto-
cols and mechanisms for computer communications" [3]. Hence, an architecture deﬁnes design
principles which serve as guidelines for the technical design of the network itself. Obviously, an
architecture is a design philosophy and may lead to several technical instantiations. The design
of an ICN architecture is an open research question which has so far led to diﬀerent realizations.
An overview of some past and current research projects on ICN is given in Sec. 1.1.1. Common
goals of ICN proposals are listed in Sec. 1.1.2. Finally, advantages of deploying an ICN are
advocated in 1.1.3, while the major open challenges in the ﬁeld are illustrated in Sec. 1.1.4.
1.1.1 Research on Information-Centric Networking
The genesis of the research on ICN is hard to track back precisely since it should be fairly
attributed to ideas converged from several domains into a unique research area. A tentative
timeline of ICN research from the TRIAD project onwards is presented in [15]. However, the au-
thor does believe that a chronology should be diﬀerently sketched outlining the birth and growth
in parallel of some seminal ideas which made the soil fertile for the emergence of further more
structured research frameworks. So, he rather proposes classifying existing related literature and
research in three distinct epochs. The classiﬁcation is illustrated in Fig. 1.2.
The ﬁrst generation of research on ICN, whose research projects are here named "the ancestors",
includes four main works on the design of a more content-oriented Internet architecture. In a
certain sense, those works laid down the foundations for most of the further related research.
In fact, they had identiﬁed the primary goals (improving security and performance of content
distribution) and some key challenges (e.g., naming, routing and forwarding, security and trust
models) in the design of such a future network as well as suggested some preliminary solutions
later leveraged and reﬁned by the next ICN architectures. The ancestors are:
• Standford's TRIAD project [16]: in the early 2000s the TRIAD work [17] is often credited
to having pioneered the ﬁeld with the ﬁrst seminal proposal for a complete content-oriented
Internet architecture. TRIAD's authors feared the inadequacy of transparent web proxies,
CDNs and load balancing switches at web sites to implement content routing at the Internet
scale. Those existing solutions are often proprietary and not eﬃcient, further, violate some
architecture principles. Therefore, TRIAD proposed an IP-compatible "content layer" to
perform eﬃcient content routing to content replicas in the network.
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Figure 1.2  The genealogy of the research on ICN from TRIAD to the current days.
• PARC's Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [18]: this work was ﬁrst advertised at Google
[19] by Van Jacobson, and later on published in [20]. CCN treats content as the main
network primitive, so departing from the address-based routing model of IP. CCN aims
to improve content availability and security by devising a content-oriented level for the
thin waist of the Internet's hourglass model. The authors illustrate the new CCN layer-
3 protocol proposing packet formats and the router's forwarding plane. Further, they
implement an open source prototype of the CCN stack and show its eﬃciency for both ﬁle
transfer and point-to-point network protocols.
• Berkeley's Data-Oriented Named Architecture (DONA) [21]: DONA proposes a clean-
slate Internet to achieve persistence of names, availability and authentication for data and
services. The architecture mainly focuses on naming (using Self-Certifying Names) and
name resolution (made by anycast routing on names) to establish the three aforementioned
properties. DONA also uses ubiquitous caching and names lower in the network stack to
achieve routing to nearest copies. The related work presented in [21] acknowledges that
this proposal merges several early ideas in an coherent architecture.
• Carzaniga et al.'s Content-Based Networking (CBN) [22]: a theoretical framework for CBN,
which is proposed in [23], deﬁnes the required building blocks and primitives for a content-
oriented communication infrastructure. Content-based networks are meant to oﬀer better
support for several classes of applications where data-transfers are triggered by receivers' in-
terests without speciﬁc sender addresses. In modern networks, that communication model
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Table 1.1  The ancestors' problem deﬁnition and goals.
Project Main targets Main challenges
TRIAD to scale content delivery eﬃcient content
routing
CCNx to improve current network scalability, secu-
rity and performance
naming and content-
based security
DONA to achieve persistence of names, availability
and authentication of data
naming and name-
based network prim-
itives
CBN to support the services of a publish/subscribe
middleware with a new communication in-
frastructure
eﬃcient routing and
forwarding on novel
datagrams
is often achieved via content-oriented publish/subscribe middleware which, however, does
not scale well on large communication infrastructures [24]. Therefore, CBN mandates new
speciﬁc datagrams and functions on datagrams to be designed. As most pressing milestone,
the work on CBN tackles the imminent need to explore the design space of content-based
forwarding and routing algorithms [25, 26].
It should be recognized that at that early stage these works were not fully aligned on the same
set of goals. The diﬀerent aims of the ancestors projects are shown in Table 1.1. Nevertheless,
they had presented many similarities (e.g., the exigence of some kind of in-network storage,
name-based routing algorithms, name-resolution mechanisms) which were leveraged later by a
second generation of projects.
The "successors" are projects which build upon the directions and the problems identiﬁed by
the ancestors by analyzing technical solutions in more mature architectural frameworks. They
are not presented anymore as separate ellipses in Fig. 1.2 since they do not stand anymore
as fully separate projects. In fact, they can rather be grouped in macro categories which have
taken mutually exclusive decisions on some core design principles like naming and routing (for a
deﬁnition of those design principles see Sec. 1.1.2). On one hand, the PURSUIT project and its
predecessor PSIRP [27] propose a clean-slate Internet architecture implementing a receiver-driven
Publish-Subscribe paradigm. PURSUIT/PSIRP leverages the ﬂat identiﬁers naming system pro-
posed in DONA, but it features rendez-vous nodes to match publications to subscriptions and
topology-manager nodes to build forwarding paths for content delivery. Further, it enhances the
ﬂat identiﬁer names with the notion of scopes in order to organize the information distribution
in the network and improve its reachability. Or, the Network of Information (NetInf) architec-
ture proposed by the 4WARD/SAIL project [28] is based on a hybrid name-based routing and
name resolution scheme. NetInf provides access to named Data by either forwarding requests by
name or by querying a Name Resolution service or both. As PURSUIT/PSIRP, NetInf uses a
ﬂat namespace to achieve persistent and location-independent naming of contents. On the other
hand, architectures like NDN [29] (at the time of its inception, the academic fork of the PARC's
CCN) and Convergence [30] use a hierarchical human-readable namespace. Routing is done by
names in both architectures. NDN assumes routing tables are populated with aggregated name
preﬁxes by means of name-based variants of intra-AS and inter-AS routing protocols. Conver-
gence includes a hierarchical name resolution service, like in DONA, which registers preﬁx names
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advertised by content providers and can be queried to get routes to contents.
Finally, no precise naming schema has been deﬁned in CURLING which is the ICN architecture
proposed by the COMET project [31]. In CURLING, names are provided by a Content Res-
olution System (CRS) where publishers previously registered this information. With regard to
the name resolution and data routing, COMET uses a hybrid approach. Name resolution and
information localization use the CRS nodes which in turn set up the data routing path from the
source of information back to the original requester.
Yet, all the successors projects contributed to advancing the understanding of important tech-
nical challenges in the design of Information-Centric Networks. For example, they did research
on the scalability of the routing tables with diﬀerent naming schemas, on routing protocols and
forwarding mechanisms, on security properties and trust models, on novel content-oriented net-
work APIs.
The contributions made by the successors projects have fueled a third generation of projects
that are hereby named "The deployables". These projects (some of which are still ongoing at the
time of writing this manuscript) focus on both large-scale deployment of ICN prototypes and the
application-driven iterative reﬁnement of the respective architectures. Application scenarios of
this third generation include distribution of critical information in the aftermath of a disaster (the
Green ICN project [32]), commercial viable IP-over ICN deployment (the POINT project [33]),
the optimization of the transport of passengers and goods (the Bonvoyage project [34]), mobile
healthcare and building automation and management systems (the NDN Next-Phase [35]). This
newest generation of projects pursues an application-driven evolution of the ICN architectures
designed so far. The goal is testing ICN solutions/architectures against selected scenarios of use
and enhancing them accordingly in an iterative fashion. Further, this research phase aims at two
more targets: i) helping industry partners to develop Proofs of Concept of products and services
exploiting ICN, ii) deploying more experimental facilities, ideally test-beds at global-scale, to
advance the state of the research on ICN.
1.1.2 Design tenets
As illustrated in the previous section, past and ongoing research projects on ICN diﬀer in the
architectural solutions proposed, meanwhile they share several assumptions and goals. There-
fore, it is reasonably possible to identify a set of design principles which are valid across diﬀerent
ICN architectures. The author summarizes the principles in one sentence before providing an
in-depth deﬁnition for all of them: "Everything is information, Information is named, Names are
scoping/forwarding hints".
First, as the paradigm name suggests, the Information is at the core of every ICN architecture.
The term is used generically to identify any kind information which is exchanged among network
participants. Second, information needs persistent and unique names. Third, the names are to
be used across diﬀerent layers to improve the content localization and distribution.
Core principles of ICN are:
Naming of Information: in ICN, identiﬁers are associated to every piece of information
traversing the network. Those identiﬁers hold some important properties. They are unique.
They are independent of location, of source (e.g., original producer, in-network replica, reposi-
tory) providing them, and of the way the related data is retrieved. In general, their semantics,
if any, is opaque to the network layer.
There have been mainly two naming schemes adopted by existing ICN architectures: hierar-
chical human-readable names (HRN) and ﬂat self-certifying names (SCN). An example of both
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name types is given in Fig. 1.3. On one hand, HRNs are often represented as URIs made of a
sequence of variable length (mostly semantically meaningful) strings separated by a delimiter.
The advantages of HRNs is that they are easy-to-understand, semantically meaningful, easy
to aggregate (aggregation at large-scale of a similar naming scheme is done in today's DNS).
On the other hand, SCNs are meant to provide with the name itself the necessary information
to verify some Data's security properties. Hence, SCNs are often made out of the hash of the
content provider identity (e.g., the public key) concatenated by the hash of the content identiﬁer.
Figure 1.3  An example of both HRN and SCN.
The schemes hold diﬀerent properties and suﬀer from diﬀerent issues. Naming properties for
ICNs have been brilliantly outlined in [36] where HRNs and SCNs are compared in terms of se-
curity, scalability and ﬂexibility, which are important requirements for any Internet architecture.
Communication Model: ICN architectures pursue publish/subscribe models as the main
communication model in their networks. Thus, the data exchange between consumers and pro-
ducers of information is asynchronous. Among other properties, this model provides two main ad-
vantages which are leveraged by the architecture to implement a content-oriented data-exchange.
First, the model decouples senders and receivers in space and time. Second, the publish/subscribe
model gives more control both to the network, on how the information is stored and delivered,
and to the consumers, which can better specify what information they are interested in fetching.
Self-Secured Data or Data-Centric Security: ICNs data are stored independently from
speciﬁc network locations. Therefore, today's end-to-end security mechanisms (e.g., the Trans-
port Layer Security protocol) cannot be used to implement secure communication in those net-
works. Instead, security must be ascertained through the content itself since that can be stored
in and retrieved by any location in the network. To achieve that, every data must carry some
additional meta-data information which can be used to assess its security properties. This secu-
rity model usually requires a cryptographic technique applied to the name and the data itself.
For example, cryptographic signatures binding names and data can be used as small in-packet
anti-tamper integrity proofs. It must be told that the choice of a certain naming schema has
direct implications on the security.
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In-Network Storage/Caching: ICN promotes to store popular contents in the network.
For that purpose, some ICN routers are supposed to be equipped with local storage to perform
application-independent opportunistic caching of data. This capability will allow routers to serve
requests locally if they hold a copy of the related contents in their caches. Obviously, in-network
caching contribute both to improve data-availability and to reduce data-delivery delay. The
beneﬁts of using in-network caches seems to be further supported by the evidence that content
requests in today's Internet exhibit a high spatial and temporal locality [37].
Application-Program Interfaces: an ICN mandates a new communication API for ap-
plications to interact with the network layer. In fact, today's most dominant interface to the
network, BSD's Sockets, does not ﬁt a data-oriented model. A socket binds an application to
both a speciﬁc protocol and an endpoint. As advocated by previous work, a perfect network
abstraction should break spatial and temporal bounds [38]. Any ICN layer-3 protocol should
expose to upper-layers applications primitives to publish and retrieve data. Diﬀerent proposals
have been advanced so far. They diﬀer yet they usually refer to contents by name and may also
take additional parameters to deﬁne scope of publications and/or ﬁltering criteria for searches.
Routing and Forwarding: in ICN, data-oriented algorithms and protocols are used to
route requests and responses in the network. The related mechanisms are strictly tied to the
naming system adopted by the architecture and may demand additional components, e.g., a name
resolution system which converts object identiﬁers to network locators. A cornerstone element
of these protocols for ICNs is that they should be designed to allow the network to locate and
fetch nearby copies of the requested contents. Sometimes this requirement is achieved on the ﬂy
inside the network by adaptive forwarding mechanisms, while other times there are omniscient
network components which translate content identiﬁers to network locators.
The above principles have been unanimously stated in several related works [39, 15], however,
the author deﬁnes two more novel principles worth outlining:
• In-Network Capabilities: all the ICN architectures envision a "more sophisticated" pro-
cessing done at layer-3 which may also require the existence of additional components, e.g.,
local caches in routers or name resolution agents.
• Cross-Layer Information: ICNs have architecture components like names or identiﬁers
which are carried across diﬀerent layers. The components' semantics serves diﬀerent pur-
poses according to the layer where that is processed. This stems from the ICN objective to
implement generic network services yet meeting application-speciﬁc requirements. This is
a shift from the current IP model where, for example, the BSD socket abstraction requires
applications to specify endpoints and select speciﬁc transport protocols. Those two pieces
of information do not allow applications to specify any requirement beyond a small set of
transport layer options. Conversely, in ICN architectures, names often specify requirements
the network layer can build services upon. For example, names can embed access control
scheme semantics in NDNs, or yet, they can scope information in PSIRP networks.
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1.1.3 Beneﬁts
On the one hand, detractors of this network revolutionary paradigm often claim that indeed ICN
does not oﬀer many advantages beyond the ones produced by in-network caching of contents
[40, 36]. On the other hand, advocates of the ICN postulate and research on scenarios to show-
case the potential manifold beneﬁts of a data-oriented architecture. Hereby follow some of the
improvements that an Information-Centric Network could bring:
Scalable vendor-free cost-eﬀective content delivery: the delivery of content across the In-
ternet has been improved by means of several content distribution mechanisms like Web caching,
Content Delivery Networks, carrier network Transparent Caching. These solutions have led to
the deployment of storage resources owned by diﬀerent operators across diﬀerent network seg-
ments. Hence, they are suboptimal in terms of required resources, management costs and further
they show low or no interoperability. Instead, ICN "democratizes" the content distribution free-
ing the content providers from buying speciﬁc services from the CDN operators and from relying
on the ad-hoc infrastructure deployed by the ISPs in order to achieve an eﬃcient distribution of
their contents. By implementing content distribution features at the network level, ICNs breaks
the current monopoly of CDN operators, ISPs and big content providers. Though this scenario
calls for new accounting schemes for ISPs and content providers [41].
New security/mobility models: by decoupling senders and receivers in space and time,
ICN opens new security and mobility scenarios. With regard to the security, ICN ﬁnally untan-
gles Internet from the authentication of every sender, receiver and channel between them. In
fact, ICN delineates a security model where every content has to be secured independently of
the source providing and/or storing it. The ICN content-oriented security model theoretically
avoids speciﬁc nodes to be target of an attack because of the absence of addresses. With regard
to the mobility, ICN applications do not necessarily need to track down mobile terminals since
every data-exchange is only based on a named content. Freeing the applications from the notion
of topological locators radically changes the layer in the stack where to deal with the mobility
of consumer and producer nodes [42]. In ICNs, content availability is determined by the network.
Reduction of middleware: most of today's applications are data/service-oriented and based
on a publish/subscribe interaction scheme [43]. Those applications do not deal with the security,
the performance and the reliability of the data transfer which are delegated to the lower layers
in the network stack. This implies that from the application layer to the network one there often
exists some middleware mapping between those diﬀerent layer abstractions. The adoption of
an Information-Centric Networking would reduce the intricacies of those in-between translation
mechanisms by means of i) novel content-oriented APIs for application developers to access net-
work services, ii) semantics-rich content identiﬁers whose expressiveness may be leveraged down
to the network layer to provide several services beyond eﬃcient content delivery.
Glue for the Internet fringes: it seems that a uniﬁed system to inter-connect diﬀerent
Internet-of-Things (IoT) silo solutions is still missing. The proliferation of ad-hoc solutions
has been partially conﬁned by the emergence of a few unifying standards, e.g., the 6LoWPAN
protocol. However, the IoT ecosystem still proliferates with diverse solutions as a proof that
"the TCP/IP stack is not a good ﬁt to the IoT environment" [44]. The data-centric communi-
cation models of ICNs oﬀer promising support to address the challenges of data retrieval delay,
resource-constrained devices and intermittent network connections, in many IoT use cases [45].
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1.1.4 Open challenges
Beyond potential beneﬁts, the design and the deployment of Information-Centric Networks raise
numerous challenges too. The main technical challenges for an Information-Centric Networking
are hereby outlined, while a more comprehensive summary can be found in [46].
Naming: the main purpose of a name in ICNs is to provide persistent unique location-
independent identiﬁers for contents. Meanwhile, a name can be used to create a veriﬁable
binding between the content and the name itself. This binding can be used to verify that the
content received corresponds to the one requested by that name (the literature on ICN refers
to this property as content integrity). Therefore, the choice of a naming scheme for an ICN
inﬂuences design choices related to security and trust models. Sec. 1.1.2 reported about the two
main approaches to naming in ICNs: hierarchical human-readable names (HRNs) and ﬂat self-
certifying ones (SCNs). Those schemas exhibit diﬀerent properties in terms of the implications
on the security and the routing. Both schemas enable data-integrity and data-authentication
mechanisms, even though, they do this by means of diﬀerent solutions.
Scalability of the routing system: as raised in [36], any ICN architecture should be able
to deal with a large number of objects. Conservative estimates suggest 1012 objects. That order
of magnitude would have a direct impact on the size of the routing tables in ICN-enabled routers.
Today, routing tables must be relatively smaller, roughly 106, for IP routers to operate at packet
speeds in certain network segments. By consequence, the mismatch between size manageable by
today's routing technologies and foreseeable ICN scenarios must be solved somehow. Classless
InterDomain Routing (CIDR) has taught us that aggregation could be a viable solution to reduce
the size of routing tables. Along this line, a similar aggregation of domain names in Domain
Name Servers suggests HRNs could be shrunk to generate relatively small ICN routing tables.
Nevertheless, the choice to adopt HRNs could limit caching eﬀectiveness by always routing re-
quests towards the original providers. This argument was ﬁrst raised in [36], however, since then,
adaptive forwarding techniques2 have been included in some ICNs [48], which could potentially
neutralizes this side-eﬀect. In fact, an adaptive forwarding behavior would contribute to contents
be fetched through and cached across diﬀerent network paths to a set of content sources.
Security and privacy: ICN promotes a content-oriented security model where no secure
channels exist between users and content providers. Implications on the security and privacy
models naturally arise from this design choice. This novel security model immunizes the network
against some well-known vulnerabilities which were caused by the Internet's host-centric commu-
nication model. However, ICN introduces novel components and features which open new attack
surfaces. For example, this manuscript thoroughly analyzes the security vulnerabilities of a class
of ICNs performing stateful forwarding. Furthermore, neither source nor destination addresses
are included in ICN packets, hence, parties involved in a data-exchange beneﬁt from anonymity.
However, the name of and other information about every requested content are available to the
all the nodes processing the related packets. This generates privacy issues on multiple dimen-
sions: in-network caches, contents, names and signatures [49]. The revealed information can
2An adaptive forwarding plane [47] can explore multi-path routes in response to speciﬁc network conditions or
as a simple probing mechanism to ﬁnd more eﬃcient paths.
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be exploited for diﬀerent purposes like censorship, tracking users' behaviors, non-repudiation.
Therefore, ICN proposals have to be carefully designed to support better privacy. A good survey
of the related work identifying risks of and proposing mitigation mechanisms for privacy issues
in ICNs can be found in [50].
Caching: there are four main challenges to achieve ubiquitous in-network caching. The ﬁrst
one relates to the decision of which nodes are eligible to cache contents, which is referred to the
cache placement problem. The second one relates to the distribution of contents to deployed
caches, which is referred to content placement. The third one deals with the eﬃcient routing of
content requests to the closest caches, which is referred to request-to-cache problem. The fourth
one relates to the policy to empty and/or replace contents when there is no more space in cache,
which is referred to the cache replacement policy. The above challenges are usually addressed
according to performance/gain the caching techniques aim to achieve. Among the goals, delivery
latency, cache utilization and network load are usually considered. Some of the performance
indicators are conﬂicting, thus, some caching techniques prioritize one metric over another one.
Deployment: although they may be considered of secondary issue in the early investiga-
tion of a clean-slate networking paradigm, activities like prototyping, simulating, testing are of
foremost importance to validate and explore the implications of a network architecture design.
The goal is even more challenging since the needed experimentation should happen at large scale
and under realistic traﬃc conditions. A deﬁnition of such an experimental facility for clean-slate
research on networking is provided in [11]. Current deployment challenges for ICNs include the
design of ICN-compliant forwarding elements, the set-up of large-scale testbeds, standardiza-
tion activities, solutions to achieve integration with and backward compatibility to the existing
infrastructure.
1.2 A primer on Content-Centric/Named-Data Networking
Among the available ICN realizations, CCN and its academic twin NDN have achieved a certain
degree of maturity since their inception. Today, both ICN platforms and protocol speciﬁcations
are widely used as reference by the research community to further investigate challenges and
opportunities in the Information-Centric Networking arena. This kind of architecture has been
mainly investigated in the context of this work, hence, it is better illustrated in this section
to help the reader familiarize with the architecture components and details which will be often
referenced in the rest of the manuscript. The rest of the section is organized as follows. Sec. 1.2.1
illustrates a timeline of both projects to give some historical perspective about the development
of the architecture. Sec. 1.2.2 presents the architecture and describes core components like
naming, the routing and forwarding plane, security and privacy, applications. Finally, Sec. 1.2.3
outlines the current status of the technology with current and future research directions working
on the reﬁnement of the architecture.
1.2.1 Historical notes
The Content-Centric Networking (CCN) architecture is the outcome of a research project on
ICN launched at the Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in 2007. The idea behind
CCN was anticipated through a speech given at Google in 2006 [19] by Van Jacobson, who had
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joined PARC to lead this project. PARC's CCN proposes a communication architecture based
on named content chunks rather than on named hosts. The vision and the design principles
were stated in the seminal paper [20]. PARC made the project public on a website in 2009
when it also released an open-source software implementation of the proposed protocols to build
content-centric networks, called CCNx. Since then, the PARC's CCN project has devoted a cer-
tain eﬀort to document the CCNx reference implementation (by periodically releasing protocols
speciﬁcations and software bundles) and promoted its adoption to advance the status of research
on content-oriented networks.
The original CCN architecture has been iteratively reﬁned over years of research on architec-
tural challenges and applications design done by PARC and the NDN's consortium. A precise
timeline of the CCN/NDN project is out of the scope of this work. Nevertheless, the rest of this
section tracks the evolution of the two siblings architectures through some milestones which are
illustrated in Fig. 1.4.
Figure 1.4  Timeline of Named-Data Networking and Content-Centric Networking projects.
Shortly after the release of the open-source software implementation, the ccnx source code was
leveraged for research by a large consortium of US universities running one of the ﬁve successful
NSF Future Internet Architecture (FIA) projects, i.e., the Named-Data Networking (NDN) [51].
Around October 2012, the CCNx and the NDN projects got separated. First, a few months after
the separation, PARC parted away from the NDN team and stated its design goals in a roadmap
document for the release of CCNx 1.0 [52]. Then, in August 2013, the NDN consortium created
a fork of the ccnx code. The separation has been most likely driven by irreconcilable divergences
in design choices (see the Appendix A for the "Diﬀerences between CCN and NDN"). Since the
separation, CCNx and NDN have diverged on several features and there exists no comprehensive
report documenting those3.
On one hand, PARC has contributed to the creation of important drafts which have been adopted
as working documents from the IETF ICNRG [54, 55]. In 2017, Cisco announced the acquisition
of the CCN platform from PARC with the goal "to foster convergence of various dialects of
ICN (namely CCN and NDN) into a single harmonized version of ICN, promoting wider and
faster adoption of ICN-based solutions required to solve future networking needs" [56]. Cisco
has merged the acquired CCNx code with other of its contributions and integrated all of it into
the Community ICN (cICN) [57] open-source project hosted by the Linux Foundation.
3Since July 2016 the ICN research community has committed to precisely document and harmonize those
diﬀerences via the creation of an IETF-ICNRG work item [53].
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On the other hand, the NDN project has so far gathered together in a consortium roughly 30
members equally spread across founding universities, industrial partners and other academic
institutions. Undeniably, the NDN consortium has been able to foster a vibrant ecosystem of
research on future Internet architectures beyond the NDN architecture itself. Since 2014 the
NDN consortium has been pursuing more research on and validation of the NDN architecture
over the key areas of Health IT and Cyberphysical Systems under the umbrella of a next-phase
NSF's award [35].
1.2.2 The Named-Data Networking Architecture
Communication in NDN is achieved asynchronously by means of two diﬀerent packets: Interest
and Data. An Interest represents a request from a certain consumer for the network to fetch
some content or access some service, while a Data contains the content/service itself. Neither
Interests nor Data carry any address, since both packets are named instead and the names are
used to route them across the network. The communication is receiver-driven; hence, Interests
trigger Data to be fetched and forwarded downstream to consumers. Every NDN router holds
the three following main data-structures:
• Content Store (CS): the router's local cache used to opportunistically store Data packets.
• Pending Interest Table (PIT): a table recording forwarded Interests which have not been
consumed by any Data yet.
• Forwarding Information Base (FIB): a name-based forwarding table performing component-
wise longest preﬁx matching and determining output interfaces to forward Interests.
An illustration of an Interest-Data exchange in NDN/CCN routers is depicted in Fig. 1.5 where
the content of a router's data-structures during an Interest-Data exchange is showed too. The
consumer Alice expresses an Interest to fetch the ﬁle "ndn-protocols.pdf" held by Bob. Alice's
Interest traverses in sequence the routers R1-R2-R3. At each router the following operations
take place. First, the router checks if it holds a local copy of the requested content by looking
up its CS. If so, a copy of the content is sent downstream through the interface where the
Interest was received. If not, the Interest is looked up to the PIT to check if there are similar
pending requests. If a PIT entry for the same name exists, then the Interest is dropped while
the PIT entry is updated if the interface has not been seen yet. If the router does not have
any PIT entry, then the FIB is looked up to forward the Interest to a next hop upstream. The
FIB lookup consists of a Longest-Preﬁx Match (LPM) on the name components. This LPM
selects the FIB entry with more name components over all the matching entries. The matching
FIB entry provides one or more output interfaces out of which the Interest can be forwarded.
If there is a matching FIB entry, the Interest is forwarded and a new PIT entry tracking the
Interest name and the incoming interface is created. The status of R2's PIT after the Interest
is processed is reported in Fig. 1.5 and it consists of one entry with the Interest name as key
and the incoming interface as value. Once a Data packet is found, e.g., when Alice's Interest
reaches Bob, that is forwarded downstream on the reverse path by following the respective PIT
entries. At each router, processing of Data consists of checking if the Data is solicited (that is,
corresponding to any PIT entry), possibly forwarding downstream and/or caching. Unsolicited
Data are dropped. Solicited Data are forwarded out the interfaces recorded in the corresponding
PIT entries. Further, a solicited Data consumes the related PIT entry, meaning that the PIT
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entry is deleted after the Data packet is forwarded. Caching of the data packet may happen,
however, it depends on the router's caching policy and available resources, e.g., free storage
space. So, R2 will have a new cache record for the Data content and the PIT entry previously
set by the Interest is deleted since the related Data has been forwarded downstream.
The basic workﬂow described above can be amended by the presence of a Strategy Component. A
forwarding strategy is a piece of software logic which may perform adaptive forwarding decisions
after the FIB lookup.
Figure 1.5  Interest-Data exchange in an NDN network.
Packet format
The current packet format for NDN Interest and Data packets is the outcome of an iterative
reﬁnement process old as the research project itself. The design of the NDN packet format is
driven by a set of requirements: universality/elasticity, extensibility and process eﬃciency [58].
When requirements conﬂict, they are sorted by priority. For example, the packet format is made
of many variable length ﬁelds which provide ﬂexibility but at the price of an increase of the
packet processing time.
The general structure of Interest and Data packets is illustrated in Fig. 1.6. All the packet
ﬁelds in Interest and Data follow the variable-length Type-Length-Value (TLV) encoding spec-
iﬁed in [59]. The Name ﬁeld, present in both Interest and Data, is made of a variable number
of TLV ﬁelds each containing a single name segment (see the following "naming" subsection).
The full name of a Data packet should also contain a ﬁnal digest component within the Implic-
itSha256DigestComponent ﬁeld. However, this implicit digest may appear in an Interest and is
never included in Data packet explicitly. An Interest must contain a randomly-generated 32 bit
nonce too. In fact, the combination of the Name and a Nonce uniquely identiﬁes an Interest and
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thus detects possible looping ones. Between the Name and the Nonce, an Interest may include
Selectors. Selectors are optional ﬁelds which can be used to either fetch or avoid to fetch speciﬁc
contents. At the end of the packet, an Interest may also include two other optional ﬁelds called
Guiders. Guiders indicate how far, in the Scope ﬁeld, and for how long, in the InterestLifetime
ﬁeld, an Interest may propagate.
A Data packet may contain some meta information following the Name in the MetaInfo ﬁeld.
That meta-information speciﬁes the type of content (e.g., simple payload or public key or link
object), the validity time for this Data and the identiﬁer of the ﬁnal block in a sequence of data
chunks. The MetaInfo ﬁeld is immediately followed by the payload. Finally, a Data always
includes a Signature block made of two TLVs. Those ﬁelds, namely the SignatureInfo and the
SignatureValue, contain respectively a signature description and the actual bits of the signature.
Figure 1.6  Format of Interest and Data packets from the slides presented by A. Afanasyev at
the Jan17 ICNRG Interim Meeting.
Naming
Names are a cornerstone of NDN. Names exhibit two main properties by design: network opac-
ity and structured hierarchy. First, NDN names are opaque to the network. In fact, routers
understand names structure for forwarding purposes but they are agnostic to any upper-layer
semantics. This property was meant to guarantee names and the network layer to evolve inde-
pendently. This desired opacity allows applications to deﬁne speciﬁc name conventions without
aﬀecting the basic forwarding operations in the network. Second, NDN names are hierarchically
structured. This has a twofold objective. Hierarchies can be exploited to achieve the scalability
of the routing system through aggregation, as already discussed in Sec. 1.1.2. Further, the
structure of a name can be leveraged to embed conventions in it, e.g., in the order of the name
components. NDN names are often represented likewise today's omnipresent Web URLs. They
are human-readable variable-length strings separated by instances of a certain delimiter (e.g.,
the forward-slash '/'). The name of some headlines on ccn (a), of a segment of a video clip on
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youtube (b), of the command to switch oﬀ some lights in one of the computer science department
rooms of the university of Luxembourg (c) could respectively look like:
(a) ndn:/cnn.com/2018/04/13/news/economy/us-tpp-trade-trump/index.html
(b) ndn:/youtube.com/videos/DaveMatthewsBand-IfOnly/1/32
(c) ndn:/uni.lu/cs-building/2nd/A103/switch-oﬀ/light/sensor2
There are two more clariﬁcations often made with regard to names in NDN. The ﬁrst one is about
name uniqueness. Indeed, names must be unique only when they refer to globally addressable
data. For example, the ccn news and the youtube video in (a) e (b) may need to have globally
unique names. Otherwise, when names only refer to objects within a certain scope, their global
uniqueness is not required anymore. For example, the name of the command in (c) could be
simply understood by routers within the University of Luxembourg campus network.
Finally, since the research on NDN started, the architecture was meant neither to advocate nor to
manage any speciﬁc namespace. Nevertheless, the exploration of namespaces driven by diﬀerent
applications' needs has suggested name conventions which may improve the content localization
and delivery. Therefore, a set of generic naming principles have been ﬁnally implemented in
software libraries for the NDN.
Routing and Forwarding
In NDN, routing and forwarding is based on names. At a ﬁrst glance, this approach solves a
series of problems aﬀecting the current IP routing architecture: NAT traversal, mobility, address
exhaustion and management. However, it also introduces notable challenges. The rest of this
section tries to summarize both aspects.
NDN guards the separation of routing and forwarding planes. Name preﬁxes are exchanged
through routing protocols and kept in forwarding tables (FIBs) by NDN routers. Further, at
the data-plane, NDN leverages per-Interest state in routers and speciﬁc Interest packet ﬁelds to
support loop-less multi-path routing. Security of routing is improved with NDN for three main
reasons: i) all data packets, including routing announcements, are signed so preventing the dis-
semination of fake information in the routing plane, ii) the multipath capabilities allow routers
to detect and circumvent security threat in the network, e.g., preﬁx hijacking , iii) because of
the absence of addresses, no single speciﬁc recipient can be attacked.
Nevertheless, routing in NDN raises some challenges too. First, an unbounded namespace can
generate a large number of routing entries which must indeed ﬁt in routing tables whose size must
stay limited for scalability reasons. Second, it is not clear how a multi-path routing protocol
should intelligently support forwarding on diﬀerent paths. In theory, this capability would be
beneﬁcial; yet, the implications are not fully understood.
NDN radically changes today's forwarding plane logic. In IP networks, all the forwarding deci-
sions are taken by routing protocols and forwarding in the data-plane is merely done by following
the routing table entries. While NDN routers keep datagram state which enables adaptive be-
haviors in the forwarding plane and exonerates routers from certain tasks. More in detail, routers
may use every PIT entry to store information about the related forwarded Interest (e.g., Interest
arrival time) and measure some relative performance (e.g., the time for the Data packet to be
received). Those measurements can possibly help adjust the forwarding behavior to the network
conditions. Beyond the basic components described in Sec. 1.2.2, each NDN router has also a
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Forwarding Strategy module containing customizable forwarding behaviors. This module even-
tually makes forwarding decisions for every Interest packet.
The adaptive forwarding capabilities of NDN routers constitute a promising tool to detect, among
the others, packet losses, network congestion, broken links and to measure packet delivery per-
formance [48]. Nevertheless, forwarding variable length names instead of ﬁxed size IP addresses
requires a re-engineering of today's forwarding devices. In fact, NDN prototypes must be able
to sustain line rates over tables supporting millions and even billions of names.
It must be said that such an enhanced forwarding plane implies a rethink of the role of the rout-
ing protocols in NDN networks [60]. The adaptive forwarding plane may overcome short term
network churns without relying on the convergence of the upper routing protocol. Therefore, a
less stringent requirement for quick convergence in routing protocols allows to explore routing
protocols which were thought to be unsuitable before.
In-Network Storage
NDN Data packets carry names and signatures, so their integrity and validity can be assessed
independently from the source producing them. This implies they can be cached in routers'
Content Stores (CSes) to serve further requests for the same data. An NDN router's CS may
be considered analogous to an IP router's local packet buﬀer, except that buﬀered IP packets
cannot be reused while buﬀered Data packets can be.
On one hand, in-network caching of both static and dynamic contents (e.g., a live-stream video)
provide advantages. Cached static content can be leveraged to reduce the delivery time to con-
sumers as well as the load on content producers and network links. Cached dynamic content can
be leveraged by network for multicast communications or retransmissions after packet losses. On
the other hand, cached contents raise several privacy issues, since any router can infer sensitive
information about those [49].
Furthermore, the NDN architecture supports an additional form of shared persistent storage,
namely a repository, which has been developed to answer a common need among diﬀerent dis-
tributed applications. A repository represents a shared data-set which needs to be synchronized
among distributed participants. A repository, which includes a list of namespaces, is essentially
a data-set of contents. This storage, which is usually more persistent and larger-volume than a
CS, has been used so far to support ﬁles or keys sharing.
Finally, the NDN community is currently investigating diﬀerent storage models, ﬁle-system or
database like, to design standard method for applications to discover, trust and write to diﬀerent
kinds of persistent storage in the network.
Security and Privacy
The NDN comes with built-in security since a mandatory signature binds the name to the con-
tent in every Data packet. Therefore, once a Data is emitted in the network and is signed by the
producer private key, its integrity is guaranteed and the content cannot be tampered. In fact,
the signature and some additional information about the publisher identity (see the Data packet
format illustrated in Sec. 1.2.2) can be used by consumers to verify the Data provenance too.
In this model, the trust is decoupled from the network and is left to applications to authenticate
entities and grant those with privileges to perform operations.
The robustness of the NDN architecture can be theoretically evaluated against Internet's well-
known Denial-Of-Service (DoS) attacks. A seminal analysis of both resilience to existing attacks
and architecture-speciﬁc vulnerabilities was presented in [61]. NDN is resilient to the attacks
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targeting speciﬁc network endpoints, since it has no notion of address. Hence, attacks which
ﬂood victims with traﬃc to saturate their resources, e.g., TCP SYN ﬂooding attacks, cannot be
carried out. Furthermore, attacks carried out by compromised routers advertising invalid routes,
e.g., black-holing via preﬁx hijacking [47], can be detected and circumvented by the NDN's ada-
pative forwarding plane.
Nevertheless, some inherent NDN features can be leveraged by potential attackers to mount
novel DoS attacks. In fact, the architecture has so far showed to be vulnerable to attacks which
capitalize on per-packet state and storage in NDN routers. In particular, routers can be over-
ﬂowed with malicious requests aiming to stop them from serving legitimate requests. Those
malicious requests aim to occupy routers' available resources, mainly the PIT space. This at-
tack is commonly identiﬁed with the term Interest Flooding Attack and is extensively covered
in Chapter 3. A second kind of NDN-speciﬁc threat relates to contents cached by routers. Data
packets are all signed, so their validity can be ascertained by signature veriﬁcation. However,
line-rate signature veriﬁcation of every Data is technically impracticable in routers. Moreover,
even though consumers can verify signatures and so detect fake content, they do not have mean
to ask routers to ﬂush some contents from their caches. The two above conditions favor attackers
to pollute routers' caches with fake content which is both fetched by consumers and stored in
network caches. This attack is commonly referred to Content Poisoning [62].
With regard to privacy, some NDN features enhance some privacy aspects. For instance, the ab-
sence of addresses makes impossible to identify source and destination entities of a communication
in any point of the network. Nevertheless, the presence of caches and the use of human-readable
names may reveal information about the requested Data. Indeed, NDN suﬀers from the same
general privacy issues other Information-Centric architectures are aﬀected with, which have been
brieﬂy described in 1.1.4. In fact, the semantic correlation between names and contents can be
exploited to unveil or guess the payload of Data packets by only looking at names. Then, this
information can be benignly used to proﬁle users' requests or maliciously to censor some traf-
ﬁc. Further, cached contents are not encrypted by default. Thus, it is the responsibility of the
content producer to prevent the content from being eavesdropped. However, the latter task is
not easy, since plain cryptography would hinder the usefulness of the in-network caching for the
encrypted contents.
Transport Layers?
The NDN architecture does not foresee any transport-layer protocol since most of the services
provided by that layer have been spread across diﬀerent other components. Usually a transport
protocol builds upon a network protocol to provide delivery from a process on a machine to
another process on a diﬀerent machine with a certain reliability. Further, a transport layer pro-
vides abstractions to the applications to use the implemented delivery services. In the following,
typical services implemented in a transport protocol (see Chapter 6 of [63]) are analyzed in the
context of the NDN architecture.
Addressing - In IP networks, there are Transport Service Access Points (TSAPs), i.e.,
port numbers, which work as transport addresses software processes can listen to. Port num-
bers are meant to distinguish multiple transport processes on the same network address. This
functionality in NDN can be achieved via names. In fact, conventions can be applied to
name components so that Interests are delivered to the appropriate applications. For example,
ndn://uni.lu/CSF/s1/pandora/ and ndn://uni.lu/CSF/s1/navi/ could be used to demultiplex
the communication to two diﬀerent processes, named pandora and navi, hosted on the s1 server
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in the Computer Science Faculty (CSF) of the University of Luxembourg. Similarly, NDN would
also allow programmers to replicate the idea of a portmapper process which already exist in
today's operating systems. That is, a dedicated process which is reachable by a well-deﬁned
standard name and can be contacted by requests that do not know a TSAP in advance.
Connection Establishment and Release - there are no ﬁxed destinations in NDN, so no
persistent connection between two endpoints must be established and then released to achieve
data exchanges. This alleviates all the related problems faced by the design of the TCP protocol,
to name a few, the wrapping of sequence numbers in the establishment of a connection or the
two-army problem of releasing a connection.
Error and Flow Control - Error control refers to a mechanism verifying Data are delivered
without errors. Flow Control is a mechanism meant to impede fast senders to overload slow re-
ceivers. In NDN, the former is guaranteed by signatures carried by every Data packet which can
be veriﬁed at the receiver to assess the packet integrity. The latter is somehow natively smoothed
by the receiver-driven communication pattern and by PIT entries which can be consumed only
by a single Data packet.
Congestion Control - Congestion control mechanisms deal with machines sending too many
packets and too quickly in the network since this sort of behavior can cause network congestion
and by consequence performance degradation. Although congestion occurs at routers, it is under
the responsibility of both transport and network protocols to avoid it. Therefore, in IP networks,
mechanisms to control congestion are implemented at both layers (for example, the Explicit Con-
gestion Notiﬁcation (ECN) ﬂag bits in the IP header and the Additive Increase Multiplicative
Decrease (AIMD) control law of the TCP protocol). Network congestion is a phenomenon that
persists even in NDN networks. Nevertheless, since traditional congestion control mechanisms
are designed for host-to-host connections, those cannot be directly leveraged by the connection-
less NDN architecture. Moreover, the design of congestion control mechanisms for NDN has to
take into account additional factors like in-network caching and multi-path forwarding. There
have been so far several proposals of congestion control algorithms for NDN, a summary of the
related work can be found in [64].
API to the application layer - A proposal of a Consumer-Producer API for NDN exists
and was ﬁrst presented in a technical report in 2014 [65] and then reﬁned in [66]. Although the
deﬁnition of this API is an ongoing process driven by the design of new applications, the current
one already sets out two main requirements. First, the data transfer is controlled by properties of
the namespace. Second, some Consumer and Producer requirements may be really diﬀerent. So,
the current NDN API deﬁnes two diﬀerent programming abstractions: a Consumer context and
a Producer one. The consumer context assists consumer applications to fetch contents under
a certain preﬁx name. While the producer context assists producer applications to perform
data publishing under a certain preﬁx name. Both contexts have options which can be used by
applications to deﬁne the parameters of the data transfer. For example, consumers may want to
specify Interest selector ﬁelds or Interest retransmission policies; instead, producers may want
to specify algorithms and key size for the signature of Data packets. Both contexts also supply
callback functions to notify about events they may trigger.
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1.2.3 Ongoing and future development
During the ﬁrst four years of the NDN's life, the research community had focused to address more
fundamental questions like naming, scalable routing and forwarding on names, content-oriented
security models [67]. Those diﬀerent research questions were addressed within a consistent ar-
chitectural framework. After that, throughout the next two years of the Next-Phase NSF award
[35], the research on NDN focused on the validation and the reﬁnement of the conceived archi-
tecture on diﬀerent network environments through the design of several key applications.
The explored network environments were enterprise building automation and management sys-
tems (as test-case, the large Siemens building monitoring system deployed at the UCLA university
facilities [68]) and mobile health (as test-case, the Open mHealth non-proﬁt patient-centric open
platform to share clinical data [69]). Those environments had been selected to address two of
the national priorities of the NSF, namely Health IT and Cyber-physical systems. With regard
to the application design, the fruition of digital media through mobile devices like smartphones,
laptops, vehicles, a.k.a. Mobile Multimedia, was selected. Both network environments and appli-
cations have been chosen since they characterize environments and communication patterns that
a data-centric architecture could serve better than the current host-based TCP/IP architecture.
Those use cases have improved the status of the NDN architecture on diﬀerent aspects with a
special focus on namespace design, name-based access control, trust management, distributed
synchronization of data-sets, routing and forwarding, congestion control. In the meantime, this
phase of research has also outlined open issues which still deserve more investigation, e.g., pro-
ducer mobility support [70], encryption-based access control [71], a distributed always-on lookup
service [72].
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1.3 ICN enablers
Running ICN protocols in today's networks would require either to have all the network equip-
ment to be "ICN aware" or to design an overlay network upon the Internet's TCP/IP protocol
suite. The former scenario is quite unlikely to happen in the near future since a forklift upgrade
of a large fraction of the deployed network equipment on a global scale is literally no feasible. The
second scenario requires statically conﬁgured IP tunnels necessary to implement ICN services
in the overlay network which, by the way, imposes a certain shift from the original vision of a
native in-network support of the ICN functionality. Overall, this barrier to upgrade or replace
the existing infrastructure, and the consequent frustration of a possibly very long, even never-
happening, deployment contribute to generate some strong fear of impracticality about the ICN
paradigm.
Nevertheless, over the last decade research on computer networks has produced technologies
which can enable ICN deployments in a short term. In particular, the Software Deﬁned Net-
working (SDN) [73] paradigm has changed the way today's networks are designed and managed.
The SDN introduces the separation of the control plane from the data-plane in forwarding el-
ements like switches and routers4. The former runs the logic which decides how to handle the
network traﬃc. The latter operates the forwarding of packets based on the decision made by the
former. With SDN, a single software running in the control-plane can control the data-plane of
multiple devices via standard Application Program Interfaces (APIs).
Today, the de facto standard SDN API is OpenFlow (OF) [74], which is supported by many
products across diﬀerent network vendors. The OF API follows a programming model where
switches hold tables of packet forwarding rules. In the most basic form, each rule has a matching
pattern and a list of actions which can be associated to the table entry. Actions implement
protocol-speciﬁc packet editing operations and forwarding decisions. Actions are executed on a
packet when that matches the corresponding rule. OF does not dictate how control plane pro-
grams should be written. However, SDN and OF have allowed operators to write control-plane
programs so to address disparate control and management issues in their networks [75].
In theory, SDN could facilitate the deployment of ICN features in today's networks without
requiring any network equipment upgrade. In practice, today's SDN standards like OpenFlow
mostly work with standardized host-oriented protocols. This implies that those SDN standards
can be directly leveraged to program networks to handle novel content-oriented ICN protocols.
Two approaches can be followed to overcome this issue. The long-term one is to envision exten-
sions of the current SDN standards to accommodate the ICN protocols [76]. The short-term one
is to use the existing SDN solutions to oﬀer the ICN functionality [77, 78]. The former solution
is hardly applicable because of the long extension process of the existing SDN standards and of
the ongoing evolution of the current ICN protocols. The latter seems the viable approach since
it only relies on commercial SDN-enabled elements compliant to established standards.
Several works [77, 78] have already investigated how ICN functions could be supported via to-
day's OF switches. Since OF deﬁnes matches and operations on TCP/IP protocols' header ﬁelds,
an ICN protocol's ﬁelds must be mapped to the available OF ﬁelds. In the existing approaches
this is usually done by either specialized nodes (border nodes in [78]) or a control plane logic
as in [77]. The mapping is mainly meant to i) identify ICN traﬃc in the networks, ii) carry
information related to the ICN protocol, e.g., content names, iii) deﬁne ﬂow identiﬁers. Flow
identiﬁers are used to set-up forwarding paths for both requests and responses in SDN-enabled
4The term switch is used from now on to identify any network element performing forwarding decisions on
traﬃc.
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elements. Those SDN-based approaches may also allow ICN traﬃc to traverse non-SDN network
segments [77]. Despite the design diﬀerences, the solutions in [77, 78] achieve ICN deployments
over traditional IP-based networks by leveraging the SDN paradigm.
In addition to the existing SDN standards, another set of recently emerging solutions to program
the data-plane of the network forwarding elements represents a promising enabler for the ICN. In
fact, nowadays, the design of switching chips undergoes a transition from Application Speﬁc In-
tegrated Circuits (ASICs) to fully-programmable chips. ASICs were believed to be the only way
to achieve the latency required to perform packet processing operations at high network speeds.
Yet, ASICs produced ﬁxed-function switches, i.e., switches able to operate on a predetermined
set of protocols ﬁelds with a small set of predeﬁned actions. However, recent studies [79] showed
that fully-programmable switching chips can be designed for the same purpose. The data-plane
of those chips can be programmed to support non-standard protocols and packet processing op-
erations. The emergence of these new switching chips has also fueled the dialogue about the
need for a common high-level language to program diﬀerent kinds of forwarding elements (e.g.,
software and hardware switches, Network Processor Units, FPGAs) [80]. The design of such
a language targets protocol- and target-independence to write portable and modular network
programs.
We believe that the latest generation of programmable switches and the related high-level lan-
guages will both i) in a long-term ease the deployment of ICN over existing networks, ii) in a
short-term enable experimentation of ICN protocols at an unprecedented pace. Both technolo-
gies will overcome the limitations posed by today's SDN standards. First, the new switching
chips could be conﬁgured to understand and process ICN protocols without devising cumbersome
translation mechanisms to map those protocols to standard protocols as done with today's OF-
based elements. Second, ICN designs could for the ﬁrst time be written in a easy and portable
way. This latter characteristic is absent in the state-of-the-art ICN designs, which are tailored to
speciﬁc hardware and software platforms instead. Existing designs are diﬃcult to share, modify,
improve and so, use for further research.
To promote this line of research, we have implemented NDN.p4 [81], the ﬁrst NDN router design
written in the high-level language for packet processors P4, which is illustrated in chapter 5.
Although NDN.p4 features a partial implementation of an NDN router, because of the early
P4's language speciﬁcation limitations, its design is simple and can be ported over multiple P4-
compliant platforms. The NDN.p4 showcases for the ﬁrst time a promising direction to advance
the deployment in research and production networks of ICN forwarding devices.
1.4 Summary
This chapter has introduced the clean-slate research on future Internet architectures with a
speciﬁc focus on the Information-Centric Networking (ICN) paradigm. The main ICN design
principles, the research challenges and the opportunities in the deployment of such architectures
have been presented. Among the ICN realizations, the Named-Data Networking (NDN) archi-
tecture has been described in more depth since it has been the main target of the research of
this dissertation.
The next chapter focuses on the description of the Pending Interest Table (PIT), a core com-
ponent of the NDN's forwarding plane. The PIT enables the basic data-exchange in the NDN
architecture. Yet, the PIT exposes the NDN architecture to a severe security threat this work has
studied and addressed from diﬀerent perspectives. Therefore, Chapter 2 provides the background
to understand the role of the PIT in the NDN and the vulnerability it exposes.
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Pending Interest Table
The original main purpose for a table of the pending interests has been stated in the seminal pa-
per on Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [20]. A table recording Interests forwarded upstream
to potential content sources is used to send Data packets downstream to nodes requesting them.
That table, called Pending Interest Table (PIT), performs exact-match on names for those In-
terests which cannot be served at ﬁrst by a node's local cache. First, Interests traversing the
network are recorded at routers by creating PIT entries. Afterward, potential Data can follow
and consume those PIT entries. Lately, the PIT entries, which are eventually not consumed by
any Data, expire after a certain timeout set independently by each router.
The current Pending Interest Table is still a key component of the NDN forwarding plane. Be-
yond the originally-stated asynchronous Interest-Data exchange, the PIT enables an important
control ﬂow principle. That is, a Data packet is accepted for forwarding only if there exists a
related PIT entry and, once that Data is forwarded downstream, the related PIT entry is deleted.
The PIT's 1-to-1 Interest-Data mapping, initially conceived as a control ﬂow mechanism inspired
by the ancestor data-ack mapping in TCP, oﬀers several additional beneﬁts. In fact, state in
PITs can be used to ooad complexity in the design of multipath routing protocols (e.g., loops
avoidance) to the data-plane. Or yet, measurements over PIT entries can be leveraged directly
by the data-plane to track the performance of every Interest-Data exchange and deﬁne adaptive
forwarding behaviors. For example, unusually large RTTs or expired PIT entries can be used to
detect and react to anomalies in the network like broken links, congestion or, worse, attacks [47].
The software and hardware design of the PIT in NDN routers has been an open challenge since
the early inception of the NDN architecture. Several design choices must be taken, e.g., the
choice of the data-structure, the sizing of the table and, when in hardware, the placement on
the forwarding element's line cards. Further, PIT designs must also consider the requirements
of a possible Internet-scale deployment. According to the research done so far, it seems that the
design of a PIT working at common link speeds is feasible with the current technology. However,
the security threat opened by the PIT per-Interest state seriously questions the existence of this
component in the data-plane of NDN routers. Therefore, alternative forwarding mechanisms are
more and more recently emerging, aiming to preserve some of the main PIT properties while
avoiding the related security issues.
The content of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the generic data-
structure by focusing on the information contained and the requirements. Section 2.2 focuses
on the software and/or hardware requirements for the design of the data-structure. Section 2.3
discusses the main other design challenges. Finally, section 2.4 analyzes the direct and indirect
properties of the PIT.
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2.1 PIT Description
The operations performed by the NDN forwarding plane have been described in the Sec. 1.2.2
of the ﬁrst chapter. The PIT is the functional block responsible to record forwarded upstream
Interests which wait to be consumed by potential Data downstream. Abstractly, the PIT can
be seen as an associative memory binding Interest names to supplementary information about
forwarded Interests. At each node, each forwarded Interest is recorded through a PIT entry.
Generally, a PIT entry associates the Interest name to the following information at least: an
expiration time, two lists of interfaces, and a list of nonces. The expiration time indicates the
longest duration for which the entry lasts in the PIT before being deleted if no Data consumes
it. A list of the interfaces where a certain Interest has been received is needed to perform a
correct multicast delivery when the related Data packet is received. A PIT entry also records
the outgoing interfaces, that is, where the Interest has been forwarded to. A track of outgoing
interfaces is used to i) diﬀerentiate between solicited and unsolicited Data, ii) do performance
measurements. A list of seen nonces unambiguously tracks diﬀerent Interests.
In theory, a PIT performs a lookup through an exact match of Interest and Data names. That
is, the full Interest or Data name is used to lookup the table for existing records. In prac-
tice, the NDN protocol deﬁnes two more preﬁx name matches performed by the PIT (see Sec.
2.2 of [82]). Further, a ﬁner search in the PIT can be activated through optional Interest
header ﬁelds. Overall, an Interest matches existing PIT records according to its name and the
selectors ﬁelds (see Packet format in Sec. 1.6 of chapter 1). While, a data packet matches
all the records sharing a common name preﬁx. Thus, for example, the entry whose name is
"/ndn.com/ﬁle/docs.zip" would be matched by any of the following: '/ndn.com/ﬁle/docs.zip/v1',
'/ndn.com/ﬁle/docs.zip/annexes', '/ndn.com/ﬁle/docs.zip/errata'. By consequence, there could
be many similar Data packets consuming the same PIT entry. Nevertheless, for sake of gener-
ality, the exact match lookup for both Interests and Data is mostly considered when reasoning
about the logical structure of the PIT.
The most common operations done by the PIT are summarized in Fig. 2.1. For the sake of gen-
erality, any outcome of the Forwarding Strategy module, which indeed makes the ﬁnal forwarding
decision for every Interest, is not considered. At the reception of a new Interest, a successful
forwarding operation generates a new PIT entry as showed in Fig. 2.1a. The generated entry
records incoming and outgoing interface, the Interest nonce and the entry lifetime (e.g., respec-
tively the values {i1}, {o4}, {bcd...a2}, {2s} of the third PIT entry generated in Fig. 2.1a).
Because of multipath routing protocols which do not feature loop avoidance, in NDN the same
Interest could be received twice at the same router. However, a duplicate is easily detected and
dropped thanks to the recorded Nonce values in the related PIT entry as shown in Fig. 2.1b.
When an Interest for an existing PIT entry is received at a diﬀerent input interface, the new
interface and the nonce are added to the existing entry as shown in Fig. 2.1c. An Interest can
also be retransmitted either by a consumer or by a router's forwarding strategy module. Nonces
are used to distinguish retransmissions from the original Interests. A retransmitted Interest car-
ries a new Nonce, so it updates an existing entry as shown in Fig. 2.1d. A Data packet is said
to be solicited when there exists a related PIT entry whose list of outgoing interfaces contains
the interface where the Data has been received. Copies of a solicited Data packet are forwarded
downstream to all the incoming interfaces recorded by the related PIT entry as shown in Fig.
2.1e. A solicited Data also consumes the related PIT entry. When the interface where a Data
packet is received is not in the list of the outgoing interfaces of the related PIT entry, the Data
is considered unsolicited and so dropped as shown in Fig. 2.1f. Unsolicited Data do not alter
the related PIT entries.
26
2.1. PIT Description
In summary, the PIT provides two main services: Interests aggregation at Interest reception
and multicast Data delivery at Data reception. The Interests aggregation happens when a new
Interest is received and a PIT entry with that name already exists (e.g., in Fig. 2.1b, 2.1c,
2.1d). The outcome of the aggregation depends on whether or not a similar Interest was either
previously received on a diﬀerent interface. If so, the related PIT entry has to be updated to
record the new interface (e.g., in Fig. 2.1c, 2.1d). If not, the new Interest can be simply dropped
without taking any further action (e.g., in Fig. 2.1b). The multicast Data delivery happens
when a new Data packet is received and there exists a related PIT entry. Multiple copies of the
same Data packet are forwarded downstream on all the interfaces recorded in the corresponding
PIT entry (as in Fig. 2.1e). Overall, the PIT keeps a natural ﬂow balance between Interests
and Data since, at every router, it does neither transmit duplicate Interests nor accept duplicate
Data.
The PIT records per-Interest state in the data-plane. The PIT state is also per-hop, that is, it
is only local to a certain router. Therefore, if a router crashes, only its state gets lost and this
does not directly aﬀect any state in neighbor routers. The PIT state is cardinal to Data being
delivered over the reverse path to consumers, yet it may also be used to dynamically perform
real-time adaptation of the forwarding behavior to the network conditions. Although the soft
state in PIT can be leveraged to design an adaptive forwarding plane, e.g., for robust packet de-
livery [47] and simpliﬁed routing algorithms [60], NDN does not mandate any speciﬁc forwarding
behavior per-se. The design choice of generality on the functions of the data-plane state was
driven by past experiences with IP networks. In fact, there had been several previous attempts
to introduce some state in the network, however, their coarse granularity did not make the state
reusable for diﬀerent purposes. For example, state stored to perform congestion control (e.g., the
state needed by the eXplicit Congestion Protocol) was not compatible with the one required by
a DDoS defense mechanism (e.g., the state needed by the Pushback mechanism for IP traceback)
[48]. Conversely, NDN stores datagram state, so achieving the ﬁnest possible granularity. Storing
datagram state requires more resources yet gives the ﬂexibility to implement more functions.
Among the three main functional blocks of an NDN router, the PIT is the one which has the
most stringent and critical update requirements. The FIB is updated with coarser frequency by
routing protocols running in the slow path. Thus, modiﬁcations to the FIB can tolerate a certain
delay before becoming eﬀective. The CS is updated by the forwarding plane. However, if any
insertion or removal of content from the local cache is deferred, the consequences are either unnec-
essary upstream forwarding of a few Interests or replies containing outdated content. Conversely,
PIT state changes must be performed almost instantaneously at line-rate since the processing of
the next received Interest or Data packet may depend upon the updated state. Therefore, the
design of the PIT is not trivial. Beyond the per-packet state update at line rate, the design also
requires determining the size of the table according to diﬀerent link loads and traﬃc distributions.
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Figure 2.1  Illustrations of the diﬀerent PIT operations at Interest and Data reception, numbers in parenthesis
indicate the temporal sequence.
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2.2 Data structure
The key issue in the design of a data-structure for the PIT is the "exact string matching with
fast updates" [83]. This problem refers to a membership veriﬁcation for a string, the Interest
name, in a set of strings, the names of the existing PIT entries. Further, the problem deﬁnition
includes also i) insertions, when no PIT entries match incoming Interests, ii) removals, when
Data packets consume existing PIT entries, iii) updates, when new nonce or interface or lifetime
values have to be recorded in existing PIT entries.
High-speed exact matching on strings has been thoroughly investigated by the research on intru-
sion detection and ﬁltering systems in IP networks. However, those systems do not consider the
requirement of possible per-packet update. On the contrary, per-packet updates at line-rate are
fundamental for the correctness of the NDN forwarding plane. Furthermore, content names may
be very long and so require a lot of storage to be recorded together with additional forwarding
information. For all the aforementioned reasons, some research has been done to address the
more stringent requirements of exact string matching for the PIT in the NDN data-plane.
In summary, the design of a data-structure for the PIT is challenging because of the three fol-
lowing requirements:
• fast exact-match on variable length names: this has required a re-engineering of the state-
of-the-art techniques which were mostly designed to deal with ﬁxed-length IP addresses.
Instead, NDN uses hierarchical human-readable names (HRNs) (see Sec. 1.1.2 of chapter
1 for a recap of this naming scheme). HRNs have variable length with no upper bound.
Those factors could cause a lookup time linear to the name length which could easily not
meet the requirements of the NDN forwarding-plane for certain link speeds (several tens
or hundredths of Gbps).
• per-packet lookup, insertion or update: all of these operations have to be performed with
almost no delay since the processing of a next packet could be aﬀected by the state change
caused by the current one.
• per-content state information: a PIT table may require a considerable amount of memory
to be stored. If URLs are considered in analogy to NDN names, today's URLs require
several tens of bytes of storage per name. In addition to that, as detailed in Sec. 2.1 each
entry records additional information about interfaces, nonces and performance measure-
ments. Furthermore, the PIT size increases with the data-rate since more packets may be
received on faster links. For example, at 100 Gbps, packets may have an arrival rate of
a few nanoseconds. Those tight packet inter-arrival times mandate PIT designs to target
data-structure which all or partially reside in small on-chip memories, like SRAM or RL-
DRAM. Those high-speed memories are overly expensive and so space-limited.
Generally, a PIT design aims at two main improvements: i) shrinking the data-structure size
and ii) reducing the average access time by also determining exactly the worst case one. PIT
design should be guided by some additional observations as seminally outlined in [83]. First, the
structure of NDN names can be leveraged in the design. Names are made of components and
matches are deﬁned at the component-level rather than at the character-level. This point can
guide the reﬁnement of existing techniques which were originally meant to work at the character
granularity. Second, even though there is no theoretic limit to the number of components in a
name, it is foreseeable that in real networks there would be such an upper bound. Therefore,
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the maximum number of components for most names (for example, some related works report
that most URLs have less than 30 name components) can be used to deﬁne heuristics which
achieve constant times with certain name distributions. Third, it is better to consider simple
data-structures because of the requirement of the possible very fast per-packet update. A very
little time from one packet to the other seems to preclude the utilization of any complex highly-
nested data-structure. Fourth, the role and position of a forwarding device in the network can
be used to relax the PIT requirements. In fact, while backbone routers must sustain higher loads
than edge routers, the former ones can perform more aggregation without risking to break the
Data packet delivery [84]. Three diﬀerent kind of data-structures have been so far proposed in
the state-of-the-art works: name preﬁx trie based, bloom-ﬁlter based, hash table based. The
classiﬁcation reported in [85] has been hereby extended.
2.2.1 Name Preﬁx Trie (NPT) based
The Name Preﬁx Trie (NPT) is a data-structure inspired by the binary trie for IP preﬁx lookup,
which capitalizes the hierarchical structure of names and the component-level granularity of the
longest preﬁx matching in NDN. The design of a PIT based on an NPT data-structure was ﬁrst
proposed in [86] as further reﬁnement of an encoding technique for Name Preﬁx Trie previously
proposed in [87].
The main idea of NPT is to represent NDN names through trees like the one in Fig. 2.2a. Ev-
ery edge represents a component and every node represents a lookup state. The reader could be
wondering about the rationale to use a data-structure giving visibility of the full name structure
when only an exact match is required to lookup the PIT. Indeed, NPTs have been proposed as
solution to implement a single index for the three main functional blocks of the NDN data-plane,
i.e., CS, PIT and FIB. In fact, Fig. 2.2a shows that a non-empty lookup state may correspond
to either a FIB entry or a CS one or a PIT one. The advantage is a reduction of the memory
space to store a single index rather than three. The downside is the additional complexity of the
data-structure required to support diﬀerent kinds of read/write operations.
An NPT can be represented with a name character trie (NCT) [88]. Nevertheless, character tries
require a lot of memory to store states and transitions. Besides, they have an O(mn) computation
for the LPM lookup in average (where m and n are the average number respectively of children
per node and name length). Compression techniques can be applied at the name-component level
to reduce the space needed to store the preﬁx trie. Encoding rather than hashing techniques
are preferred for compression by existing literature since the latter ones aﬀect the correctness of
routing because of collisions. Thus, for example, the preﬁx trie in Fig. 2.2a could be encoded
in a new trie showed in Fig. 2.2b, called Encoded Name Preﬁx Trie (ENPT), where codes are
assigned to name components. The representation with codes is already more compact than the
one storing the characters. However, it can be further improved as detailed in [86, 87] where a
Name Component Encoding (NCE) is proposed. Improvements of an NCE relate to the code
allocation mechanism which aims to reduce the total number of codes, to the trie representation
which is implemented by means of State Transition Arrays (STAs), to the algorithm to perform
components' code lookup and to the management of the STAs for the insertion/removal/update
operations.
In terms of complexity analysis, the NCE reduces the memory space to store an NPT and speeds
up the lookup in the average case compared to the NCT. Experiments reported by [87] compare
the two data-structures on three data sets built using domain information from the D-MOZ,
ALEXA and Blacklist public websites. For the biggest data set composed of around 3 million
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Figure 2.2  Examples of the Name Preﬁx Trie (NPT) in Fig. 2.2a and of the Encoded Name Preﬁx Trie (ENPT)
in Fig. 2.2b.
31
Chapter 2. Pending Interest Table
names, the average name length in bits is reduced by 75% after encoding the names with NCE.
The complete NCE representation through STAs saves around 20% over the NCT one. NCE
memory requirements also grow more slowly compared to the NCT one. Thus, NCE turns to be
more memory eﬃcient on both small and large data-sets. In a followup work [86], a mapping
method to infer size and access frequency required by a PIT on a 20Gbps link is proposed. The
trace translation suggests some requirements in terms of number of entries and lookup/inser-
tion/deletion frequencies which are all met by the NCE.
Despite the high compression rate and the lookup performance, the NPT has not been leveraged
in any complete design of an NDN router yet. In fact, related work features either Bloom Filter
based or Hash-based PIT designs whose characteristics are illustrated in the rest of this section.
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Figure 2.3  An example of bloom ﬁlter used to record pending Interests. The ﬁlter is initially
all set to 0. At every Interest reception, the Interest name is hashed k times, with each hash
producing several bit locations in the ﬁlter which are set to 1. To check if an Interest/Data is in
the ﬁlter, its name is hashed k times and the corresponding bits in the ﬁlter are checked. If at
least one corresponding bit in the ﬁlter is not set, then the ﬁlter does not hold this Interest/Data.
2.2.2 Bloom Filter-based (BF-based)
A bloom ﬁlter (BF) [89] is a memory-eﬃcient data-structure for membership queries which suﬀers
from false positives. A standard or binary BF is represented by an array of m bits initially all
set to 0. The BF uses k independent hash functions to map items of a set to the array m. An
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item is inserted in the ﬁlter by hashing it k times and setting the resulting 1 bits of every hash
in the array m. To check if an item is in the ﬁlter, the item must be hashed k times and every
time the 1 bit locations in the computed hashes must correspond to the ones in the array m. If
at least one 1 bit position in any of the hashes corresponds to a 0 in the ﬁlter, then the item is
surely not part of the ﬁlter. If all the 1 bits in the hashes correspond to the 1 bits in the ﬁlter,
then either the item is in the set or it is a false positive. The false positive probability of a BF
depends on the size m of the ﬁlter, the number n of elements in the set and the number k of
hashing functions, so it can be tuned.
BFs are an excellent candidate for exact matches on Interest names. In fact, Interest names,
which work as keys for PIT entries, can be added to a bloom ﬁlter and then the ﬁlter can be
queried to check if a new packet, Interest or Data, corresponds to any existing set element as
illustrated in Fig. 2.3. Further, there exists a considerable amount of literature about the use
of BFs for packet processing algorithms [90]. In fact, BFs have two appealing properties i) they
are compact, ii) they do not generate false negatives, that is, if the query result is negative, the
element is surely not part of the set. Those properties make possible to design compact ﬁlters
which can be queried quickly before performing any more cost-intensive operation. For example,
BFs have been used to speed up IP longest preﬁx matching algorithms [91]. Therein, BFs stored
in on-chip memories are used to footprint the set of IP preﬁxes which are stored in hash tables
on oﬀ-chip memories. This idea reduces drastically the number of hash table lookups with the
assumption that those are slower and more costly than the BF ones.
Although bloom ﬁlters are able to compactly store sets of elements which can be queried quickly,
they cannot be applied straightforwardly to represent a table of the pending Interests for three
main reasons. Firstly, a PIT entry contains more information than the Interest name itself.
Interest names can be stored in a bloom ﬁlter, but the other entry's information (see Sec. 2.1)
cannot. Therefore, when BFs are used to represent a PIT, a subsidiary data-structure is required
to store the full entries. Secondly, traditional binary BFs do not support deletions of elements
where PITs needs to be updated when either Data consume existing entries or those expire after
a timeout. To overcome this second issue, a BF variant, which is called Counting Bloom Filter
(CBF) and requires more space in memory, can be used. CBFs replace binary digits in BFs with
integer counters. Last but not least, even though the error probability is tunable and can be
kept very low, BFs can always generate false positives.
With regard to false positives, it is important to understand their consequences and take the
necessary precautions in any BF-based PIT design. A BF-based PIT is queried both at Interest
and Data reception. The veriﬁcation process is identical, but the consequences of a false positive
in those two cases are diﬀerent:
(A) a false positive at Interest reception means that an Interest which indeed was not seen
before is wrongly considered to be duplicate. As result, the Interest is dropped and not
forwarded. Although there could be Interest retransmission mechanisms either at the client
side or in the network, this is deﬁnitely an undesirable critical eﬀect.
(B) a false positive at Data reception creates two issues: i) incorrect downstream Data forward-
ing where no related Interest had been previously received; ii) incorrect deletion since the
BF is updated by an incorrect Data forwarding and, thus, state relative to other Interests
is irreparably lost. The former issue is most likely naturally solved by other downstream
routers, where the Data are detected as unsolicited and so dropped. The consequence of
the forwarding is some unnecessary consumption of network data rate. As for the issue
with false positive at Interest reception, the latter issue can be mitigated by regular Interest
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retransmissions, but it is considered more critical than the former one.
An early idea to leverage BFs to compress the PIT, named United Bloom Filter (UBF), was
sketched in [92]. Therein, a BF is associated to each interface and the PIT is seen as the union
of all those BFs. That design accepts False positives at Interest and Data reception assuming
retransmissions deal with those. UBF uses two binary BFs rather than CBFs since the latter
ones cause incorrect deletion when false positives happen at Data reception. Regular deletions
are implemented through a mechanism of aging between diﬀerent epochs where the two BFs are
swapped and one of them is cleared. UBF assumes all PIT entries exist for a short amount of
time and so they can be deleted after that anyway.
DiPIT, a PIT design based on BFs, was proposed in [93]. The DiPIT design aims to tackle
the issues generated by false positives, which aﬀect the regular Interest and Data forwarding as
detailed in points (A) and (B), by lowering the related probability. DiPIT is made of per-face
counting bloom ﬁlters complemented by a single shared binary bloom ﬁlter. DiPIT features
separate BFs not to explicitly keep track of Interests incoming interfaces. The single shared
BF is queried when any of the CBFs generates a positive response for an Interest name. The
additional BF is meant to lower the probability of the A issue as that is the product of the false
probability errors of the two bloom ﬁlters. So, received Interests are checked ﬁrst against the
per-face CBF. If the check is positive, then a second check is done against the shared bloom ﬁlter.
If the second check is again positive, then the Interest is considered duplicate and so dropped.
If not, the Interest is regularly forwarded and later added to the shared bloom ﬁlter. Instead,
the forwarding of Data only goes through the per-face ﬁlters. Data packets are supposed to be
checked against all the per-face BFs except the one those are received at. The design includes
an additional control-plane triggered mechanism to update the shared BF, which being a binary
ﬁlter does not feature an automatic deletion mechanism.
Despite the positive evaluation results reported in [93], the DiPIT design fails to address some
other PIT requirements which would make impossible to apply it without further reﬁnements.
For example, the DiPIT approach assumes PIT entries only store names and incoming interfaces
when, as outlined in the list of general requirements for a BF-based design, there is additional
information about nonces, outgoing interfaces and lifetime timers to be stored too.
Another BF-based PIT design, called MaPIT, is proposed in [94]. MaPIT mainly aims to reduce
the on-chip and oﬀ-chip memory cost while keeping up with line-speed processing without in-
curring in high false positive rates. MaPIT is based on a data-structure, called Mapping Bloom
Filter (MBF), made of two main components: an on-chip Index Table and an oﬀ-chip Packet
Store. The index table records the presence and the address of entries in the set respectively
through a BF and a Mapping Array. The packet store records information about the entry ex-
cept the name, which is omitted. MaPIT achieves higher compression rates for tested data-set
compared to hash table-based designs and to the trie-based NCE of [86]. Nevertheless, the de-
scription of the design presented in [94] does not detail how the critical issues above described
in points (A) and (B) are addressed.
Overall, BF-based PIT designs pose some constraints on the placement of this data-structure
on a device's line-cards, a design issue which is explained in Sec. 2.3. Moreover, any BF-based
design must be complemented by subsidiary data-structures. In fact, nonces and timers must be
stored in each entry to guarantee loop detection and entry expiration.
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2.2.3 Hash Table based (HT-based)
Since more than a decade HT-based systems and algorithms have been extensively investigated
for wire speed network processing. The reasons for such an increasing research interest are some
of the promising conclusions drawn by related theoretical research. A foremost theoretical ﬁnd-
ing is that there exist simple hash functions which perform similarly to theoretical fully random
hash functions and that can be implemented eﬃciently. That and other theoretical results have
ﬁnally led to eﬃcient software and hardware implementations for practical applications in areas
like packet forwarding, load balancing and network monitoring.
In hash tables, the time to lookup a particular item is expected to be constant on average. How-
ever, hash tables suﬀer from collisions, i.e., multiple items can be assigned to the same bucket.
Hence, some lookup performance may diﬀer from average till a certain worst case time. Luckily,
collisions lead to worst case lookup times whose upper bound can be known with high probability.
More in detail, collisions are usually solved by two techniques: chaining and open addressing.
Chaining hash tables store more elements per bucket usually in a linked list. Chaining avoids
collisions, but it increases the number of memory accesses when a collision happens, since multi-
ple elements within the same bucket need to be checked. There exist techniques to improve the
performance of hash-table with chaining, which exhibit better probabilistic worst case lookup
guarantees (for example, multiple chain hash tables are hash tables where every item is stored in
a bucket according to one of several hash functions). Yet another method to resolve collision are
the open-addressed hash tables whose buckets store a ﬁxed constant number of items. Usually,
this number is ﬁxed so that all the items in a bucket can be read in parallel (e.g., the size of a
cache line). In open-addressed hash-tables, all the items are stored in the table and there are no
external lists. So, the advantage of open-addressing is that it eliminates the need for pointers
and this extra memory can be used to increase the size of the table itself. The downside of open
addressing is that to perform an insertion and a search, diﬀerent slots may need to be examined.
With regard to the PIT, HT-based designs maps keys (Interest names) to values (PIT entries).
An advantage of any HT-based design over to the BF-based ones is that the former can store
full information about PIT entries and so preserve PIT properties, like loop detection. Further,
authors of [95] also motivates why HT-based PIT designs are better amenable to diﬀerent place-
ments on hardware forwarding devices (see Sec. 2.3). The clear disadvantage is that HT-based
designs have a bigger memory footprint than the BF-based counterparts.
In what follows three diﬀerent HT-based PIT designs are presented with the aim of giving an
overview of the state of the art. Those designs had been driven by slightly diﬀerent goals. On
the one hand, the schema proposed in [95] by Perino et al. targets an hardware implementation
of the single PIT component. On the other hand, the schema in [96] targets a software design for
a full NDN data-plane. Finally, the schema proposed in [84] targets an Internet scalable design,
which is motivated by the infeasibility of state-of-the-art pure HT-based PIT designs for core
router speeds.
In [95], the authors analyzed two HT-based solutions to implement the PIT: linear chaining
hash-table (LHT) and open-addressed d-left hash-table (DHT). Both solutions store full PIT
entries and can support deletions. The space needed by each kind of data-structure is illustrated
in Fig. 2.4. In particular, under the assumption to allocate 48 bits to store an entry's subsidiary
information, LHT requires 112+l bit per entry, while DHT requires 80+l bits, where l is the
content name length in bits. The additional 32 bits required by the LHT schema are due to the
pointer needed to implement the chains as linked lists. In [95], the two HT-based designs are
compared in terms of memory footprint under some assumptions about the length of the content
names and the number of PIT entries. The number of entries is theoretically computed for 10 and
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Figure 2.4  Illustration of the data-structure and the table entry for the linear chaining hash-
table (LHT) and the open-addressed d-left hash-table (DHT) PIT designs.
40 Gbps in both average and worst case packet arrival rate. According to the ﬁndings, none of
the state-of-the-art data-structures for the PIT can ﬁt on on-chip memory, i.e., on SRAM (access
time 0.45 ns, maximum size ~210 Mb), for worst case scenario. Furthermore, the two HT-based
solutions would not ﬁt on existing RLDRAMs (access time 15 ns, maximum size ~2 Gb) either,
so nowadays those must be implemented on DRAM (access time 55 ns, maximum size ~10 GB)
5. As a further result, DHT seems to be more resilient to the traﬃc load growth. While, other
data-structures degrade the more the load approaches the worst case. The bottom line in [95]
is that DHT seems to be the more promising solution among the data-structures compared to
(CBF, DHT, LHT, ENPT). Moreover, DHT suits to diﬀerent placements on a device's line-card
while sustaining traﬃc up to 10 Gbps as conﬁrmed by a prototype implementations on a Cavium
network processor.
In [96], a software design for a complete NDN forwarding engine is proposed and tested on a
target platform. The proposed HT-based design has been optimized to perform operations for all
the main data-plane functional blocks, i.e., CS, PIT and FIB. This design is based on a compact
representation of a chained hash table. Further, it only uses a single hash function because that
must be computed on all the preﬁxes of each name for forwarding purposes. An illustration of
that schema is shown in Fig. 2.5. The chaining hash table is implemented as a compact array
of buckets rather than as regular linked list. The objective of this representation is to minimize
data cache misses during lookup since those introduce memory stall cycles. Every bucket con-
tains seven compact entries, made of the hash of an entry name and the pointer to the full entry.
The name hash is stored instead of the full name in the bucket so to avoid string comparison
to all the entry in a bucket. String comparison to the full name is only done when the stored
5All the information about diﬀerent memory technologies' access time and maximum size reported in [95] refers
to the previous estimates in [97].
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Figure 2.5  Illustration of the data-structure and of the table entry for the Cisco's hash table-
based PIT design.
hash matches the content name one. Moreover, some pre-fetching of the HT buckets is done to
further reduce the number of data cache misses. This design envisions further optimization of
the PIT lookup operation. In fact, the PIT can be partitioned and partitions can be assigned to
diﬀerent cores/threads so for those do not conﬂict on resources and fully exploit the parallelism
on multi-core/multi-threaded systems. For the second optimization to work, Interests and Data
related to the same entry must be assigned to the same PIT partition. This last requirement is
met by assigning packets to a partition based on full-name hashes. From the reported evaluation,
the throughput of the NDN forwarding engine is minimally aﬀected by diﬀerent PIT sizes, yet
its performance drops when the HT load factor (#entries/#buckets) is greater or equal to 8.
The full router design of [96], which is implemented on the Integrated Service Module (ISM) of
a Cisco ASR 9000 router, achieves an average throughput of 8 Mpps when running on multiple
cores (The reader should be aware that some of the latest NDN router designs proposed [98, 99]
can achieve higher throughput respectively of 10 and 40 Mpps on oﬀ-the-shelf hardware).
Another HT-based schema is proposed in [84], where the PIT is implemented as a d-left hash
table. That design achieves a PIT compact representation at core routers by storing ﬁxed-length
ﬁngerprints instead of full names. Assumptions on Interest aggregation at edge routers are made
to preserve the correctness of packet delivery (this design choice is driven by scalability issues in
PIT design which are discussed in Sec. 2.3). The data-structure is illustrated in Fig. 2.6 and
is based on the d-leftCBF (dlCBF) construction proposed in [100]. A d-leftCBF is a hash table
based data-structure which replicates the functionality of counting bloom ﬁlters but requires less
space. In dlCBF, cells stored in d buckets contain a ﬁxed number of bits for ﬁngerprints and
counters instead of full elements. The d tables have B buckets which can contain up to E entries.
The d hash functions compute the index of the bucket and the ﬁngerprint. The design in Fig. 2.6
also includes an overﬂow table since d-left hashtables suﬀer from overﬂow when all the possible
buckets where an element could be placed are not empty. Every PIT entry is made of ﬁve ﬁelds.
The Occupy bit indicates if the entry is in use and enables the implementation of lazy deletion
mechanisms by ﬂagging/unﬂagging this bit. The collision bit indicates the presence of one or
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Figure 2.6  Illustration of the data-structure and of the table entry for the d-leftCBF (dlCBF)
PIT design.
more Interests received for this entry. The ﬁngerprint is computed by the hash function for a
certain table based on the content name. The expiry time is the timeout validity for the entry.
The list of faces is a bit vector of the same size of the number of available interfaces on a certain
device.
The analysis of the memory size of this PIT design is highly dependent on the ﬁngerprint dis-
tribution. In particular, it is important to derive an upper bound on the number of duplicate
Interests since those will increase the lifetime of the relative PIT entries. Such an upper bound
is computed in [84] and is used to perform a worst case analysis on the memory size for this PIT
design. According to the analysis in [84], the dlCBF design's size seems to be of the order of
40MiB in the ideal case, which would ﬁt in on-chip SRAM memories, while it seems to be around
250 MiB in the worst case, which would instead mandate the use of RLDRAM memories.
Nevertheless, storing ﬁngerprints instead of full names in PIT entries compromises the basic
services at NDN routers, that is, Interest aggregation and multi-cast Data delivery (see Sec.
2.1). Therefore, any ﬁngerprints-based PIT design should be complemented with additional
mechanisms so as to guarantee the correctness of the above basic PIT services.
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2.3 Design challenges
Beyond the choice of a data-structure, there are other factors which must be considered when
designing a PIT:
1. First and foremost, the appropriate PIT size should be determined since insuﬃcient PIT
space leads to Interests to be dropped. A PIT has to be large enough to sustain the traﬃc
rate carried on the device's links across static and dynamic cases in diﬀerent network
settings. Because of the tight resource constraints in the design of architectures for NDN-
compliant network equipment, overprovisioning PIT space is not considered a viable option.
Further, PIT has preferably to reside on fast memory to cope with certain link speeds. This
problem is usually referred to sizing or dimensioning.
2. Second, although NDN is a clean-slate proposal, it has not been assumed yet to redesign
current routers architecture. By consequence, the NDN data-plane must be implemented
on existing routing/switching architectures. The abstract NDN data-plane assumes the
existence of globally accessible tables which, however, are not present in the majority
of current routing/switching architectures. In fact, most routers have several line-cards,
usually connected through a high-speed crossbar switch-fabric, containing the interface
logic for a data link. Then, every line card has a forwarding engine CPU with non-shared
memory resources leading to the question of where to store information about the PIT so
that it can be accessed consistently by several line-cards' CPUs. This problem is usually
referred to placement.
3. Third, assessing the scalability of a certain PIT design could become critical when NDN
has to be deployed either at Internet scale or in resource-constrained networks. At a ﬁrst
glance, this issue could be considered analogous to the PIT sizing. However, dimensioning
the PIT does not yield any universal design, rather it provides general guidelines and
resource bounds. Once boundaries are known, moving "from principles to practice" [84]
could require additional design trade-oﬀs, e.g., the choice of a certain data-structure over
another and/or changes to the normal data-plane operations to achieve packet processing
at a certain line-speed.
4. Last but not least, security of any proposed PIT design must be thoroughly assessed since
the PIT constitutes a functional block of core network elements. In NDN, normal user's
requests create and modify PIT entries in routers. Unfortunately, user's misconducts can
be really disruptive. They cannot be predicted a priori and can be achieved via legitimate
means. Thus, the possible attack surface has to be limited at design time.
2.3.1 Sizing
Compared to literature on the design of a data-structure for the PIT, the understanding of the
required PIT size as a function of the system parameters has received much less attention. The-
oretically, such size could be estimated as a function of two components, the data-rate of the
router's links and the average time entries last in the PIT. This simple formula would need, of
course, to be complemented with assumptions on packet sizes for Interest and Data to estimate
the number of packets which may create and consume PIT state. Practically, there are other
factors like content popularity distributions, application request patterns, routers network posi-
tion which ask for a much more diﬃcult characterization of the resources required for a PIT.
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Related works on PIT sizing account to only three works [101, 86, 102] leading to contradicting
ﬁndings. Seminary, the work in [102] analyzed the content state in content-centric networks
mainly to identify possible attack vectors. Therein, the router's forwarding state evolution
is modeled over time as a function of the link utilization and the average network Round Trip
Time (RTT). Nevertheless, content-centric networks are expected to exhibit highly variable RTT
measurements because of their intrinsic characteristics (e.g., in-network caching, multipath for-
warding). Therefore, diﬀerently from what has been done in the past with TCP, good estimates
of average RTT values will be hardly predictable by routers in content-centric networks. By
consequence, large RTT ﬂuctuations would make it diﬃcult to provision properly resources on
routers. In any case, assuming a steady-state model in the absence of retransmissions and packet
loss, the lower bounds are estimated respectively as 16 ∗ 104 and 16 ∗ 106 for the number of
PIT entries on 1Gbps and 100Gbps links (assuming maximum link capacity, an average packet
size of 1000 bytes and the Internet RTT mean and standard deviation values measured by the
PingER project). A further strong, yet apparently premature according to some later work [101],
assertion in [102] is that the estimated lower bound for the number of PIT entries should hold for
any router where it is only a function of its interface capacities and of the average time an entry
remains in the table (similar assumptions were held in [97] which, however, led to a diﬀerent
estimate of the number of entries).
A more empirical analysis is presented in [86], where a one-hour trace of a 20Gbps link is used
to estimate PIT size and access frequency. That work details a method to map TCP/UDP con-
nections for a common set of Internet applications (e.g., HTTP, FTP, P2P applications, email
services) to NDN Interest/Data exchanges. The mapping method is used to identify and group
ﬂows in the trace, which are related to the same applicative data exchange, and then to convert
them to PIT operations. In terms of size, the proposed mapping method produces 1.5 M PIT
entries for the main applications (that is, excluding network management protocols and domain
name resolution messages). Furthermore, read, insertion and deletion frequencies are estimated
through ﬂows behavior too. So, for example, the emergence of a new ﬂow is considered as a PIT
insertion, while the disappearance is considered as a PIT deletion. The computed lookup, insert
and delete frequencies account respectively for 1.4 M/s, 0.9 M/s and 0.9 M/s (Million per sec-
ond). Although the work lacks a theoretical model and the mapping method is highly arguable,
it still makes a valid point about the diﬀerent nature of Internet services which generate diﬀerent
PIT access patterns.
Finally, the work in [101] presents an analytical model of average and medium PIT size over time
at steady-state in a single bottleneck scenario. The proposed model is validated on an ad-hoc
high-speed platform by using synthetic and trace-driven traﬃc workloads. The model applies a
deterministic ﬂuid model consistently to what was done on previous well-accredited literature on
buﬀer and queue sizing in IP routers. Furthermore, a major contribution is that the model takes
into account queue oscillations and dynamics, which have been neglected by previous works. PIT
dimensioning is modeled in the very worst case, without in-network caching, Interest aggregation
and expiration of PIT entries.
Hereby some of the main ﬁndings of [101] are reported:
• in the static case (constant number of parallel ﬂows), there is a strong correlation between
the status of the queue on a bottlenecked link and the PIT sizes on the nodes downstream
it.
• the PIT size in routers downstream a bottlenecked link does not depend on the bottlenecked
capacity rather on the number of parallel ﬂows.
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• experiments suggest that proper settings in a congestion control algorithm can be used to
reduce the PIT size while fully exploiting the link capacity. In the dynamic case (number
of ﬂows dynamically changing during the experiment), correlation between queues at bot-
tlenecked links and PIT size in routers is still present. Moreover, the PIT size at a certain
router grows as a function of the load on the upstream bottlenecked link.
In a realistic ISP topology, the model is used to estimate the PIT size for three network equip-
ment with very diﬀerent links fan-out in diﬀerent networks: an optical line terminator (OLT) in
the access network, an IP edge router in the backhaul network and a router of the backbone.
Overall, the estimated PIT size never seems to make the design of the component unfeasible.
OLT's PIT stays very small (less than one thousand entries in the very worst case where all
the ﬂows are bottlenecked upstream the OLT) and depends on the ﬂows bottlenecked upstream.
Backbone routers are estimated to need around 2 million entries in the very worst case. The
required number would account for a PIT size of 400 MB in the considered implementation (d-
left HT-based PIT in [95]). Such a PIT size would easily ﬁt on oﬀ-chip DRAM technology yet
it could only sustain a few tens Gbps data-rate, which would be a bit less of the requirements
for that portion of the network. No indication about PIT size at the edge router are reported,
where only a statement about the absence of any concern for dimensioning the component at
that stage is made.
More importantly, the latest state-of-the-art work on PIT sizing [101] has generally dismantled
concerns and estimates raised by previous related works. Further, that work has undoubt-
edly advanced the general understanding of the memory requirements for this NDN data-plane
component. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, the derived analytical model is based on
assumptions that may not be necessarily true in every network scenario and, so, whose impact
should be better studied too. For example, client requests are expressed assuming there is an
optimal congestion control mechanism regulating them, or, no other management schemas, e.g.,
to mitigate DoS attacks, are considered either.
2.3.2 Placement
The work in [95] provides a good overview of the diﬀerent PIT placement options on router's line-
cards. Therein, an analysis of the pros and cons of each approach is presented and, moreover,
a novel placement schema is conjectured to address issues with the state-of-the-art solutions.
Hereby those options are recapitulated assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that device line-
cards can be logically separated in two categories: input and output.
Input-only placement [92, 93]: PIT tables are only placed on each input-line card. By conse-
quence, an Interest creates a PIT entry only on the card where it is received. By contrast, Data
packets must be broadcasted to all the line cards except to the one those are received to in order
to ﬁnd possible related PIT entries. Hence, this placement requires additional switching and
multiple PIT lookups at Data reception. Even worse, this placement does not preserve Interest
aggregation and loop detection since similar Interests yet received at diﬀerent line-cards generate
PIT entries on diﬀerent tables.
Output-only placement [86] PIT tables are only placed on each output-line card. Interests
do not create PIT entries at input line-cards where those are just looked up to the FIB. Rather
PIT tables are stored on output-line cards. This approach ﬁxes issues with Interest aggregation
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and loop detection the input-only placement is aﬀected with. However, it requires a FIB lookup
per-Interest and it shows limitations in case of multi-path. The former issue matters since it may
introduce unnecessary FIB lookup when a PIT entry is already present on some output card.
The latter issue is present if there exist multi-path FIB entries. In fact, those routing entries
create separate entries on diﬀerent output line-cards which then will possibly receive and switch
internally multiple times the same Data packets. This latter issue can be further worsened by
cases where a forwarding strategy module decides upon the available forwarding options and may
alternate output cards leading to much more inconsistency among the PITs on diﬀerent output
cards. This last scenario aﬀects the ability to detect loops and retransmissions since diﬀerent
nonces may be stored in diﬀerent output line-cards' PITs.
Input-Output placement [86]: this placement suggests PIT entries should be created on both
input and output line-cards for every forwarded Interest. This placement does not create any
unnecessary FIB lookup. However, it suﬀers from a multi-path Data replication issue analogous
to the one described for the output-only placement. Thus, multiple Data packets may be inter-
nally switched through the input line-cards if PIT entries were previously created at diﬀerent
output line-cards. Furthermore, this placement increases of a factor of two the required number
of PIT lookup operations.
Third-party placement [95]: this placement steers every received Interest to a dedicated line-
card based on the content name hash. The selected line-card holds the PIT for all the received
Interests. At Data reception, the output-line card identiﬁes the related line-card by using the
same hash function on the Data name. The Data is forwarded to the designated card. On the
one hand, this placement introduces additional in-router switching operations both at Interest
and Data reception. On the other hand, it does not experience the issues with loop detection
and multicast delivery the other placements do.
2.3.3 Scalability
The deployment at the Internet scale of NDN requires routers being able to operate NDN packet
processing at high line-speeds. Above certain link speeds, the inter-arrival packet translates to a
very few nanoseconds to process a single packet. As known in routers, memory access aﬀects the
packet processing more than combinatorial logic. Thus, tight execution times make the number
of allowed memory accesses very limited. This imposes additional constraints to the PIT design
too.
As evidence of this issue, the work in [84] shows how the state-of-the-art HT-based PIT imple-
mentations may not meet the requirements of backbone routers. In fact, the required memory
to sustain tens of interfaces at 100 Gbps is estimated to be around 500MiB, which would oblige
to implement HT-based PIT on oﬀ-chip DRAM memory. However, the required packet pro-
cessing speed would not tolerate multiple read/write operations on oﬀ-chip memories. Storing
compressed ﬁlters on small SRAM chips has been showed by the related work on high speed
packet processing to be a valuable resource to save DRAM accesses. Along the same line, the
work in [84] proposes a PIT design which stores ﬁngerprints instead of full content names at
core routers and reduces the number of required DRAM accesses per PIT operation. However,
storing ﬁngerprints incurs two main issues, namely, collisions and duplicates. Collisions happen
when two diﬀerent Interest names produce the same ﬁngerprint and hash bucket index. Interest
duplicates are a normal phenomenon, which, however, become diﬃcult to detect since those are
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identical to collisions. The colliding Interest should be forwarded, while the duplicate one should
be dropped. So, as can be guessed, this design needs some reﬁnements to deal with those two
side eﬀects. For example, the work in [84] describes as the aggregation of requests for popular
contents in edge routers, caching and adaptive forwarding behaviors can be leveraged to address
and/or limit the aforementioned issues. Further, it identiﬁes the consequences in terms of net-
work and memory overhead generated by those collateral eﬀects and measures via simulation the
ﬁngerprint collision rates.
Security: security in PIT design entails many aspects. First, the PIT is subject to user-
driven modiﬁcations. So, in theory, PIT designs should be resilient to any possible users' misbe-
havior. However, in practice, the PIT design can already be driven by some well-known security
threats. For example, a DDoS aiming to overload PIT resources has already been identiﬁed
and characterized by some related research [103, 104, 105], so resilience to those existing threats
should be considered at design time. Second, with regard to the data-structure, HT-based PIT
implementations seem to be the mainstream choice. Therefore, a careful choice of the hashing
function is vital to reduce the hash computation and bucket lookup time. Otherwise, certain
hash functions could expose routers to hash ﬂooding attacks aiming to generate many collisions
so as to degrade the average lookup performance. Finally, the PIT represents the status of the
requests processed by a certain router at anytime. Thus, snapshots of the PIT state can be
misused for censorship or monitoring purposes. This naturally raises questions about the infor-
mation revealed through this component and the degree of privacy which should be guaranteed.
The above-discussed four issues and the choice of the data-structure covered in Sec. 2.2
account for some mainstream problems in the PIT design space. Additional secondary require-
ments, e.g., the PIT entry timeout and the Interest retransmission policies, may further inﬂuence
the design of this component.
2.4 Properties
The previous section has outlined challenges in the design of a Pending Interest Table for NDN.
Meantime, the PIT state in the data-plane establishes properties which go far beyond the original
conception of the component. A PIT entry represents network state of the lowest granularity,
that is, per-Interest per-hop. Further, the semantics of the PIT state is left undeﬁned by the
NDN architecture design and so can be leveraged to implement very diﬀerent features. In what
follows, some of the mainstream uses of the NDN datagram state are brieﬂy illustrated. Nev-
ertheless, for the sake of completeness, it also must be said that potential beneﬁts of the NDN
stateful forwarding plane are still vividly debated among the ICN research community members.
Further, there have been strong claims about "supposed beneﬁts" in face of real problems [106].
Anonymous communication: NDN packets contain neither source nor destination addresses.
The lack of addresses enables anonymous communication between diﬀerent parties where only
the content is revealed. Forwarding Interests upstream is guaranteed by an anycast name-based
routing which aims to identify nearby sources of a certain named information. Forwarding Data
downstream is made possible only by the so-called "breadcrumbs trail" left in routers' PITs by
the related Interests. The PIT state is used to implement Reverse Path Forwarding and deliver
Data to consumers who requested them.
Further, host anonymity in NDN shields speciﬁc recipients from being targets of Denial-of-service
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attacks. The address-less Interest and Data packets do not carry the identity of a host or a group
of hosts. This characteristic makes unfeasible to launch a large set of DoS attacks commonly
used in today's IP networks, e.g., TCP ﬂooding, replay attacks.
Interest aggregation/collapsing: PIT aggregates duplicate requests for the same content by
merging information about similar Interests in a single table entry and by suppressing exact
duplicate ones. Merging similar Interests reduces both upstream traﬃc and load on content
providers. Overall, Interest aggregation saves network bandwidth.
Multicast delivery: PIT entries record incoming interfaces of similar Interests which have been
aggregated. This information is used at Data reception to multicast out on diﬀerent downstream
interfaces copies of the same Data packet.
Multi-path loop-less routing: FIB entries may include multiple next-hops for the same preﬁx
name. Therefore, multiple paths can be explored seeking Data for Interests under such preﬁx
names. Multiple Data traveling downstream do not create concerns since once the ﬁrst received
Data consumes the related PIT entry, all the next Data are considered unsolicited and so dropped.
Nevertheless, NDN Interest packets have no IP-TimeToLive analogous header ﬁeld to limit their
lifespan6. Meaning that some Interest could loop indeﬁnitely (though an application can still
specify an Interest's approximate maximum lifetime, see the description of the InterestLifetime
packet ﬁeld in Sec. 1.2.2 of chapter 1). Such race conditions are avoided by means of Nonce in-
formation recorded by PIT entries. Nonces allow routers to distinguish between looped Interests
and retransmissions or new requests.
The multi-path ability enabled by the PIT enables probing multiple interfaces in parallel and
possibly discovering new "best" paths. Further, ooading loop-detection mechanism in the data-
plane also relaxes complexity in the design of routing algorithms leading to the exploration of
solutions considerable unfeasible before [60].
Hop-by-Hop ﬂow balancing: the PIT guarantees that on each link one Interest brings back
no more than one Data. This strict 1-to-1 Interest-Data mapping naturally allows the routers
to control the load over their links. Furthermore, this ﬂow balance guarantee can be leveraged
to design in-network congestion control mechanisms [107] by assuming the content/interest size
ratio on a certain link can be estimated (as done by the Interest shaper mechanism in [108]).
Adaptive forwarding capabilities: the presence of per-packet state in the NDN data-plane can
be leveraged to implement adaptive forwarding behaviors as forwarding strategies (see Sec. 1.2.2
of Chapter 1) at the network layer. In IP, routing protocols exchange information about available
routes and compute best paths from sources to destinations according to link costs and policies.
The routing information is later made available as table entries that the data-plane forwarding
logic dumbly follows. Whenever path changes happen because of planned routing updates or un-
expected network failures, routing protocols converge to a new set of valid paths by exchanging
update messages and adapt to the topological network changes. However, routing convergence
takes a certain time and may yield to some side eﬀects like routes oscillation and destination
unreachability, particularly in the presence of short-term connectivity losses [109]. Instead, the
NDN architecture leaves the semantics of the PIT state undeﬁned. The granularity of the for-
6It should be noted that since the version 0.3 of the NDN packet speciﬁcation, the optional ﬁeld HopLimit has
been added to the Interest packet to indicate the number of hops an Interest is allowed to be forwarded.
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warding state in PITs enables the implementation of a very diﬀerent range of services. Basically,
storing information about each Interest enables routers to precisely measure performance of the
data-plane (e.g., by measuring at each hop the RTT of every Interest-Data exchange). Those
measurements can be leveraged to test forwarding paths as well as to dynamically react to sud-
den network problems like congested links. The related work in [47] has already showcased how
data-plane designs can leverage the PIT state to achieve robust packet delivery. The forwarding
strategy designed in [47] emits Interests retransmissions, performs proactive interface probing
and implements Interest NACKs by using the information stored in the PIT. According to the
evaluation, the designed forwarding strategy deals eﬃciently with network congestion, security
attacks, broken links.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has described the Pending Interest Table (PIT) component of the NDN's data-
plane. The description details the PIT operations in the forwarding of Interest and Data packets
across the network. The mechanics of the PIT impose certain requirements to the design of a
data-structure for this table to operate at high link-speeds. Those requirements have been sorted
and the state-of-the-art PIT designs have been analyzed. Additional design requirements about
the size of table, the scalability, the placement on a hardware forwarding device, the security,
have been illustrated too. Among the design requirements for a PIT, the security is the one
which stays unsolved at the time being and, so, deserves immediate attention. In fact, by design,
the PIT can be easily abused by malicious users to carry out very disruptive Denial-of-Service
attacks. For the above reason, the next two chapters address the security of the PIT by reviewing
the state of the art on this subject, reassessing existing solutions and proposing novel ones.
To conclude, this chapter also illustrates some ancillary properties enabled by the per-Interest
state kept in the PIT. The importance of the PIT state is outlined since it is leveraged today
by several mechanisms present in the NDN architecture. Therefore, a clear understanding of
those properties is mandatory if the PIT existence has to be rethought. For example, as it
is advocated in Chapter 5 where research on alternative forwarding mechanisms is pursued to
address the current PIT security issues.
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Interest Flooding Attacks
Interest and Data packets carry hierarchical human-readable names which are made of globally-
routable preﬁxes and provider-speciﬁc content identiﬁers. NDN packet names are used by a
stateful forwarding plane in routers. In fact, processed Interests are temporarily stored by their
names in routers' pending interest tables for homonymous Data packets to be routed on reverse
paths. On one hand, such status in the network can be leveraged to implement useful features
at the data-plane level like loop-free multipath forwarding, ﬂow balance, real-time recovery from
network anomalies, etc. [47]. On the other hand, this state exposes NDN networks to novel Dis-
tributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. Interest Flooding Attacks (IFAs) are NDN-speciﬁc
DDoS attacks issuing a huge quantity of unsatisﬁable Interests with the aim to exhaust network's
and content providers' resources [103, 104, 61]. The severity of IFAs for NDN-like networks and
the questionable eﬃcacy of the proposed solutions threaten the stateful forwarding plane exis-
tence in ICNs [106].
The aim of the work presented in this chapter was to avoid premature conclusions on the eﬃcacy
of the state-of-the-art countermeasures against IFAs. In fact, while several countermeasures had
been proposed to mitigate this kind of attack, overall, simplistic assumptions widely used in the
evaluated attack scenarios risked to provide erroneous, either promising or deceptive, ﬁndings.
First, the quasi-totality of the existing countermeasures are reactive, i.e., the mitigation of an at-
tack inevitably starts after a time interval in which routers collect statistics about the processed
traﬃc. Second, the evaluation scenarios for those countermeasures often assume malicious and
legitimate Interests belong to trivial disjoint preﬁx sets and/or use randomly-generated content
identiﬁers to generate requests for non-existent contents. The former makes these countermea-
sures vulnerable to attackers which may adjust their Interest generation pattern to inﬂuence
collected statistics or exploit routers' monitoring time windows. The latter makes it easy to drop
malicious traﬃc once a certain preﬁx has been detected as infected. None of the two factors was
considered by attacker models in related work. Therefore, this work proposed a stealthy attacker
model where attackers would mimic real content names and vary the attack characteristics over
time in order to remain undetected by routers.
Sec. 3.1 introduces the IFA security threat and a novel related attacker model. Sec. 3.2 provides
an overview of the state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures by outlining weak points both of the
existing defense mechanisms and in the related evaluation scenarios. Sec. 3.3 proposes some
new IFAs based on the novel attacker model, which capitalize on the pitfalls of existing defense
mechanisms. The eﬃcacy of those novel IFAs against the most eﬀective state-of-the-art counter-
measures has been proved by extensive experiments which are summarized in Sec 3.4. Overall,
according to the results presented in this chapter, the exploration of the design space for coun-
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termeasures against this NDN-speciﬁc security threat is still incomplete. Therefore, alternative
research directions are presented in the next chapters.
3.1 IFA in NDN networks
The NDN data-plane makes the architecture resilient to many of the DoS attacks aﬀecting
the current Internet [110, 47]. NDN packets do not contain physical addresses yet content
names. Therefore, attackers can not aim to exhaust speciﬁc endpoints' resources like in today's
application-level ﬂooding attacks. Further, routers accept Data only when solicited by previous
related Interests. Thus, prospective attackers can hardly ﬂood unsolicited Data through the
network like in today's reﬂection attacks in IP-networks.
Meanwhile, the NDN has been shown to be vulnerable to some totally new attacks which capital-
ize on architecture-speciﬁc features [110]. Among other features, the presence of per-Interest PIT
state in NDN introduces some security threats. In fact, since PIT modiﬁcations are packet driven,
tailor-made packets and packet generation frequencies may be misused to overload routers and
content providers with unnecessary processing or to exhaust their resources, e.g., tables memory
or CPU cycles. As consequence, regular traﬃc will suﬀer from a degradation of performance at
best or from a denial of service at worst.
An Interest Flooding Attack (IFA) consists of a large number of closely time-spaced Interests
emitted by a pool of nodes to overload the network infrastructure and/or content providers. It is
generally an attack which capitalizes on the possibility of raising computation at providers and
consuming resources at routers by emitting a large amount of content requests.
3.1.1 Attack Genealogy
Preliminary evidence of the IFA vulnerability, as well as of the possibility to easily exploit it,
was shown in [104]. Among several vulnerabilities identiﬁed therein, the authors showed that
resource exhaustion on routers can be achieved by issuing a large number of Interests for non-
existent content. However, the term Interest ﬂooding was coined for the ﬁrst time in [67] to
identify an attack mirroring traditional DoS attacks by sending large numbers of Interests hard
to aggregate and be served by caches. A more precise deﬁnition was later given in [61], where
the attack goal to overﬂow routers' PIT is also clearly stated. Finally, the ﬁrst seminal proof
that IFAs can severely disrupt network services was proven empirically in [105] where a modest
number of attacking nodes sharply decreased the throughput delivered to legitimate consumers.
3.1.2 General Characteristics and IFA types
The kind of Interests used to generate an attack can be used to characterize an IFA in terms
of attacker's goals and consequences for consumers, producers and network infrastructure. A
preliminary tentative taxonomy was presented in [110] and then resumed in [111] with the aim
of classifying unambiguously the Interest types and the respective IFAs.
Interests whose aim is to fetch Data for a legitimate purpose are commonly referred to Legitimate
Interests (LIs). While, Interests aiming to achieve network or producers service degradation are
commonly referred to Malicious Interests (MIs). A Malicious Interest can be satisﬁable, when
it refers to an existent content or to a dynamically generated content, or Fake, when it refers to
a non-existent content (FI). FIs can be easily created by trailing randomly generated strings to
48
3.1. IFA in NDN networks
valid routable preﬁx names, e.g., "ndn:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/technology/media/512h3jh10u". A
valid routable preﬁx name, e.g., "/en.wikipedia.org/ ", allows FIs to create PIT entries in routers
across the paths to content sources in the network. Further, assuming there is no speciﬁc eviction
policy in PITs, FIs maximize related PIT entries lifetime, since those cannot be consumed by any
Data packet and so last until expiration (although PIT entries persistence depends on diﬀerent
expiration timers set by routers, a PIT entry lifetime is supposed to last longer than the average
Round Trip Time)7.
An IFA consists of the generation of a large number of closely time-spaced MIs targeting one or
few preﬁx names. The attack rate (which is the number of MIs per second) is important since
MIs saturate router's PIT if their frequency is greater than the one at which the Interests are
erased from the PIT, either consumed by Data or expired. Before the work presented in this
manuscript, the following IFA variants had been investigated in the related scientiﬁc literature:
i) IFAs mounted by a weakly-coordinated botnet of consumers issuing FIs, as illustrated in Fig.
3.1, which is the attack variant mainly studied by other works in literature; ii) IFAs performed
by a botnet of collusive consumers and producers where consumers issue malicious yet satisﬁable
Interests, while collusive producers delay at maximum the delivery of the corresponding Data
packets [112]; iii) IFAs performed by a botnet of malicious users issuing malicious yet valid
interests for dynamic content, called DoS-signing attack in [113], so to overload content producers
with an excessive generation of content signatures.
3.1.3 Attacker model
This work introduces a robust attack model with attacker capabilities and goals described in the
following. Furthermore, Table 3.1 summarizes the attack impact on diﬀerent targets and the
Interest type that can be used to achieve it. The summary also outlines that an attacker may
decide to shape the attack with diﬀerent Interest types in order to achieve diﬀerent results.
Attacker capabilities - Interests are regular requests expressed by users without any spe-
ciﬁc privilege. Hence, controlled end-hosts are suﬃcient to launch an IFA and no control over
the network infrastructure is required. However, according to [114], a botnet of infected end-
devices generating FIs can maximize the attack eﬃcacy. Wherein, no router is compromised nor
misused to intensify or make more eﬃcient the attack.
In general, IFA attackers have the following capabilities:
• ability to produce Interests for existent and non-existent content,
• some knowledge about detection techniques operated in routers,
• ability to aﬀect multiple targets at the same time by means of certain Interest types and
diﬀerent preﬁx names,
• ability to inﬂuence traﬃc metrics monitored by routers.
Attacker goals - IFAs may be targeting either content providers or the network infrastructure
or both. So far it has appeared that they can achieve the following eﬀects:
7As outlined in [61], some Interest packet header ﬁelds can also be used to create MIs. For example, diﬀerent
Nonces can be misused to refresh the expiration time of the same PIT entry; while the PublisherPublicKeyLocator
ﬁeld can be used not to fetch cached contents and direct all the requests to target content sources. However, the
analysis of the feasibility and the eﬃcacy of IFAs based on the above packet ﬁelds has not been investigated in
literature yet.
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Interest Name Iface
/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/technology/media/abracablah 1
/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/technology/media/simsalabim 2
/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/technology/media/tatabtatab 1
/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/technology/media/patpattata 2
    LIs
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    Fake 
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1 2
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Figure 3.1  Illustration of an IFA targeting a Wikipedia content provider on an NDN network. Malicious users
produce closely-spaced Interests for non-existent contents (alias Fake Interests) which persist on routers' PITs
until expiring. Aﬀected routers are across the path to the content provider. Thus, as a result, Legitimate Interests
(LIs) may be frequently dropped by some router whose PIT is full (e.g., routers R4 and R5).
• the exhaustion of routers' resources. Especially, they tend to fully occupy the PIT space
causing further Interests to be dropped.
• the overload of requests on target providers. In order to be more eﬃcient, such requests
should ask for existent contents since those require more computation from the provider,
e.g., signatures generation. Instead, FIs can be more easily ﬁltered out by content produc-
ers.
• the saturation of network links due to a certain asymmetry in size between Interests and
Data packets. Although this requires colluding parties performing the attack or asking for
many diﬀerent existent contents, ﬂooding with Interests upstream links may cause Data
packets received downstream to saturate the bandwidth.
3.2 IFA countermeasures and good practices
Since the identiﬁcation of the IFA, a considerable amount of research has been devoted to the
assessment of the severity of the attack and to the design of countermeasures to prevent it. The
majority of the countermeasures against IFAs feature a two-phase, detection and mitigation,
defense mechanism. The detection phase aims to identify the attack source (generally, a speciﬁc
interface) and/or target preﬁx names. While the reaction, which is triggered by a successful
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Table 3.1  Summary of the IFA impact on diﬀerent targets and of the Interest types used for
each purpose.
Attack target Attack eﬀects Interest Type
Content providers overwhelmed with requests demanding com-
putation. Some Interests may require more
computation on the provider, e.g., for the sig-
nature generation [115], while FIs can be ﬁl-
tered out by lightweight mechanisms.
MI
Routers suﬀering from resources exhaustion, espe-
cially of PIT space, which causes further in-
coming Interests to be dropped
MI
Network infrastructure saturated links due to a certain size asymme-
try between Interests and Data packets.
MI−FI = {x ∈ MI : x /∈ FI}
identiﬁcation, tries to either stop the attack or reduce the attack's impact.
The rest of this section introduces the state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures with a focus respec-
tively on detection techniques in 3.2.1, mitigation mechanisms in 3.2.2, evaluation settings in
3.2.3. Finally, Sec 3.2.4 outlines pitfalls of the presented techniques with regard to those three
aspects.
3.2.1 IFA detection
The detection of an attack is based on the periodic observation of some metrics that can suggest
anomalous traﬃc patterns. Although, the metric deﬁnition and the granularity of the monitored
time window may vary from a countermeasure to another, the construction of the attack indica-
tors is based on roughly the same set of information. In fact, so far, none of the previous works
on IFAs fetches information from the Content Store (CS) to monitor the router's status, a few
of them [116] propose to use modiﬁed FIB entries, but most of them analyze PIT activities for
the same purpose.
Both percentage of expired Interests and PIT usage may be periodically observed to detect IFAs.
On one hand, routers know precisely whether every forwarded Interest is satisﬁed by a Data or
expired after a timeout because of the strict NDN ﬂow balance principle ("in absence of packet
losses, one Interest packet results in one Data packet on each link" [117]). Therefore, an un-
usual number of expired Interests over forwarded ones along a certain time window certainly
indicates the presence of anomalies on certain paths in the network. In fact, metrics like the
Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) in [103], which is deﬁned as the ratio between expired Interests
over satisﬁed ones, or the ratio of incoming Interests over outgoing Data in [118] are monitored
to detect an IFA. Less precisely, counters on expired Interests can work as similar indicators
[116, 119]. On the other hand, information about the PIT usage provides an indication of the
traﬃc load managed by a router at a certain time. Therefore, abnormal utilization of the PIT
space is also employed to detect network anomalies. For example, PIT size in bytes is monitored
in [120, 114], while, PIT utilization rate over the entire PIT or per preﬁx name are monitored
respectively in [121] and in [122, 112].
Overall, both ISR-oriented and PIT-oriented metrics are good indicators of anomalies in the
network, yet assuming the related ratios are computed over meaningful time windows and in-
terpreted conjunctly. Nevertheless, both detection metrics require to deﬁne threshold values to
trigger alarms when exceeded. Ideally, thresholds are dynamically adjusted to reﬂect the net-
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work status like in [114]. In reality, most of the times threshold values are based on empirical
observations which are inevitably biased by a very few topologies and traﬃc distributions used
in the evaluation settings [122].
Lastly, a very diﬀerent approach is taken in [123, 124] where strong assumptions (i.e., Interest/-
Data arrival rates on the router's interfaces and packet-loss rate) on the traﬃc distributions of
Interest and Data packets are made to build a statistical framework based on the hypothesis
testing theory. Although those results seem promising, since they would allow to have a detector
whose precision would only depend on the number of samples and the desired probability of false
alarms, those assumptions seem to make that approach unsuitable for any real deployment.
3.2.2 IFA mitigation
With regard to the mitigation mechanisms, diﬀerent reactions can be performed locally at each
router:
• rate limits of accepted Interests can be enforced on interfaces based on diﬀerent parameters,
e.g, expired Interests per FIB-record [116], at access routers [120], explicit alerts received
on neighbor routers [114, 103], physical link capacity [103].
• detection and mitigation can be consolidated in a single phase, e.g., the satisfaction-based
mechanisms of [103] use the ISR as the probability to forward or drop Interests.
• those preﬁx names, which are detected as target of an attack, can be processed diﬀerently
to prevent them from generating state in the PIT, as done, for example, in [119].
Nevertheless, forwarding decisions taken independently at every router suﬀer from two issues
as empirically proven by related work in [103, 114]. First, they cause overreaction [103], that
is, Interests are unnecessarily checked multiple times by the same defense mechanism on all the
routers along the path from a consumer to any producer (for example, in Fig. 3.1, the routers
R3-R4-R5 along the path from the user to the wikipedia content provider may independently
apply their own defense mechanism). Overreaction increases the probability of dropping mali-
cious Interests over a certain network path, meanwhile it lowers the probability of forwarding
legitimate Interests from one source to a destination [103]. Second, a decision local to a router
does not necessarily detect or mitigate the attack globally. In fact, the eﬀect of the attack is
expected to be stronger in the proximity of producers of contents for a targeted preﬁx name (see
the diameter of the circles around routers R4 and R5 in Fig. 3.1). While, routers which are more
distant from those target producers (e.g., router R1 in Fig. 3.1) may carry malicious traﬃc as
well but not be able to detect it properly.
For the above reasons, collaborative8 defense mechanisms [120, 114, 121, 122, 103] result to be
more eﬃcient. In fact, in collaborative techniques, the dissemination of routers' local status
allows defense mechanisms to be triggered even where the attack eﬀect is not suﬃciently strong
to be detected (e.g., in Fig. 3 alert messages produced by router R4 may trigger mitigation at
R1). Three diﬀerent collaborative techniques are hereby brieﬂy described, while a summary of
their characteristics and diﬀerences is provided in Table 3.2. These countermeasures have been
tested against some novel IFAs based on the attacker model presented in 3.1.3. Related results
8The terms coordinated, distributed and collaborative can all be found in literature to refer to countermeasures
where routers collaborate to detect and mitigate attacks. Therefore, those terms are used as synonyms throughout
this manuscript.
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Table 3.2  Summary of the Collaborative IFA Countermeasures re-evaluated in this work.
Technique Detection Reaction Preﬁx name Content
Identi-
ﬁer
Protocol changes
SBP
[103]
none Probabilistic For-
warding based on
ISR values adver-
tised by neighbor
routers for their
interfaces
trivial dis-
joint sets
random
integers
appending information
to the name of an Inter-
est with a local scope;
queuing and scheduling
mechanisms at output
interfaces
DP [114] local ISR
& PIT us-
age values
& neigh-
bors' alerts
reception
rate limit on the
infected interface
& dissemina-
tion of alerts to
neighbors
unreported unreported reserved name-space for
the communication be-
tween neighbor routers;
processing of unsolicited
Data packets
CNMR
[122]
locally at
router: per-
preﬁx ISR
& PIT us-
age values.
Globally
at the con-
troller: ISR
per-preﬁx
name
Probabilistic For-
warding based on
ISR values locally
at each router
non-disjoint
sets
random
integers
i) placement algorithm
for the selection of mon-
itoring nodes; ii) ad-hoc
routing and forward-
ing algorithms to max-
imize traﬃc coverage by
the monitoring nodes;
iii) ad-hoc messages and
namespaces between the
controller and the moni-
toring nodes; iv) custom
changes to the Interest
packet format
are presented and discussed in Sec. 3.4.
Satisfaction-Based Pushback (SBP) [103] implements a three-fold strategy to reduce the
impact of an IFA. First, SBP uses the Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) of an interface as prob-
ability to either forward or drop incoming Interests to penalize malicious traﬃc. Second, SBP
implements separate queues on output interfaces to establish fairness among diﬀerent input in-
terfaces. Third, SBP adjusts forwarding rates on interfaces according to rate limits pushed back
by upstream routers.
In Distributed Poseidon (DP) [114], routers monitor the PIT usage and ISR values per in-
coming interface and issue alarms to their downstream neighbors when observed values exceed
their respective thresholds. DP aims to propagate downstream information about a possible
attack as close as possible to its source. An alarm message announces a new rate limit on a
certain interface and an aﬀected namespace. Propagated alerts are used by traversed routers to
lower their respective detection thresholds. The idea of pushing back notiﬁcations, which is also
leveraged by the TraceBack countermeasure proposed in [120], is inspired by previous work on
DDoS detection in IP routers [125, 126].
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Coordination Monitoring (CNMR)9 [122] envisions the deployment of specialized routers
which are meant to closely monitor the forwarding of Interest packets within the same Au-
tonomous System. Those monitoring routers may either detect an attack through the analysis of
local statistics or rely on explicit indications provided by a centralized controller, which collects
reports about suspicious activities from all the monitoring routers. At each monitoring router,
detection is triggered by anomalous PIT usage and ISR values per-preﬁx name, while reaction is
implemented as a probabilistic forwarding based on the related local ISR values.
Moreover, the monitoring routers avoid overreaction issues by ﬂagging previously monitored In-
terests for no further inspection. Globally, a ratio of expired Interests is computed over all the
monitoring nodes by the controller per every reported preﬁx name. If the overall ratio exceeds
a certain threshold, then the controller alerts the monitoring routers that certain preﬁx names
could be the target of an ongoing attack.
3.2.3 Evaluation
Evaluation metrics - The metrics commonly observed to validate both the impact of an at-
tack and the eﬃcacy of a countermeasure are the amount of resources consumed in routers and
the average quality of service perceived by ﬁnal consumers. The former usually relates to PIT
space and computation resources like CPU cycles. The latter usually relates to both download
time and number of contents retrieved. A successful attack increases sharply the load on routers
and degrades clients experience. While, an eﬀective countermeasure shields routers from being
overloaded and guarantees a certain quality of service to clients.
An indicator of the quality of service perceived by ﬁnal consumers can be obtained by looking
at the percentage of satisﬁed Interests over the expressed ones. Among the existing literature
works, this metric seems to be considered more than the average download time. As regards the
routers, both consumed resources as PIT space, and throughput as number of content packets
forwarded in the unit of time, are measured.
Content names - Legitimate consumers and attackers issue Interests with speciﬁc content
names which, however, either are sporadically reported in or whose importance is underestimated
by related literature. The name sets used for the evaluation of countermeasures in previous works
are reported in Table 3.3. Those works are classiﬁed in three diﬀerent categories. The largest
portion of the previous works, which are listed in the row "unreported", provide no information
about the content names. A further division in two subcategories is applied to the works which
report about used content names, either in their publications or in the related publicly available
implementations. On one hand, the subcategory "disjoint sets" lists the works using diﬀerent
preﬁx names for attackers and legitimate consumers. On the other hand, the subcategory "non-
disjoint" lists the works assuming malicious Interests and legitimate ones may be expressed with
the same preﬁx name.
As for the content name composition, in the vast majority of works, where reported, content
names consist of only two name segments, one segment for the routable preﬁx name and one
for the content identiﬁer. The preﬁx name is usually a short string, whether mimicking some
original domain name, like "/google.com/", or aiming to be self-explanatory, like "/good/" to
indicate that Interests with that preﬁx are legitimate. As regards to the content identiﬁer, the
consumer applications provided by the widely used ndnSim simulator [127] use integers.
9There is no such an acronym in [122], which indeed was found in the related implementation.
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Table 3.3  Summary of preﬁx names used in literature.
Unreported [123, 124, 114, 105, 120, 112]
Reported disjoint [103, 116, 119]
non-disjoint [122]
Simulation Environment - Throughout the literature on IFAs, several network topologies
have been used to evaluate the proposed countermeasures on a network simulator (for the sake
of completeness, it must be said that there are also some techniques which have been evaluated
on real network topologies [105]). Among the simulated topologies, there are simple ones and
more realistic ones. On one hand, testing on a simple topology constitutes a canonical ﬁrst step
towards a more complete evaluation and can help convey general ideas about the characteristics of
a proposed approach. Instead, larger and more complex topologies explore more realistic network
scenarios. Countermeasures against IFAs have been often evaluated on a set of topologies inferred
by the [128] work which can be imported in the ndnSim network simulator environment [127].
3.2.4 Pitfalls
Some of the design ﬂaws in the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms, which are outlined in this
section, inspired the design of more eﬀective IFAs which are described in Sec. 3.3. Most impor-
tantly, the here-reported ﬁndings constitute a general handbook of good practices for the design
and evaluation of future countermeasures.
Detection - As explained in Sec. 3.2.1, the presence of FIs has so far been identiﬁed by moni-
toring the ISR and/or PIT usage in routers, yet both detection metrics present some downsides:
• ISR-based metrics are inﬂuenced by all types of Interest (even at the preﬁx name granular-
ity), e.g., legitimate Interests satisﬁed, legitimate Interests expired, fake Interests expired,
legitimate, yet issued by the attacker, Interests satisﬁed. Therefore, this sort of metric
can be intentionally polluted to circumvent the detection. For example, the ﬁrst IFA vari-
ant presented in Sec. 3.3.3 employs a certain percentage of legitimate interests with the
aim of keeping the IRS-based metrics observed by routers under the respective detection
thresholds.
• abnormal PIT usage values may be also caused by network conditions where the load grows
more easily, e.g., bursts of Interests or congestion; therefore, an overloaded PIT itself does
not provide any indication about the kind of Interests which populate the PIT.
The above issues might be overcome by conjunctively analyze both metrics. For example, in
[114] routers assume low ISR values may avoid false alarms when traﬃc peaks generate a high,
yet legitimate, PIT usage. However, attackers can still inﬂuence the ISR-based metrics and stay
undetected even under heavy PIT load conditions, as achieved, for example, by the ﬁrst IFA
variant of Sec. 3.3.3.
Finally, detection metrics are observed over a certain time window and, beyond that, should
be ideally applied to a preﬁx name granularity to penalize less legitimate traﬃc. This implies
respectively that i) any reaction happens with a certain delay, ii) speciﬁc preﬁx names have to be
ﬁrst identiﬁed as infected. Both conditions can be potentially exploited by attackers to remain
undetected. For example, attackers in the second attack variant presented in Sec. 3.3.3 achieve
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this goal by changing target preﬁx name over short time intervals.
Reaction - As outlined in Sec. 3.2.2, distributed defense mechanisms have so far proved to
be more eﬃcient in the detection and mitigation of IFAs, yet they open up other issues:
• they often require reserved preﬁx names and ad-hoc data-plane modiﬁcations (e.g., see
the column "Protocol changes" of Tab. 3.2). For example, routers in [114] exchange
unsolicited Data packets or routers in [120] generate spoofed Data to trace an attack back
to its closest source. Those practical requirements limit any straightforward deployment
of proposed solutions and impede their interoperability.
• they introduce overhead, e.g., for inter-router communication, in-router storage and anal-
ysis of detection metrics, which is not always considered and reported in the evaluation of
the countermeasures.
• they may counter-productively disseminate wrong information when detection metrics are
purposely polluted by the attackers.
Evaluation - The evaluation of works in the subcategory "disjoint sets" of Tab. 3.3 assumes
attackers and legitimate consumers issue Interests with diﬀerent preﬁx names. In those condi-
tions, mitigation techniques applied at the preﬁx-level result extremely eﬀective since they do not
penalize any legitimate Interest. Indeed, as speciﬁed by the steadier attacker model described
in Sec. 3.1.3, attackers have the ability to precisely produce Interests both for existing contents
and non-existent ones. Therefore, attackers aim to masquerade their malicious Interests with
the legitimate ones to remain undetected by routers. Therefore, those mitigation techniques
dropping Interests with an infected preﬁx name inevitably aﬀect some legitimate traﬃc too.
Moreover, using simplistic names as content identiﬁers in the simulation environment represents
a risk of underestimation of several operations done for packet processing [83]. In fact, although
the size of the PIT entries, which will be eventually determined by a speciﬁc PIT implementa-
tion, could be independent of the Interest name size, longer content names are deﬁnitely going to
inﬂuence many other processing tasks performed in routers and by content providers. Overall,
at the time being the precise implications of the content name composition on the evaluation
of countermeasures against IFAs stay unexplored. Nevertheless, the IFA using Wikipedia page
titles, which is presented in Sec. 3.2.3, has shown to be more eﬃcient compared to the more
simplistic models previously adopted by the related literature.
3.3 Flooding an imaginary NDN-based wikipedia
This section describes a novel IFA which targets large websites whose lists of contents are publicly
available and are only subject to incremental changes. By accessing lists of available content
names for target providers, prospective attackers can more eﬀectively calibrate Interest types in
attacks according to their goals. The attack i) is built upon the attacker model which has been
detailed in Sec. 3.1.3, and ii) exploits drawbacks of existing defense mechanisms which have been
illustrated in Sec. 3.2.4. The choice of a speciﬁc target website used for the evaluation of the
attack impact is motivated in Sec. 3.3.1. The main attack is presented in Sec. 3.3.2, while two
attack variants are illustrated in Sec. 3.3.3.
56
3.3. Flooding an imaginary NDN-based wikipedia
3.3.1 NDN content names for Wikipedia pages
As outlined in Sec. 3.2.4, related works on IFAs have so far neglected the importance of the name
sets used for the evaluation of their proposed countermeasures. In contrast, more realistic sets of
content names are important for two reasons. First, those allow research to better quantify the
resources needed by routers and the impact of an attack whose main purpose is to abuse them.
Second, they help simulate and test more realistic attack scenarios where attackers produce
diﬃcult-to-detect fake Interests (FIs) to dissimulate their attack.
In the attack model presented in Sec. 3.1.3, prospective attackers can refer to publicly available
content lists to spoof content names so those look very similar to valid ones. Moreover, attackers
can precisely issue Interests for existent and non-existent contents. This latter ability allows
the attackers to dose the generated Interests for speciﬁc purposes, like in the attack variants
presented in Sec. 3.3.3.
For the purpose of the evaluation of the novel IFAs presented in this work, a speciﬁc target
website has been selected, i.e., the free online encyclopedia Wikipedia (however, the attack is
widely applicable to any large website whose list of contents is available). A daily updated list of
Wikipedia's page titles is provided by the Wikimedia Foundation [129]. All the content names
used in the evaluation of this work share the same valid routable 1-component-long preﬁx name,
which is "/wikipedia.org/". Then, legitimate Interests include one of the English page titles
as 1-component-long content identiﬁer, which is a variable-length alphanumeric string; while,
malicious Interests have a 1-component-long fake content identiﬁer generated as described in
Sec. 3.3.2.
3.3.2 IFA on an NDN-based Wikipedia server
A novel Interest Flooding Attack targeting a speciﬁc NDN content provider has been proposed in
[111]. The attack is named pure IFA (pIFA) and some more eﬃcient attack variants (described
in 3.3.3) can be also easily mounted by slightly varying the attackers behavior. The pIFA attack
assumes NDN contents holding similar naming property of DNS names. Namely, content names
from the same content provider follow a naming scheme which make them semantically related,
as shown in [130]. A pIFA models the structure of content names for a targeted provider using
the available related set of existent content names. The model is later used to generate new and
non-existent content names following the provider naming scheme.
By choosing Wikipedia as target content provider, pIFA attackers can download the full list
of existent contents since that is publicly available. Wikipedia page titles are composed as
follows: "word1_word2_..._wordn" with n ∈ [1, x] where wordi is meaningful. New names for
Wikipedia pages can be created via DISCO [131], which is a generator of semantically related
words. Given an input word w and a number m, DISCO returns a maximum of m most related
words to w. Using an existing seed content name w, attackers generate the list l1 of 200 most
related words to w, e.g., the words "computing, hardware, desktop, etc." are generated from the
existing Wikipedia content name "computer". The word generation process is launched a second
time on each word obtained in l1 with parameter m = 200 to produce a second word list l2. Each
obtained word in l1 and l2 can be used as content name for a malicious Interest by the attacking
nodes in a pIFA. For sake of completeness, it must be said that this generation process produces
less than 200 + 200× 200 = 40, 200 new words since seed names and duplicates are deleted from
l1 and l2 and only unique words are considered.
The pIFA in [111] uses a ﬁxed number of attacking nodes holding each a list of 5,000 seed
Wikipedia content names. Each node generates oﬀ-line content names for malicious interests
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using the above-described generation technique. Generated existent content names are discarded
since the full list of existent contents is publicly available for the Wikipedia use-case. The oﬀ-line
generation process produced 180,800 new content names per node on average, from which 50.3%
were non-existent.
3.3.3 Attack variants
Two simple variants of the pIFA have also been proposed in this work. The blended IFA (bIFA)
includes attackers generating Interest for both existent contents and non-existent ones. The
percentage of Interest for existent contents is a ﬁxed portion of the attack frequency per second,
called purity level. The purity level is set at a certain value at the beginning of the attack by
all the attacking nodes and kept invariant for all the duration of the attack. The main aim of
a bIFA is to pollute the detection metrics observed by routers, i.e., the ISR-based ones and the
PIT usage. By lowering the ratio of expired Interests over forwarded ones, bIFA attackers try
to remain undetected and/or lower the probability for their malicious Interests to be dropped.
The chameleonic IFA (cIFA) includes attackers which change the target valid preﬁx name after a
certain time window. The decision about the change of a target preﬁx name may be probabilistic
or driven by the observation of the content retrieval latency. The goal of a cIFA is to avoid
preﬁx name based mitigation which is generally applied by countermeasures after an observation
window where certain name preﬁxes are marked as infected.
3.4 Evaluation
This section reports results obtained from the evaluation of three collaborative state-of-the-art
countermeasures against the IFAs introduced in Sec. 3.3.2 and Sec. 3.3.3. The evaluation results
indicate that existing defense mechanisms show poor robustness against a steady IFA attacker
model. These ﬁndings suggest to reconsider results reported by previous related works where
proposed countermeasures were shown to eﬃciently protect NDN networks from this kind of
attack.
The simulation settings reported in Sec. 6B of the work in [122], which are brieﬂy summarized
in Sec. 3.4.1, have been replicated for the sake of comparison to related work. In particular,
the experiments in [122] have been taken as reference since the CNMR countermeasure, therein
proposed, happens to be the latest defense mechanism overperforming previous state-of-the-art
countermeasures. The countermeasures have been evaluated against the pIFA, the bIFA and
the cIFA of Sec. 3.3.2. All the experiments have been conducted on version 1.0 of the open-
source ndnSIM [127] module to fairly compare to the state-of-the-art countermeasures which
were implemented and evaluated on that version of the simulator. The ndnSIM extensions
implementing the novel attacks and all the tools developed for the sake of this work have been
made available at [132] in order to reproduce the reported experiments.
3.4.1 Set-up and Metrics
Set-up
The network topology simulated is the same as in [122], that is, the Exodus ISP (AS 3967)
inferred by the Rocketfuel project [128]. In every simulation scenario, 25% of the total number
of client nodes are selected as attackers. Normal clients generate 100 Interest packets per second
(ipps), while attackers Interest generation frequency varies from 500 ipps to 10000 ipps. Hereby
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(a) Average ISR of legitimate clients (b) Average PUR of all the routers
Figure 3.2  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) in 3.2a and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) in 3.2b for the SoA
experiments reproduced by this work.
mainly results for the 1000 ipps attack frequency have been reported since this frequency is
representative enough for the conducted experiments (further, it helps the reader visualize more
clearly results in each plot). Each simulation lasts nine minutes with the attack starting at 60
seconds and ending at 360 seconds. All the scenarios have been simulated 10 times and average
values are reported each time. With regard to each technique's speciﬁc parameters, settings re-
ported in the related papers and/or implementations have been exactly replicated where possible.
The curves labeled with 'ND' correspond to a baseline scenario with no defense mechanism. The
curves labeled SBP, CNMR, DP correspond to scenarios with selected countermeasures, [103],
[122] and [114] respectively on.
Metrics
The impact of the novel IFAs of Sec. 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 is evaluated on two metrics which have
been widely used in the related works (the rationale behind the evaluation metrics for IFAs
was already introduced in Sec. 3.2.3). First, the Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) at clients,
which is computed as the ratio between satisﬁed Interests and issued ones over a time window,
gives an indication of the quality of service perceived by end-users while the network is under
attack. Second, the PIT utilization ratio (PUR) reports about the available capacity on routers
to process legitimate traﬃc during an attack. The PUR is computed as the ratio between the
number of PIT entries and the maximum PIT size in entries over a time window.
State-of-the-art (SoA) results
As ﬁrst evaluation step, the experiments presented in [122] have been replicated, where only the
countermeasures CNMR and SBP were evaluated10. Surprisingly, although the general trend
for both the evaluation metrics is almost consistent with what reported therein, diﬀerent results
have been obtained.
10DP is not considered in [122], most likely because the implementation has never been made available since
that work was published. For the sake of this work, DP has been implemented as forwarding strategy in ndnSim
according to the description in the original work [114] and made available at [132].
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(a) PUR values for all routers (b) PUR values for monitoring routers
Figure 3.3  PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) average values for all the routers in Fig. 3.3a with diﬀerent attack
frequencies and for monitoring routers in Fig. 3.3b in the SoA experiments.
The ISR values for the ND and the CNMR scenarios, plotted in Fig. 3.2a, are 10 to 20% higher
than the ones in [122]. Fig. 3.2a also shows that SBP and DP worsen the ISR compared to the
baseline. This last behavior was only reported in [122] for higher attack frequencies. Indeed,
this result was expected since SBP and DP apply rate limits of accepted interests on interfaces
detected as infected independently from the aﬀected preﬁx name. Meaning that, when multiple
preﬁx names are used in the evaluation, as done for the experiments in [122], SBP and DP may
accidentally drop many Legitimate Interests. CNMR, diﬀerently, mitigates only the preﬁx names
which are detected as infected. Therefore, CNMR overperforms SBP and DP in this evaluation
scenario because the former never drops legitimate Interests with other preﬁx names except the
one under attack11.
With regards to the PUR plotted in Fig. 3.2b, none of the countermeasures alleviates the av-
erage PIT consumption in routers contrary to what reported in [122]. This would be expected
for SBP and DP, which would allow more malicious Interests to occupy PIT space across the
network since they do not mitigate the attack eﬃciently as already shown in Fig. 3.2a (low
eﬃciency of SBP in large network topologies with many attackers was already reported in [103]).
Nevertheless, as additional outcome of an aggressive dropping policy which highly aﬀects the
ISR perceived by clients, SBP/DP also reduces the number of Interests gaining PIT space in
the network. As can been seen in Fig. 3.2b, SBP/DP curves only slightly increase the PUR
compared to the baseline.
As regards CNMR, the average global PIT usage is slightly higher (less than 5% more) than the
one measured in the ND scenario. It must be said that results in [122] reported a lower average
PUR compared to the baseline under attack when the countermeasure is on. The thereby-
reported behavior was not seen in any simulated scenario by this work nor the authors of [122]
were able to provide the correct information to replicate those results when contacted about
this. A consistent behavior of CNMR with regard to the PUR has been observed by this work
11Almost all the curves reported in this section present a periodic artifact occurring at around 100, 200 and
300 seconds of the simulation time. It is extremely diﬃcult to precisely pinpoint the root cause of this eﬀect
because of the many variables involved in the simulation scenario. Nevertheless, we have measured a strong
correlation between the total number of duplicate Interests produced and this periodic variation of the ISR and
PUR curves. Although the content identiﬁers for the Interests are generated by using random functions in the
network simulator fed with diﬀerent seeds, there is an overall decrease ﬁrst and increase after of the total number
of duplicates around those time windows.
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(a) PUR values under normal IFA with no defense (b) PUR values under normal IFA with CNMR on
(c) PUR values under pIFA with no defense (d) PUR values under pIFA with CNMR on
Figure 3.4  PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) values for all the CNMR's monitoring routers under an the attack
mounted in [122] and the pIFA introduced by our work. Results for the 1000 ipps attack frequency are plotted.
The simulation scenario includes 8 monitoring routers whose PURs are reported on 8 diﬀerent colored curves.
The curve in black plots the average values.
with all the tested attack frequencies (e.g., the plot in Fig. 3.3a shows PUR values for 500, 1k
and 10k ipps with and w/o defense mechanism on). The same pattern holds if only monitoring
routers' PITs are considered, as shown in Fig. 3.3b. Indeed, it must be said that an increase of
the average PIT utilization ratio through the activation of the CNMR defense mechanism is not
unexpected. Yet, the higher PIT usage is due to a notable path stretch increment introduced
by CNMR's ad-hoc forwarding strategy. In fact, CNMR steers every Interest ﬁrst towards the
closest monitoring router in order to maximize traﬃc coverage (see description of the MR-Aware
Routing in Sec. V-B of [122]).
The plots in Fig. 3.3, as well as all the other PUR plots of this section, report the PUR average
values. This was meant to ease the comparison to the results reported by the CNMR work in
[122]. Nevertheless, the average PUR values computed over either all routers of the topology or
all the CNMR's monitoring routers may not visualize clearly an attack's impact. In fact, the
PIT usage of the reported experiments oscillates between 0.2 and 0.6. That is, the attacks seem
to never saturate any router's PIT, yet the attacks are able to aﬀect the ISR measured by the
clients. Indeed, the tested attacks saturate several routers' PITs and this can be seen more easily
by observing the PIT load of the monitoring routers under attack in the following plots.
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The plots in Fig. 3.4 show the impact of an IFA with 1000 ipps on the PIT load of the monitoring
nodes in a single experiment (not average reported this time, since every round of simulation
corresponds to diﬀerent positions in the network for both clients and attackers). The 1000 ipps
attack frequency is already suﬃcient to saturate the PIT of some of the monitoring routers as
better shown by Fig. 3.4c and 3.4d (see red and yellow curves) where the network is under a
pIFA. Further, the monitoring routers are often some hops away from the clients. So, those
clients' Interests may need to traverse ﬁrst other routers before reaching any monitoring router.
Those routers' PITs could be already heavily aﬀected by the attack. Similarly, this is observed
also with the state-of-the-art experiments in [122], as reported in Fig. 3.4a and 3.4b, where,
however, the measured impact is lower.
3.4.2 Attack results
Pure IFA - pIFA
In the evaluated pIFAs, attackers generate Interests only for non-existent contents by fetching
invalid content identiﬁers from oﬀ-line generated lists of spoofed names. Meanwhile, legitimate
users only produce Interests for existent contents referring to the original Wikipedia page titles
list. Furthermore, all the content consumers, legitimate and malicious ones, use the same single
routable preﬁx name. Both above conditions did not hold in the SoA experiments of [122].
The measured ISR values are reported in Fig. 3.5a (for the sake of clarity, from now on the DP
curves are omitted since the relative values are very similar to the SBP ones). As in the SoA
experiments, SBP poorly mitigates the attack, while CNMR improves this metric compared to
the baseline. It also important to see how the SBP countermeasure (blue curve) worsens the
attack eﬀect compared to the baseline (green curve). The low ISR average value caused by SBP
is due to its aggressive dropping policy applied to the aﬀected interfaces. Comparing the SoA
results in Fig. 3.2a to the ones in Fig. 3.5a, the pIFA introduces a 17% decrease of the ISR
values for both the baseline scenario and the CNMR one. This result conﬁrms that the novel
attacker model leads to more eﬀective attacks compared to the ones used in the evaluation of
the related works.
Fig. 3.5b also shows a 10% increment of the PUR in CNMR's monitoring routers compared to
the SoA results for both the baseline and the CNMR scenario, consistently with the observed
ISR decrease. It is worth noticing that SBP achieves lower PUR values compared to CNMR
because of the higher amount of Interests dropped to mitigate the attack.
Blended IFA - bIFA
The ISR values of the bIFA scenario are reported in Fig. 3.6a. In bIFAs, attackers also generate
Interests for existing contents (a ﬁxed percentage of the attack frequency per second, called purity
level) with the aim to reduce the number of expired Interests monitored by routers. Fig. 3.6a
shows a 22% ISR decrease of the SoA results and a 5% decrease of the pIFA ones for CNMR.
Moreover, pIFA attackers' behavior totally neutralizes this countermeasure. In fact, the CNMR
curve always lays above the baseline in Fig. 3.6a. The eﬃciency of the SBP technique is reduced
too in case of bIFA, since the detection metric monitored by the routers is polluted and allows
more fake interests to create entries in the PITs. In Fig. 3.6b the PUR values for CNMR are plot,
the attack succeeds at occupying more space across monitoring routers' PITs, as a consequence
of the poor detection achieved by the applied countermeasure.
It is also important to see how the eﬃcacy of a bIFA increases with the increment of the number
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(a) ISR values under pIFA (b) PUR values under pIFA
Figure 3.5  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) under the pure IFA (pIFA). The
PUR is computed over all the routers in the network.
(a) ISR values under bIFA (b) PUR of CNMR under bIFA
Figure 3.6  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) under the blended IFA (bIFA).
of legitimate Interests used by the attackers. Fig. 3.7a shows a decrease of the ISR for CNMR
when the bIFA's purity level increases, while Fig. 3.7b shows a small increment of the PUR
values when the attack's purity level is increased.
The eﬃcacy of a bIFA is a consequence of the forwarding decisions taken independently at each
monitoring router. In fact, although the successful detection made by the CNMR controller
node, the monitoring routers' local statistics (see deﬁnition in Sec. 3.2.1) are used as probability
to either forward or drop every Interest with the detected preﬁx name. Therefore, the legitimate
Interests issued by pIFA attackers improve routers' local statistics and, by consequence, the
probability for Fake Interests to occupy PIT space and be forwarded to the next hops.
Chameleonic IFA - cIFA
In cIFAs, the attackers either know or guess (e.g., by emitting and measuring the RTTs of some
legitimate Interests) the observation time window used by detection techniques in routers. The
attackers' goal is to avoid preﬁx name-based mitigation techniques (e.g., the CNMR of [122]).
For that purpose, attackers switch the target preﬁx name at every observation window.
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(a) ISR of CNMR (b) PUR of CNMR under bIFA
Figure 3.7  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) for diﬀerent bIFA's purity levels.
(a) ISR values under cIFA (b) PUR of CNMR under cIFA
Figure 3.8  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) under the chameleonic IFA (cIFA).
The impact of cIFAs has been evaluated in scenarios where content producers serve several preﬁx
names and CNMR monitoring routers used a ﬁxed observation time window of 10 seconds as in
[122]. Hence, attackers switch target preﬁx name at every such time window (this justiﬁes the
periodic oscillations seen in Fig. 3.8a and 3.8b during the attack). Meanwhile, legitimate clients
generate traﬃc with all the preﬁx names served by the producer nodes. As expected, this attack
reduces the ISR of CNMR compared to the SoA results as shown in Fig. 3.8a. Among the three
novel attacks, the cIFA is the attack variant which degrades more the client's performance in
the evaluated scenarios. The ISR baseline values measured for the three diﬀerent attacks when
no countermeasure is on are summarized in Fig. 3.9a. As similarly observed for the previous
scenarios, the SBP still poorly detects the attack.
As regard to the PUR of CNMR's monitoring routers, shown in Fig. 3.8b, the values are consis-
tent with the ISR ones, showing an increase of the former metric when the latter one is reduced.
Nevertheless, cIFA generates a PIT increment of the baseline which is smaller than the one caused
by the bIFA reported in Fig. 3.6b. The impact on the average PIT utilization of monitoring
routers under the diﬀerent attack scenarios is summarized in Fig. 3.9b.
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(a) ISR values for baseline scenarios (b) PUR of CNMR under diﬀerent attacks
Figure 3.9  In Fig. 3.9a, the Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) is measured in the baseline scenario under the
three novel IFAs. In Fig. 3.9b, PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) for monitoring routers under all the diﬀerent attacks
compared to the SoA results.
Summary
The IFAs, built upon the novel attack model proposed in this work, degrade the performance
of the best state-of-the-art countermeasures. In particular, the attack model reduces the quality
of service perceived by clients (i.e., lower ISR values mean less client requests satisﬁed) and
increases the load on network's nodes (i.e., higher PUR values correspond to more computational
and memory resources used in routers). Fig. 3.10b shows how the model can be leveraged
to mount increasingly strong attacks which notably aﬀect the most eﬀective state-of-the-art
countermeasure. The observed trend holds for all the tested attack frequencies and the three
introduced attack variants. The main ﬁndings are recapitulated in the following points:
• by using non-disjoint preﬁx name sets all the tested defense mechanisms drop some legiti-
mate traﬃc too. In fact, no state-of-the-art countermeasure can distinguish between Fake
and Legitimate Interests, rather, when either a preﬁx name or an interface is detected as
infected, all the related traﬃc is mitigated.
• It is possible for attackers to pollute metrics collected by defense mechanisms in routers and
increase the eﬃcacy of their attacks. This was successfully achieved by the bIFA variant
in our experiments.
• It is possible for attackers to circumvent detection operated by defense mechanisms in
routers and stay undetected. This was successfully achieved by both bIFA and cIFA variants
in our experiments.
• Under all the tested attacks, CNMR generates a higher load on routers compared to SBP.
This means that SBP better protects the network infrastructure (see the last two columns
of Tab. 3.4) while CNMR better protects the clients (see the ﬁrst two columns of Tab.
3.4). Yet, SBP performs aggressive mitigation on infected interfaces which inevitably af-
fects many legitimate Interests; thus, overall, clients experience an ISR degradation. This
behavior would be beneﬁcial to legitimate traﬃc coming from non-infected interfaces, which
would ﬁnd the necessary PIT space along the path to contents.
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(a) ISR in SoA and pIFA scenarios (b) ISR in the diﬀerent attack scenarios
Figure 3.10  ISR values for the baseline and with CNMR on for both the state-of-the-art experiments and for a
pIFA in Fig. 3.10a. ISR values for the novel IFAs compared to the state-of-the-art results in Fig. 3.10b.
Table 3.4 recapitulates the impact achieved by the diﬀerent attacks on both the evaluation met-
rics considered. Overall, the cIFA causes the worst ISR at clients as reported in the ﬁrst two
columns of Tab. 3.4. However, the cIFA is not the attack variant which generates the highest
load on routers for all the countermeasures. In fact, the bIFA variant causes higher PUR when
CNMR is on, as reported in the third column of Tab 3.4. Therefore, the ultimate choice between
bIFA and cIFA could be driven by knowledge available to the attackers (e.g., ability to guess
observation windows used by routers' defense mechanisms) and desired targets (either clients or
network infrastructure or both).
Table 3.4  Summary of the results achieved by our attacks compared to the values in the SoA
results. Negative values in the ISR-related columns indicate a decrease of the average quality of
service perceived by the clients. Positive values in the PIT-related columns indicate an increase
of the average load on routers.
CNMR-ISR SBP/DP-ISR CNMR-PUR SBP/DP-PUR
pIFA -17% -36% +10% +2%
bIFA -22% -38% +18% +1%
cIFA -28% -40% +11% +3%
3.5 Summary
This chapter has introduced the Interest Flooding Attack (IFA), a Denail-of-Service attack which
capitalizes on the per-Interest PIT state created by regular Interests in the NDN. The IFA
characteristics and goals have been illustrated before proposing a novel and steadier attack model.
The state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures have been dissected. Flaws in the current mainstream
defense approach and in the evaluation settings have been outlined. The proposed attacker model
and the analysis of the state-of-the-art countermeasures have been used to build new stealthy
IFA attacks. These attacks have revealed the ineﬃcacy of the state-of-the-art countermeasures
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to protect the clients and the network infrastructure under more realistic attack scenarios.
The ﬁndings reported in this chapter show the limitation of the existing IFA defense mechanisms
against a novel set of steadier IFAs. Therefore, these results call for diﬀerent and more robust
countermeasures to be designed in order to protect the NDN architecture from this attack. For
that reason, a novel approach to the defense against IFAs is presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Proactive defense against Interest
Flooding Attacks
Interest Flooding Attacks (IFAs) represent a major open security threat to the Named-Data
Networking architecture. In IFAs, loosely coordinated botnets of attackers may exhaust routers'
resources and deny service to legitimate users. Countermeasures may be applied to mitigate this
attack, yet those suﬀer from several drawbacks making their potential deployment either non-
eﬃcient or unfeasible. First, most of the proposed countermeasures introduce ad-hoc protocol
changes and/or make unrealistic assumptions about the control of the network infrastructure
so impeding any seamless integration in existing deployments. Second, the best state-of-the-
art countermeasures introduce monitoring overhead and perform a delayed reaction because of
their intrinsic reactive nature. The reactive nature of a countermeasure can be exploited by the
stealthy attacks proposed in Chapter 3 to circumvent defense mechanisms active in routers and
achieve the attacker's goal. Finally, all the state-of-the art countermeasures are not designed to
discern between legitimate and malicious Interests, so they inevitably penalize legitimate traﬃc
too. This latter issue is usually underestimated by the related literature which only considers
the average performance at clients achieved with the application of a certain countermeasure.
Though an improvement of the average quality of service perceived by clients could not be suf-
ﬁcient for a certain class of applications which do not tolerate too many closely spaced packet
losses, e.g., the stream of multimedia content.
The design of existing countermeasures against IFAs is based on the assumption that an Interest
packet itself does not contain the necessary information to distinguish between legitimate and
malicious Interests. Therefore, other factors have to be analyzed to determine the nature of an
Interest. For example, the NDN ﬂow balance principle ("one Interest packet results in one Data
packet on each link" [117]) is used to detect anomalous percentages of unsatisﬁed Interests [103].
Or yet, assumptions about the traﬃc distribution are used by statistical models to deﬁne the
conditions for an ongoing attack [124]. Instead, this chapter shows that under some circum-
stances an Interest name is suﬃcient to determine its either malicious or benign nature. This
assumption, though restricted to a certain case, eliminates the vulnerability exposed by reactive
countermeasures since no monitoring of previous traﬃc is required to make forwarding decisions.
Further, this work also shows that a speciﬁc proactive design is able to preserve legitimate traﬃc
from being erroneously dropped. In fact, this speciﬁc design leverages bloom ﬁlter-based content
summaries which generate no false negative, that is, no legitimate Interests can be mistaken for a
malicious one and so dropped. Both factors are showed by extensive simulations against the latest
steady attacks proposed in [111] which neutralize previously proposed IFA countermeasures.
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4.1 Issues with Reactive Countermeasures
Chapter 3 has already discussed the state of the art on countermeasures against the IFA. The
main aim of that ﬁrst survey was to highlight pitfalls in existing defense mechanisms which could
be leveraged to build stealthy attacks. The survey presented this time in Sec. 4.1.2 outlines an
intrinsic characteristic, the reactiveness, of all the most eﬀective state-of-the-art countermeasures
since that is indeed the root cause of the pitfalls identiﬁed in those defense mechanisms. Before,
Sec. 4.1.1 describes the main Interest type used by attackers in IFAs, which has oriented the
design of the related countermeasures.
4.1.1 A core strength of IFAs: Fake Interests
An eﬀective IFA DoS consists of ﬂooding the network with a large amount of Interests with the
aim to overload routers and content sources with unnecessary processing. Attackers' means and
goals may vary as clearly summarized in [111] and reported in the previous chapter. A botnet
of loosely coordinated clients generating requests hard to be aggregated and served by caches
can be used to maximize the attack's eﬃcacy. For that purpose, attackers mainly generate Fake
Interests (FIs). A FI is a unsatisﬁable Interest since it does not corresponds to any existent
content. FIs names can be easily generated by appending random identiﬁers to valid routable
preﬁx names as shown in Fig. 4.1. A valid globally routable preﬁx name allows FIs to traverse the
network towards content sources and create state in routers' PITs. The spoofed content identiﬁers
are easily discarded by the content providers which however do not notify network about those
invalid requests (at the time being the deﬁnitive role and adoption of negative acknowledgments
in CCN/NDN-like networks stays unclear [133]). Nevertheless, FIs create long-lived state in PITs
since the related entries last until the PIT entry expiration time.
FIs' strength resides in being easy to generate and hard to detect. In fact, endless diﬀerent
invalid content identiﬁers can be trailed to valid routable preﬁx name. A valid preﬁx name is the
only information looked up by routers to decide about an Interest forwarding. While no check
is done on the content identiﬁer.
Figure 4.1  Example of a Legitimate Interest in the topmost box and of a Fake Interest in the bottommost box.
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4.1.2 A novel Taxonomy for IFA countermeasures
The classiﬁcation of approaches to defend against IFAs presented in Sec. 3.2 of Chapter 3 mainly
focuses on a certain class of countermeasures which, in reality, represent a subset of all the ex-
isting defense mechanisms. A more comprehensive classiﬁcation of the countermeasures against
the IFA DoS has been proposed by [50]. The hereby presented taxonomy leverages some termi-
nology from the work in [50], but proposes a diﬀerent classiﬁcation of the existing approaches.
More speciﬁcally, two main sub-root categories are introduced in the taxonomy of Fig. 4.2 to
classify existing IFA countermeasures: reactive and proactive. The adjective reactive is used to
identify countermeasures which respond to attacks only after those have already taken place.
Potential symptoms of an IFA are an excessive load on PITs, an anomalous number of expired
Interests, an unexpected increase of the number of incoming Interests. Therefore, monitoring of
any or all of these factors is required by reactive countermeasures to detect potential ongoing
attacks. While, the adjective proactive is used to identify countermeasures which anticipate an
attack. The nature of every Interest, either legitimate or malicious, has to be determined before
forwarding it to anticipate an attack. So, forwarding decisions have to be taken only by looking
at the Interest packet ﬁelds.
As it can be seen in Fig. 4.2, among the related works the above-deﬁnition of proactiviness
cannot be applied to any existing countermeasure. In fact, the majority of the existing counter-
measures rely on the observation of some previous traﬃc and so those are considered reactive
according to the above-deﬁned classiﬁcation criteria. There exist a few other approaches which
are not considered reactive since they do not perform any monitoring: i) alternative forward-
ing mechanisms, ii) client's proof-of-work ones. The "client's proof-of-work" category identiﬁes
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Figure 4.2  Taxonomy of reactive and proactive IFA countermeasures.
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works proposing application-based solutions to defend against IFAs. That is, clients are required
to insert subsidiary information in their Interests, so as their nature can be assessed by other
network entities, e.g., routers and/or content providers. For example, the InterestCash schema
of [134] requires consumers to solve puzzles to generate Interests for dynamic contents checked
at the reception by content providers. Overall, InterestCash reduces the amount of eﬀective
malicious traﬃc that single attackers can generate in the unit time. However, the nature of
an Interest is determined at the content producer side. Hence, this schema does not prevent
malicious Interests to occupy PIT space across the network and so does not protect the network
infrastructure. A proactive variant of this mechanism could be designed assuming the informa-
tion inserted by consumers in their Interests would be validated in routers. Though, no such
work has been proposed yet. The category "alternative forwarding" refers to work addressing the
IFA security threat by proposing alternative PIT designs. Some propose stateless designs just
in order to avoid the vulnerability of the PIT stateful forwarding plane [106]. These alternative
forwarding mechanisms outline insightful and promising research directions for the design of less
vulnerable NDN/CCN networks. Thus, the related works are covered in depth in the Chapter 5.
The majority of the IFA countermeasures proposed so far is reactive. Reactive countermeasures
feature a canonical two-phase, detection and mitigation, defense mechanism. In the detection
phase, either interfaces or preﬁx names are identiﬁed as infected. The methodology used to
perform the detection can be either an analysis of traﬃc metrics observed over certain time win-
dows [103, 114, 122] or a statistical guess [124, 123]. Then, in the mitigation phase, a strategy is
adopted to reduce the attack's impact. A further characterization can be applied based on the
mitigation technique in two main subcategories: PIT-modiﬁcations approaches and rate-limiting
ones.
There are very few works proposing PIT-modiﬁcations to the data-plane operations to block
IFAs from saturating the PIT. For example, the Disable PIT Exhaustion (DPE) approach in
[119] detects an attack by monitoring some PIT-based metrics, but it applies a diﬀerent packet
processing to the traﬃc detected as suspicious. The DPE approach proposes not to record
Interests in PIT when their preﬁx name is detected under attack. Instead, the reverse path
is appended hop-by-hop to suspicious Interest packets when those are forwarded upstream for
eventual Data to be forwarded downstream.
Applying a rate limit to input/output routers interfaces is a widely adopted mitigation mecha-
nism by IFA countermeasures. Those countermeasures are classiﬁed under the "rate limiting"
category and are subject to a further distinction between collaborative and independent. In-
dependent countermeasures are applied at each router by leveraging only local detection infor-
mation. In collaborative countermeasures, routers communicate to exchange information about
their respective states. Communication between routers is of foremost importance to both avoid
overreaction on the same Interests and rate-limit an attack far from the ﬁnal targets, where it
may be harder to detect. The form of collaboration among routers vary from IP-traceback in-
spired techniques [114, 120, 103], which push-back downstream notiﬁcations asking routers closer
to the attack sources to scale down their rates, to ad-hoc deployed specialized nodes [122], which
through a global network view can localize and mitigate more precisely ongoing attacks.
Until very recently, the works under the reactive/rate-limiting/collaborative category had been
showed to be the more eﬀective defense mechanisms against IFAs. However, the canonical reac-
tive approaches have been shown by recent literature to be susceptible to stealthy attacks [111]
and their eﬃcacy to be highly-variable with network topologies [135]. In particular, the latest
attacker model proposed in [111] capitalizes on the reactive nature of those existing countermea-
sures. In fact, two intrinsic characteristics of these state-of-the-art reactive countermeasures are
to react after an observation time window and to rely on collected metrics. Both factors can be
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easily exploited by potential attackers to stay undetected, in particular when the attackers have
the necessary knowledge to dose with precision the kind of generated Interests.
The pitfalls of reactive countermeasures are not present in proactive countermeasures as the latter
are conjectured by this work. Thereby, it is worth to investigate the conception of a novel class
of countermeasures exhibiting intrinsically diﬀerent characteristics since those have the potential
to improve the state of the art. The cryptographic route token approach of [113] introduces the
notion of proactive defense and postulates novel evaluation metrics, similar to the ones deﬁned in
this work, for the ﬁrst time in literature. However, in [113] no precise deﬁnition of proactiveness
is given. Therein, the adjective proactive is rather used to diﬀerentiate an in-packet crypto-
graphic mechanism proposed in opposition to the reactive nature of existing countermeasures.
Conversely, this work precisely conjectures this novel class of defense mechanisms, delineates
general characteristics and proposes concrete implementation options for the ﬁrst time.
4.2 Proactive Countermeasures
A proactive IFA countermeasure is here deﬁned as a defense mechanism aiming to make routers
able to detect an IFA without monitoring any prior traﬃc. Thereby, proactiveness eliminates
the need for routers to collect and analyze traﬃc statistics to infer detectors of possible attacks.
Attack detectors are aﬀected by network conditions and attacker strategies, so their absence
reduces the risk of unnecessary reaction to regular traﬃc peaks and of manipulation of routers'
decisions by misleading attacker's behaviors. Moreover, proactiveness does not introduce any
delay in the reaction to ongoing attacks at the price of some additional delay in the Interest
processing.
Proactive countermeasures rely on no additional information except the one contained in the
Interest packet to determine the either benign or malicious nature of an Interest. Mainly this
revolves around the analysis of the Interest name. How this latter task is performed and the kind
of delay introduced in the Interest processing further characterize the proactive technique. First,
a list of generic requirements for the design of IFA countermeasures is presented in Sec. 4.2.1. The
framework is used in Sec. 4.2.2 to showcase the advantages of an ideal proactive countermeasure
over the existing reactive ones. Finally, a possible declination of the ideal proactive model, named
Charon, is concretely explored is Sec. 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
4.2.1 Requirements for IFA countermeasures
To clarify pros and cons of the diﬀerent kinds of defense mechanisms, this work sets out a list
of ideal goals for IFA countermeasures. This list aims to be a common framework, missing at
the time being, for a fair comparison of existing and future defense mechanisms. It would be
desirable for IFA countermeasures to exhibit the following characteristics:
• G1 - low overhead: refers to packet processing operations and resources, computation
and storage.
• G2 - high protocol compatibility: refers to avoiding possible required ad-hoc protocol
changes, e.g., the introduction of new packet ﬁelds or a change in the packet processing
workﬂow.
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Table 4.1  Ideal proactive defense versus existing reactive countermeasures against IFA compared
with respect to the Gx requirements. The rating scale includes ﬁve values ranging from very low
to very high. The score none is only applied when referring to the infrastructure deployment.
Technique Overhead Protocol Infrastructure Eﬃcacy Impact on
Compatibility Deployment Legitimate Traﬃc
Reactive - SBP high mid none mid very high
Reactive - DP high low none mid very high
Reactive - CNMR very high very low very high high high
Proactive very low very high none very high very low
• G3 - low infrastructure deployment: refers to the deployment of ad-hoc infrastructure,
e.g., nodes with additional monitoring capability.
• G4 - high eﬃcacy: refers to the performance which is usually measured in terms of the
average quality of service given to clients and the amount of resources, network bandwidth
and/or routers' resources, consumed by the attack in the network.
• G5 - low impact on legitimate traﬃc: refers to the percentage of legitimate traﬃc
aﬀected by the application of the countermeasures itself.
Certainly, priority among the above goals is not absolute rather driven by design requirements.
For example, the design of a countermeasure to be deployed at Internet scale would require
to introduce a few or almost no overhead because of the high link-speeds, nor infrastructure
deployment and the highest protocol compatibility because of the possibly involved diﬀerent
administrative network entities. In that case, the requirements G1, G2 and G3 are targeted,
while the requirements G4 and G5 may be relaxed. Conversely, a countermeasure operational in
an ICN-island at the network edge aims to block malicious traﬃc mainly to guarantee a good
experience to the clients (goals G4 and G5) accessing the mainstream network via that edge-
network segment. At the network edge, low overhead is not of foremost importance since an
edge-router handles slower network links, infrastructure deployment neither since the interested
infrastructure could be all part of the same network operator. Therefore, the requirements G4
and G5 may be prioritized over the G1, G2, G3 ones.
In Table 4.1 three of the most eﬀective reactive state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures have been
classiﬁed according to the above-deﬁned target Gx requirements: the Satisfaction-Based Push-
back (SBP) of [103], the Distributed Poseidon of [114], the CoordiNation MonitoRing (CNMR)
of [122]. The values in the columns Overhead, Protocol Compatibility, Infrastructure Deployment
of the reactive techniques have been inferred by the technique descriptions in [103, 114, 122].
The Eﬃcacy column values are based both on the evaluation reported in previous related work
[103, 114, 122] and on the latest results reported in chapter 3. The Impact on Legitimate Traﬃc
column values have been measured by this work as described in Sec. 4.3. Table 4.1 illustrates how:
• all the existing reactive techniques introduce considerable monitoring overhead. Monitoring
overhead is also highly proportional to the eﬃcacy, since a more ﬁne-grained observation
guarantees a more precise detection.
• the techniques showing higher protocol compatibility and requiring no infrastructure de-
ployment (e.g., SBP [103] and DP [114]) exhibit mid eﬃcacy and highly impact legitimate
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traﬃc.
• reactive countermeasures can be improved with regard to eﬃcacy and impact on legitimate
traﬃc at the price of largely increasing the overhead, the protocol compatibility and the
infrastructure deployment. This is exactly what is achieved by the CNMR [122] technique.
CNMR employs additional ad-hoc monitoring nodes and a centralized controller (infras-
tracture deployment), it performs a very ﬁne-grained monitoring per each preﬁx name
on each interface (overhead), it introduces Interest labeling to mark monitored Interests
as well as a protocol to communicate reports to the centralized controller unit (protocol
compatibility).
• the impact of the mitigation applied by a countermeasure on legitimate traﬃc has never
been estimated by the related work. However, all the three countermeasures are very
susceptible to the issue of dropping legitimate traﬃc if that either is issued with the preﬁx
names identiﬁed as detected or comes from the same infected interface or both.
Overall, a reactive countermeasure seems to have several downsides. First, it introduces overhead
for monitoring, protocol changes and infrastructure deployment proportionally to the desired ef-
ﬁcacy. Second, despite the invested resources, it aﬀects considerably legitimate traﬃc too since
it cannot discern Legitimate and Fake Interests issued under the same preﬁx name. Third, this
kind of countermeasure can still be circumvented with moderate attack capabilities.
4.2.2 Ideal Proactive Countermeasure
The last row of Table 4.1 shows how an ideal Proactive Countermeasure (PC) sets with respect to
the Gx target requirements. First, an ideal proactive countermeasure does not require collecting
and analyzing any traﬃc metric. Therefore, it is expected to introduce very low overhead. Per-
Interest analysis must be done to distinguish between Fake and Legitimate Interests. However,
this task can be accomplished by looking at the Interest packet ﬁelds and at a few more resources
built oﬀ-line. Second, an ideal proactive defense mechanism exhibits full protocol compatibility.
Forwarding decisions are made locally at each router and can be implemented in the form of
an NDN forwarding strategy module. Third, such a countermeasure requires no infrastructure
deployment since i) forwarding decisions are taken independently by each router, ii) no com-
munication between routers is required. With regard to the requirements G4 and G5, those
highly depend on the attacker model and on the Interest packet analysis technique applied by
the proactive countermeasure. In general, assuming an attacker model where attackers are able
to precisely generate both forged content identiﬁers and valid ones, a proactive countermeasure
could leverage the attacker's same knowledge (e.g., publicly available content lists for a certain
provider as shown in Chapter 3) to eﬀectively discern those (i.e., factors which lead to very high
eﬃcacy and no impact on legitimate traﬃc). Conversely, proactiveness is ineﬀective when it is
not possible to establish a priori the validity of content identiﬁer (e.g., providers dynamically
generating content identiﬁers for multimedia streaming content). In this last case, neither the
attacker nor the router could precisely ascertain a priori the validity of a content identiﬁer (i.e.
factors which lead to low eﬃcacy and high impact on legitimate traﬃc).
4.2.3 From Principles to Practice
The ideal behavior described in Sec. 4.2.2 faces additional constraints in realistic settings. First,
pure proactive countermeasures cannot detect valid Interests yet generated by attackers. So, they
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are totally ineﬃcient against attacks where collusive consumers and producers collaborate to de-
lay the delivery of valid Data packets [112]. Second, proactive countermeasures assume routers
are able to distinguish spoofed content identiﬁers from valid ones. This can be achieved either
by knowing all the valid content identiﬁers or by learning them through prior traﬃc observation.
The former method applies for static contents whose lists are made available by the respective
producers. The latter method applies for both dynamically generated contents or contents whose
lists are not available. In the former case, several possibly very large lists of content identiﬁers
must be stored by routers and checked at run-time. In the latter, learning models must be built
and maintained on-line. The former case is of notable interest because of the latest disruptive
IFA attacks [111] using large providers' publicly available content lists. The latter case requires
traﬃc to be monitored ﬁrst in order to build a model, hence, it exhibits the same issues seen
with existing reactive countermeasures.
The Gx requirements framework has been introduced to guide the design of future countermea-
sures. Therefore, the design of a proactive countermeasure starts from sorting the target Gx
requirements. With that aim, the design is assumed to address at ﬁrst the main issues raised by
the latest attacks with respect to the state-of-the-art reactive countermeasures [111]. That is, to
avoid using a countermeasure which performs uneﬃciently and penalizes legitimate consumers
despite a large monitoring overhead and the deployment of an ad-hoc infrastucture to ﬁne tune
the monitoring operation. Hence, low overhead (G1), high eﬃcacy (G2) and no impact on legit-
imate traﬃc (G3) are the main target requirements. While, the requirements of high protocol
compatibility (G2) and low infrastructure deployment have lower priority.
4.2.4 Content summaries
Traditionally, Legitimate Interests and Fake ones have been considered indistinguishable at
routers. In fact, those only diﬀer in content identiﬁers and routers are not supposed to have
any notion about valid and spoofed ones. Indeed, the assumption that routers do not have any
knowledge about valid content identiﬁers is not always true and so it may be relaxed in some
scenarios. For example, in the steady attack model proposed in [111], attackers have access to
public lists of valid identiﬁers for target preﬁx names, so routers do too.
Assuming lists of valid content identiﬁers are available, those could be stored and checked by
routers at the Interest reception. Such a scenario imposes three main requirements for the design
of a proactive countermeasure which should not:
• alter the correctness of the Interest forwarding operation, that is, the countermeasures
should aﬀect neither the forwarding of legitimate Interests upstream nor the forwarding of
the respective Data downstream.
• introduce large memory requirements to store the lists of contents.
• introduce intolerable additional latency in the Interest processing since the validity check
of Interest names is expected to be done at line-rate per every Interest.
Bloom ﬁlters (BFs) [89] are a perfect candidate to create space-eﬃcient summaries of content
identiﬁers under a certain preﬁx name. A BF is a data-structure for membership query which
can represent a set of n elements with an array of m bits where m << n (the mathematics
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behind the bloom ﬁlters has been summarized in Sec. 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 where the BloomFilter-
based PIT designs have been illustrated). With regard to the three above requirements, ﬁrst, BFs
guarantee a constant membership test time, so they introduce negligible latency in the processing
of Interests. Second, BFs provide a very compact representation for a set of elements, so the
related memory requirement is kept low. Third, although BFs introduce false positive (whose
error probability can be ﬁnely tuned), this does not alter the correctness of the forwarding
operation. In fact, a false positive leads to the router marking as valid a content identiﬁer which
indeed is a spoofed one. The outcome of this error is the forwarding of a Fake Interest. Knowing
this probability can be tuned, the impact on the network load will be negligible.
This work proposes Charon12, a proactive countermeasure against IFAs where NDN routers use
BF-based content summaries at run-time to check the validity of the content identiﬁer in every
Interest name. Charon, except for a few false positives, is able to drop Fake Interests as close as
possible those enter the network.
4.2.5 Addressing Scalability
The basic design of Charon assumes routers always hold the content summary for a certain preﬁx
under attack. However, this may be unlikely to scale in real settings for several reasons. First,
routers would need to store content summaries for a large number of content providers, e.g., all
the preﬁx names available in the router's FIB. Still, this would be reasonable, assuming those
were mostly stored on secondary memory and moved to main memory at run-time accordingly.
Second, those summaries may need to be updated by content providers or new summaries may
be needed due to routing updates. For the above reasons, it seems reasonable to foresee a way
for routers to occasionally fetch and/or regularly update content summaries. The basic design
of Charon enforces no speciﬁc solution for that purpose rather highlights a few possibilities.
Content summaries could be made available to routers via either a trusted centralized authority
(as it happens for today's public key certiﬁcates) or could be directly asked to the respective
content producers. In the latter case, encryption should be used to avoid prospective attackers
to fetch the content summaries and generate set of forged content identiﬁers which generate false
positives. Furthermore, once the summaries are issued by the content providers, they would be
cached in the network as ordinary Data packets. Therefore, the latency necessary to retrieve
the summaries is reduced and the risk of relying on a single centralized point of failure too. In
both cases, a secure communication channel between the router and the source of the summaries
should exist to prevent attackers from getting the information required to obtain a clear version
of a summary. The architecture envisioned by Charon is illustrated in Fig. 4.3.
With regard to the scalability of the countermeasure, Charon oﬀers a considerable advantage
over existing reactive countermeasures. In fact, while reactive countermeasures must be deployed
in several network areas and orchestrated so for the attacks to be properly detected, the check
performed by a proactive countermeasure like Charon is independent from the position in the
network where that is deployed. In fact, Charon can be selectively deployed in a few speciﬁc
points of network without compromising its overall eﬃcacy. In particular, edge-routers are perfect
candidates since they block the fake Interests as soon as those enter the mainstream network.
Additional deployment of the countermeasure in inner network tiers would not bring any tangible
beneﬁt assuming the content summaries are mostly identical, that is, having the same false error
probability. The deployment at the edge also reliefs core network routers to perform additional
per-packet processing which could not be sustained at certain link speeds.
12In Greek mythology, Charon is the Hades' ferryman who carries souls across the rivers dividing the world of
the living from the world of the dead.
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Figure 4.3  An overview of the architectural components for the deployment of the proactive countermeasure
Charon.
Finally, Charon envisions the possibility for routers to ask for diﬀerent summaries of the same
content list. The reason for this feature is to allow routers to decide about the size of the ﬁlter
to store and the computational overhead to sustain. The false probability error in BFs depends
on three factors: the number of elements in the set n, the size of the ﬁlter m, the number of
hash functions k. Thus, for example, a smaller ﬁlter could be required by a provider whether a
higher false probability error would be considered acceptable.
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4.3 Evaluation
The evaluation reported in this section concerns two main factors. First, it shows that the
proactive Charon design is more robust than the best state-of-the-art countermeasures against
all the latest stealthy attacks proposed in [111]. In fact, Charon entirely preserves the quality of
service perceived by clients when the network is under those attacks. Moreover, Charon shields
the network infrastructure from the overload of state in PITs created by the attackers ﬂooding
with malicious Interests. Second, it outlines the importance of evaluating the impact of the
application of the IFA countermeasures on legitimate traﬃc. Indeed, by precisely tracking the
forwarding decisions taken on both malicious and legitimate interests in the network simulations,
it is possible to see two diﬀerent concerning behaviors: i) a considerable amount of legitimate
traﬃc is always dropped as a consequence of the mitigation and the eﬀect of this behavior on
some kind of traﬃc, e.g., video streaming, stays unclear, ii) the portion of legitimate traﬃc
dropped does not necessarily depend on the router load rather on whether or not Malicious In-
terests and Legitimate ones enter the router from the same downstream interface.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. The evaluation settings and metrics are summa-
rized in Sec. 4.3.1. A novel evaluation metric which measures the impact of a defense mechanism
on legitimate traﬃc is introduced in Sec. 4.3.2. Finally, the performance of Charon compared
to the state-of-the art countermeasures is discussed in Sec. 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Evaluation Environment and Metrics
For the sake of a fair comparison to the related work, the eﬃcacy of the basic Charon design
has been assessed by replicating the experiments in [111]. Therein, three state-of-the-art coun-
termeasures are evaluated with respect to diﬀerent IFA attacks on the ndnSIM [127] simulation
environment. Charon has been implemented as an ndnSIM's forwarding strategy module and
deployed on all the routers of the simulation scenario. The experiments in [111] are conducted on
a single AS-like topology (the Exodus ISP topology of the Rocketfuel project [128]) containing
less than one hundred nodes. The nodes running Charon hold a bloom ﬁlter-based (BF-based)
content summary of the valid content identiﬁers for a certain preﬁx name. The BF-based content
summary is built oﬀ-line before starting the simulation.
In each simulation, attacks are carried out by a ﬁxed percentage of randomly selected nodes in
the network topology. All the attackers generate diﬀerent kinds of Interest with a ﬁxed attack
frequency of 1000 Interest packets per second (ipps), while all the clients issue 100 legitimate
Interest packets per second. Attacks start at 60 seconds and end at 360 seconds of the total
simulation time. The performance of each defense mechanism has been evaluated by measuring
two diﬀerent metrics widely used by the related work: the Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) at
clients and the PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) at routers (the rationale of both metrics has been
described in Sec. 3.4.1 of Chapter 3). Each simulation scenario has been repeated 10 times,
where diﬀerent seeds generate diﬀerent attackers and clients network positions (while Interest
generation frequencies stay ﬁxed for both kind of entities), and average values are reported.
Charon has been tested against all the three IFA variants proposed in [111].
Charon's source code and all the necessary software to replicate the hereby reported experiments
have been made available as open source at [132].
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(a) IDR at the monitoring node 1 (b) IDR at the monitoring node 3
Figure 4.4  Interest Drop Ratio (IDR) for two diﬀerent monitoring nodes, monitor1 in 4.4a and monitor3 in 4.4a,
of the CNMR technique when the network is under a pIFA with attack frequency equals to 1000 ipps. The IDR
is shown for both Legitimate Interests (LIs) and Fake Interests (FIs).
4.3.2 Interest Drop Ratio
In IFAs, attackers generally strive for generating Malicious Interests with popular preﬁx names.
By that, attackers have two main objectives: i) to masquerade an attack in-between legitimate
traﬃc, ii) to cause mitigation techniques to also penalize legitimate traﬃc too, so to further
degrade the service provided to other normal users. This assumption about the attacker model
has been proved to be eﬀective for building stealthy IFAs in [111]. Those attacks have a higher
impact on both clients and the network infrastructure. However, at the time being there exists
no evaluation metric in the literature on IFAs to quantify precisely the impact on legitimate
traﬃc neither of this kind of attack nor of the countermeasures applied in defense to it. Indeed,
a precise understanding of this eﬀect could be beneﬁcial to improve existing defense mechanisms.
This work introduces the Interest Drop Ratio (IDR) as evaluation metric to quantify the impact
of the application of a certain IFA countermeasure on the legitimate traﬃc in the network. The
IDR is deﬁned as the ratio of forwarded Interests over the received ones across a certain time
window because of the countermeasure's forwarding decisions. The motivation behind the intro-
duction of a new evaluation metric for IFAs is mainly to show that proactive countermeasures
bring the additional advantage of not aﬀecting any legitimate traﬃc over the existing reac-
tive countermeasures. This hypothesis was conﬁrmed by measuring the IDR in scenarios where
Charon was applied as defense mechanisms to counteract ongoing attacks. In fact, Charon never
drops any Legitimate Interest by design. On the contrary, both SBP [103] and CNMR [122] drop
some legitimate traﬃc as eﬀect of their mitigation techniques.
Besides, even at an early stage of the adoption of this metric, the evaluation of IDR in other
simulation scenarios has already revealed unknown behaviors of other defense mechanisms. For
example, Fig. 4.4 plots the IDR measured at diﬀerent CNMR's monitoring nodes for both Le-
gitimate and Fake Interests. The plots in Fig. 4.4a and in Fig. 4.4b show that the portion
of legitimate traﬃc aﬀected by a monitoring node in CNMR is not proportional to the load of
received Fake Interests. In fact, while the monitoring node in Fig. 4.4a and the monitoring node
in Fig. 4.4b hold the same load of Fake Interests (the IDR represented by the red curve), the
amount of legitimate traﬃc they aﬀect (the IDR represented by the green curve) is diﬀerent.
This result suggests that indeed monitoring nodes exhibiting a lower IDR for Legitimate Inter-
ests receive part of those Interests on interfaces which are not subject to any mitigation.
80
4.3. Evaluation
(a) Average ISR of legitimate clients under pIFA (b) Average PUR of all the routers under pIFA
Figure 4.5  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) in 4.5a and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) in 4.5b under a pIFA with
attack frequency of 1000 ipps.
4.3.3 Charon performance
The proactive countermeasure Charon has been compared to the most eﬃcient state-of-the-art
reactive countermeasures in scenarios where the latter ones fail to counteract eﬃcaciously stealthy
IFAs. The evaluated reactive countermeasures are the Satisfaction-Based Pushback (SBP) [103]
and the CoordiNation MonitoRing (CNMR) [122]. Both SBP and CNMR are collaborative coun-
termeasures which monitor traﬃc metrics over observation time windows to detect attacks. On
one hand, SBP applies a probabilistic forwarding to each Interest where the forwarding decision
is based on locally measured ISR values and rate-limits announced by upstream neighbors. On
the other hand, CNMR relies on an ad-hoc set of monitoring routers coordinated by a centralized
controller to identify preﬁx names potentially under attack. Then, each CNMR router mitigates
the attack according to the locally measured ISR. Overall, both defense mechanisms suﬀer from
some weaknesses which can be exploited by attackers to remain undetected. More precisely,
metrics collected at routers can be tainted by dosing diﬀerent Interest types and by periodically
varying target preﬁx names, as done respectively by the blended IFA and the chamaleonic IFA
variants proposed in [111].
Fig. 4.5a and Fig. 4.5b illustrate respectively the average ISR and PUR values in a scenario
where the network is under a pure Interest Flooding Attack (pIFA) (see Sec. 3.3.2 of chapter 3
for a description of the attack). In a pIFA, attackers use oﬀ-line generated list of spoofed con-
tent identiﬁers to precisely issue only Fake Interests, that is, Interests for non-existent contents.
Fig. 4.5a shows that SBP performs closely to the baseline ND (which is the scenario where no
defense mechanism is on). In the same plot, CNMR improves compared to the baseline yet still
suﬀers from around a 30% loss of the original ISR measured at clients. In the same scenario,
Charon totally preserves legitimate traﬃc from any degradation of service since it easily detects
Fake Interests by querying the BF-based content summary held by every router. With regard to
the load on the network generated by a pIFA, Fig. 4.5b shows Charon blocks the attackers to
generate any additional load on routers since their Fake Interests are almost (except a few false
positives whose eﬀect is negligible) never forwarded farther than the ﬁrst network hop.
Fig. 4.6a and Fig. 4.6b illustrate respectively the average ISR and PUR values in the same
evaluation scenario where the network is under a blended Interest Flooding Attack (bIFA). The
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(a) Average ISR of legitimate clients under bIFA (b) Average PUR of all the routers under bIFA
Figure 4.6  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) in 4.6a and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) in 4.6b under a bIFA with
attack frequency of 1000 ipps.
(a) Average ISR of legitimate clients under cIFA (b) Average PUR of all the routers under cIFA
Figure 4.7  Interest Satisfaction Ratio (ISR) in 4.5a and PIT Utilization Ratio (PUR) in 4.5b under a cIFA with
attack frequency of 1000 ipps.
main aim of a bIFA is to pollute detection metrics computed by routers and stay undetected.
bIFA's attackers achieve this goal by issuing a certain percentage of valid Interests too. Valid
Interests allow attackers to maintain observed metrics below the respective detection thresholds
set by the routers. In this way, a bIFA remains undetected. As shown in Fig. 4.6a, a bIFA results
very eﬃcient against reactive countermeasures since it is never mitigated (the CNMR and SBP
curves lay below the baseline ND curve). Charon (the red curve represents the average ISR when
Charon is active), instead, is immune to this kind of attacker's strategy since it does not rely on
any detection metric. The only evidence of an ongoing attack is the little raise of the average
PUR value illustrated in Fig. 4.6b. In fact, although the attack fails to achieve its purpose, the
valid Interests emitted by the attacking nodes are regularly forwarded by all the routers in the
network and so generate additional PIT state.
Fig. 4.7a and Fig. 4.7b illustrate respectively the average ISR and PUR values in the same
evaluation scenario where the network is under a chamaleonic Interest Flooding Attack (cIFA).
In cIFAs, attackers periodically change target preﬁx name to avoid preﬁx name-based mitigation
techniques activated after a certain observation time window. The change of the target preﬁx
name nulliﬁes the rate-limit which is applied to that preﬁx name after the detection. If attackers
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change target with the same periodicity used by routers to trigger the detection (as done in the
scenario illustrated by the plots in Fig. 4.7), then the mitigation is applied to a preﬁx name
which does not carry anymore malicious traﬃc. Among the attacks proposed in [111], the cIFA is
the one degrading the most the performance of the tested reactive countermeasures. Conversely,
Charon is also immune to this IFA variant since its forwarding decisions are not driven by any
detection threshold. Therefore, Charon keeps average ISR and PUR values close the baseline
even during the attack.
In summary, the attack variants proposed in [111] revealed the ineﬃcacy of existing defense
mechanisms to neutralize a certain type of stealthy IFAs. Charon, instead, neutralizes those
attacks as soon as they enter the network, so it preserves the quality of service perceived by
legitimate clients and ooads the rest of the network infrastructure from dealing with loads of
unsatisﬁable requests.
4.4 Charon: size of the summary, optimizations and future work
This section introduces some design aspects of Charon which deserve immediate attention to
assess the feasibility of the proposed approach and target speciﬁc improvements as subject of
any future work.
First, it is important to estimate the size of a BF-based content summary since that could be
queried by routers at link-speed per every Interest packet. For that purpose, a BF-based content
summary is required to be stored on a memory technology fast enough to sustain the necessary
network throughput (the reader should remember that Charon is supposed to be deployed at the
edge of network whose throughput requirements can be read in [84]). The size m of a BF-based
content summary may be tuned according to the desired false probability rate p and the number
of hash functions k, where the number of elements n in the set is known. Considering a content
list of one million elements (this is not uncommon since, for example, the wikipedia page titles
content list used for the evaluations presented in Sec. 3.2.3 of chapter 3 and in Sec. 4.3.3 of
this chapter holds almost 13 million of diﬀerent content identiﬁers), a false positive probability
of 0.01 and using between 2 and 5 hash functions would require a bloom ﬁlter of a few MB [136].
A ﬁlter of that size could be easily stored on today's SRAM memory technology (whose today's
maximum capacity is 210MB [137]). Hence, multiple ﬁlters could be contemporaneously stored
in fast on-chip memory.
Second, even though large size BF-based content summaries can be stored in fast main memories
and meet the packet processing speed requirements, the architectural framework of Charon in
Fig. 4.3 envisions the content summaries to be fetched by routers and potentially cached in the
network as Data packets. Concerning the implementation of these system features, it is also
important to understand whether bloom ﬁlter compression techniques [138] could be used to
shrink the size of a summary and ease its transmission over and caching in the network.
Third, even if a pure Charon design turned to be prohibitive because of the impossibility of
storing all the ﬁlters in a router's main memory, content summaries could still be loaded and
queried only when under attack. This would translate into a hybrid proactive/reactive design
where the detection of an attack still relies on the monitoring of traﬃc statistics, while the
mitigation loads in main memory and queries the content summaries. The mitigation based on
content summaries has the advantage of never dropping any legitimate traﬃc compared to the
canonical reactive rate-limiting applied to name preﬁxes and/or interfaces. By design, this hybrid
technique is expected to respond eﬃcaciously to a pIFA but not to the bIFA and cIFA attacks
which circumvent the classical detection metrics. However, in those latter cases the detection
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could be simply triggered by an unusual load on the router since loading and querying the ﬁlter
would not introduce the same overhead as the canonical monitoring techniques.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has introduced a novel approach to the defense against Interest Flooding Attacks
(IFAs) in NDN. This new approach stems from the observation of certain pitfalls in the state-of-
the-art countermeasures, which can be exploited by potential attackers to mount very eﬀective
IFAs as shown in Chapter 3. The reactive nature of the existing defense mechanisms is the
root cause of the ineﬃcacy to defend against stealthy IFAs. Thus, the here-proposed defense
approach departs from the usual reactive defense approach and proposes a proactive strategy to
identify and counteract an IFA instead. Proactiveness is based only on the analysis of an Interest
packet ﬁelds to determine its either malicious or benign nature. Therefore, an ideal proactive
defense requires no monitoring of previous traﬃc to be performed to make forwarding decisions.
The absence of monitoring, typically used across reactive defense mechanisms, eliminates the
vulnerabilities which are exploited by the stealthy attacks introduced in Chapter 3.
This chapter has also designed a speciﬁc proactive defense schema, called Charon, and shown
its eﬃcacy against the latest stealthy IFAs. Nevertheless, Charon, speciﬁcally, and proactive
defense, in general, are only applicable under certain attack scenarios. Thus, the IFA threat
persists in the NDN. Therefore, the next chapter advocates for the investigation of diﬀerent
forwarding mechanisms for the NDN with the aim to preserve the main PIT properties without
exposing the IFA-related security issue.
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Alternative "defense" mechanisms
The Interest Flooding Attack (IFA) represents a severe security threat to Named-Data Networks
(NDNs). In fact, the state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures prove to be eﬀective only against naive
attackers. Yet, as thoroughly analyzed in chapter 3, eﬀective IFAs built upon realistic attacker
models can be easily mounted to disrupt even the most robust defense mechanism. Chapter 4
has introduced the concept of proactiveness in the design space of IFA countermeasures. Later,
that theoretical framework is leveraged to instantiate a defense mechanism of that sort to coun-
teract eﬃcaciously the latest proposed IFAs [111]. Proactive countermeasures eliminate serious
drawbacks experienced by their reactive counterparts. Neither monitoring overhead is required
nor delayed reaction is introduced by proactive countermeasures. Nevertheless, proactive defense
is not the panacea for IFAs, since this class of defense mechanisms applies well under certain
conditions of static content names and publicly available content lists. Provisioning of dynamic
contents, a very common scenario nowadays, breaks the assumptions proactive countermeasures
are designed upon. Overall, the uncertainty about the eﬃcacy of existing defense mechanisms as
well as the poor understanding of the real implications of IFAs for an operational network raise
the legitimate question whether or not diﬀerent forwarding mechanisms should be considered at
this early stage of design of the NDN architecture.
The root cause of the IFA attack is the per-Interest state kept by the Pending Interest Table. As
a consequence, both works proposing more lightweight PIT designs [139, 140] and works ques-
tioning the PIT existence by proposing alternative forwarding mechanisms [141, 142] have been
recently emerging. Nevertheless, replacing the PIT forwarding mechanism in NDNs has several
implications. In fact, the PIT guarantees several properties which may be inevitably lost with
a diﬀerent data-plane design. Beyond the basic Interest-Data design, the PIT enables, among
others, Interest aggregation, Data multicast delivery, sender anonymity and adaptive forwarding
behaviors. Further, the PIT has been leveraged to detect network problems [47] and has inﬂu-
enced the design of routing protocols for the NDN architecture [60]. Or yet, the PIT has been
used for the design of hop-by-hop Interest shapers to achieve congestion control [143] and for
tracking producers in mobility schemas [70].
Moreover, the lack of a common easy-to-access platform for testing and comparing alternative
forwarding plane designs makes hard to get a solid understanding of pros and cons of the diﬀer-
ent available approaches. For the above reasons, this chapter's contribution is two-fold. First, a
taxonomy of the main alternative forwarding mechanisms for CCN/NDNs is presented in Section
5.1. The presented taxonomy classiﬁes the existing diﬀerent approaches with respect to a set
of PIT's cardinal properties here identiﬁed. Second, by acknowledging that the current state of
aﬀairs does not contribute to compare and evaluate alternative forwarding mechanisms, emerging
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technologies for programming the data-plane have also been explored in the context of this work.
Thus, Sec. 5.2 introduces the P4 language, a novel high-level programming language for packet
processors, which has been used to implement the high-level description of an NDN data-plane,
NDN.p4, which is presented in Sec. 5.3.
5.1 Alternative PIT designs
The PIT is a core component of the NDN data-plane. As widely explained in Chapter 2, the PIT
enables the basic Interest-Data packets exchange. Beyond the stateful address-less forwarding
mechanism, the presence of per-packet state in the PIT has interesting implications for the role of
routing protocols, the design of adaptive forwarding behaviors, the regulation of network traﬃc.
Thus, alternative forwarding mechanisms for NDN should not be only considered with respect
to the basic Interest-Data exchange but rather by looking at their impact to all the secondary
PIT properties.
Since the inception of the NDN architecture, several alternative forwarding mechanisms have
been proposed with the aim to reduce the amount of necessary state in the PIT. Those works
have been mainly driven by concerns about the scalability of and the security threat introduced
by the PIT. The former is investigated since the estimate of the amount of resources needed
by the PIT (see Sec. 2.3 in Chapter 2) guarantees this component can sustain certain link
speeds. Therefore, a compression of the PIT size could mean the component would ﬁt into faster
memories. The latter represents a serious concern since, by design, normal users can easily abuse
PIT resources in the network to create denials of services. With regard to the PIT scalability,
the latest work about PIT sizing [101, 84] suggested available PIT designs can be implemented in
fast memories and sustain edge and core network link speeds. Instead, the uncertainty about the
eﬃcacy of existing defense mechanisms against IFAs fosters the research on alternative forwarding
mechanisms immune to this Denial Of Service attack.
5.1.1 Summary of the cardinal PIT properties
The main goal of the NDN's stateful data-plane design is that Data can be routed back to the
origins of the requests from any point in the network without the notion of the source address in
Interest packets. This mechanism is often referred to as Reverse Path or Breadcrumb Forward-
ing. Other properties, like the multicast data delivery, the interest aggregation and the adaptive
forwarding, can be considered the outcome of the NDN-speciﬁc stateful forwarding design. Most
of the time those properties are stated diﬀerently in the related works which seek for PIT re-
placements. Thus, the terminology is hereby clariﬁed before the state-of-the-art alternative PIT
designs can be compared.
Reverse Path Forwarding : Interests dynamically generate or update forwarding state in tra-
versed routers for Data to follow the trails back to the origins of the Interests. Thus, the presence
of PIT state allows Interests to be issued without source address. Further, PIT entries allow
routers to detect those Interests which are possibly looping because of the multipath feature
oﬀered by FIBs. However, the NDN's reverse path forwarding assumes path symmetry dwells
in the network, which is in sharp contrast with the path asymmetry observed in the Internet
backbone [144].
Interest aggregation: at the ﬁrst common router, Interests for the same content are aggregated
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in the same PIT entry. Interest aggregation has been promoted in NDN to reduce network and
server loads in combination with in-network caching. There have been so far few works analyzing
the likelihood of Interest aggregation in CCN/NDN networks. Further, the related ﬁndings are
contradictory. In fact, the theoretical models derived in [106, 145] suggest that indeed aggrega-
tion may appear at the network edge with very low probability for popular contents. Meanwhile,
the latest large trace-driven study in [146] reports that there could have been a considerable
reduction of server hits with Interest aggregation in the network for the analyzed traﬃc trace.
Multicast Data delivery : Interests for a content traveling from origins to content sources build a
temporary multicast forwarding tree which is made of the PIT entries left in the network. Dif-
ferent consumers may join the "multicast group" at any time and their requests are aggregated
at the ﬁrst router where a similar Interest has already been received and forwarded. Data pack-
ets are delivered downstream by following the tree and get multicasted where the tree branches.
Data consume related PIT entries. The multicast tree construction and deletion happens entirely
in the data-plane without any support from the control-plane.
Infrastructure security and robustness: the absence of end-host addresses in the NDN communi-
cation nulliﬁes some popular kinds of DDoS attack which aﬀect today's Internet. For example,
bandwidth depletion attacks, which ﬂood the network and target victims with unsustainable
traﬃc rates, cannot be carried out in NDNs because of the absence of addresses and of the pres-
ence of intrinsic mechanisms like Interest aggregation and in-network caching meant to smooth
excessive loads. Moreover, the PIT state may be leveraged to design adaptive forwarding behav-
iors to react against diﬀerent sort of anomalies, e.g., network problems like broken links and/or
congestion, malicious behaviors like preﬁx hijacking.
Sender anonymity : the absence of the source address in Interest packets guarantees consumer
privacy. That is, a third party cannot determine the source of an Interest only by looking at
the Interest packet ﬁelds. It is the state in routers' PITs which allows Data to track back the
origin of a request. An origin could only be determined if routers collaborated, for example, as
postulated in [120] to trace back sources of an Interest Flooding Attack.
5.1.2 Taxonomy of PIT alternatives
At a ﬁrst glance, there seem to be only two viable approaches, namely stateless or stateful, to de-
sign the forwarding mechanisms in Information-Centric Networking (ICN) architectures. Indeed,
several attempts have been made to either reduce the PIT size or replace the PIT component
in NDN/CCN networks. Hence, the categorization is broader and includes at least the following
categories:
• aggregation techniques [93]: these techniques aim to consolidate multiple PIT entries in one
single record as to reduce the maximum amount of forwarding state in the PIT. However,
since the compression is not loss-less, some forwarding information is lost.
• hybrid techniques [139, 140]: this refers to techniques which are neither entirely stateless
nor fully stateful. A portion of the Interests is generally forwarded without storing any
related status in the PIT. The nature of an Interest, either stateless or stateful, may be
chosen by diﬀerent factors, e.g., content popularity [140], probabilistic or deterministic
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Table 5.1  Alternative forwarding mechanisms in NDNs evaluated in terms of cardinal PIT
properties.
Technique RPF Interest ag-
gregation
Multicast Security Sender
Anonymity
Aggregation YES YES YES YES YES
Hybrid YES Some YES Some YES
Routing-
based
NO NO NO NO NO
State-
shifting
YES NO YES YES YES/NO
functions applied by routers [139]. Those techniques generally require a mechanism to
track the Interests when those travel through stateless part of the network. In general,
routers encode the reverse path in the Interest header which is used to forward the Interest
across network portions where no related state has been stored. If the mechanism is not
fully deterministic, then the Data delivery may cause overhead since Data are forwarded
downstream on unsolicited paths.
• fully routing-based techniques [142]: this refers to stateless techniques using routing tables
to forward Interest upstream and Data downstream. Additional routing information to
reach the origins of Interests is needed in order to route Data packets downstream. There-
fore, these methods increase the size of the FIB tables in routers to contain routes for both
consumers and producers of contents. Furthermore, if the source address is a topologi-
cal address, this kind of approach violates the consumer privacy by revealing the sender's
identity. Nevertheless, an identiﬁer local to a router can be used to denote the source of
Interests and preserve sender identity, as done with the anonymous datagrams proposed in
[141].
• state shifting techniques [147, 148]: this class refers to techniques where the state necessary
for a potential further data delivery is moved to packet headers. The state may be either
collected by Interests traversing the network (for example, in the CONET architecture
[147]) or source-routed by the origin by means of a topology-omniscient centralized entity
(like done in the LIPSIN forwarding architecture [148]).
Table 5.1 summarizes whether these forwarding mechanisms keep or lose the PIT properties
previously described in 5.1.1.
On the one hand, aggregation and hybrid techniques seem to be promising solutions since those
preserve many of the original PIT design properties. For example, all the cardinal properties
stay unaltered for the fraction of Interests which are forwarded statefully by hybrid techniques,
since the basic PIT forwarding mechanism is neither replaced nor eliminated. However, those
techniques only partially eliminate the exposure to Interest Flooding Attacks, which, by the way,
is the main concern driving the research on alternative forwarding mechanism designs. In fact,
those techniques bring only a reduction of the overall forwarding state in the network and do
not eliminate the possibility for malicious users to generate that.
On the other hand, routing-based and state-shifting techniques eliminate the issue with the state
in the network, though as a consequence they lose some of the related PIT properties. Generally,
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those techniques completely lose the ability to perform in-network Interest aggregation. How-
ever, it is interesting to analyze the mechanisms those techniques put in place to preserve some
of the other cardinal properties which are lost because of the absence of the PIT state.
Overall, all the proposed techniques introduce some modiﬁcations to the forwarding plane, e.g.,
new packet headers [147, 142], additional PIT state per entry [139], diﬀerent forwarding data-
structures and operations [139, 142]. Therefore, all the current proposals may face deployment
issues because of incompatibility with the existing architectures and protocols.
5.1.3 Questioning PIT beneﬁts
Some of the latest proposed alternative forwarding mechanisms for NDN/CCN networks [142,
141] present strong arguments against the cardinal PIT properties. Those works try to demon-
strate that the PIT may be infeasible in practice because of actual network ISP agreements and
of the unsolved security issues which are inherent to its stateful design. Moreover, many of the
claimed beneﬁts, like reduced end-to-end latency via Interest aggregation and consumer privacy
via sender anonymity, may either not subsist or be achieved by means of other forwarding mech-
anisms. If indeed the beneﬁts are overrated and the actual gain is considerably marginal, but
the security issues are real and harmful, then the use of the PIT should be reconsidered.
With regard to the Reverse Path Forwarding tenet, that seems to be based on the common
belief among the research community that communications ﬂow bidirectionally across the same
physical links in the Internet. This symmetry has been embedded for a long time in traﬃc clas-
siﬁcation tools and then adopted in the design of the NDN architecture where every Data packet
follows a reverse path to one or more origins of the request. Nevertheless, recent studies [144]
based on data collected over diﬀerent Internet links (e.g., diﬀerent tiers and links between those)
show that moving from the network edge to the core Internet path symmetry is rarely observed.
A dominant cause of this asymmetry is the "hot-potato routing" [149] practice employed by ISPs
to minimize the transit of some traﬃc within their networks. Besides that routing policy, traﬃc
engineering techniques, e.g., load balancing, may also cause packets sent to the same destination
to be forwarded over diﬀerent paths. Therefore, taking into account today's ISPs routing policies
and economic settlements, assuming path symmetry across the future Internet seems unfeasible.
As a conclusion, the reverse path forwarding is a property which should be either entirely re-
thinked or only enforced at the network edge where there could be the conditions to realize it.
As regards the Interest Aggregation property, some works [106, 145] have tried to determine the
likelihood of Interest collapsing via theoretical models and network simulations. Interests are
aggregated when they exhibit temporal correlation. That is, if the Interests arrive at a router
within a very small time window, which is expected to be of the order of tens of milliseconds.
Further, Interest aggregation will bring the most gain when that happens the most closest to
the consumer. Hence, it is important to understand how likely both conditions hold. Both
the independent studies [106, 145] highlight the high interplay between in-network caching and
Interest aggregation. According to their simulation results, it appears that the former plays a
fundamental role in determining the fraction of Interests which could beneﬁt from aggregation.
To summarize the ﬁndings therein, the percentage of aggregated Interests decreases with even
a small amount of caching budget (e.g., 1% of the total number of published objects) available
in the network and when consumers are less likely to ask for similar content (e.g., low tempo-
ral correlation among Interests). Moreover, most of the Interests are aggregated closer to the
content sources. This last behavior would drastically aﬀect the beneﬁts of reduced end-to-end
latency and network load advocated by this structure. These ﬁndings seem to demystify the
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need of Interest aggregation, since in-network caching could be applied to achieve similar bene-
ﬁts without exposing the NDN data-plane to IFAs. It is assumed that Interest aggregation also
prevents multipath routing to generate loops. In fact, PIT entries store Interest nonces and so
are able to distinguish the reception of a duplicate Interest which may be looping in the network.
However, there exist conditions (for the ﬁrst time presented in [150]) where Interest aggregation
in the PIT may prevent Interests loops to be detected and cause Data to never be delivered
to consumers. The same work [150] proves no correct forwarding can be designed simply by
uniquely identifying with a diﬀerent Nonce each Interest. Therefore, the current NDN Interest
aggregation mechanism does not guarantee correct interest forwarding. Alternative forwarding
mechanisms, which are immune to the undetected loops problem, have already been proposed
[151].
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5.2 Programmable Data-planes
The ﬁrst generation of IP routers were software programs running on general purpose processors
[152]. The use of generic platforms eased the design and implementation of packet processing
functions at a high level at a time where network throughput was not a prime requirement. In
fact, general purpose chips and architectures were not designed to optimize few speciﬁc tasks,
rather to be generic enough to perform a vast set of operations. Today, network functions are
mostly implemented with Application Speciﬁc Integrated Circuits (ASICs) to meet strict latency
and network throughput requirements imposed by higher link-speeds. Meanwhile, more versatile
chips, like Network Processor Units (NPUs), can be used in less time-critical network environ-
ments where, however, changes of the network behavior may be required on the ﬁeld.
Wisely looking at the design of forwarding devices, i.e., switches and routers, over the past
decades, two important facts emerge. First, new protocols have always been ﬁrst standardized
and then implemented in network equipment (among them, the recent proliferation of encapsu-
lation protocols like VxLAN, PBB, GRE). Second, today's forwarding devices oﬀer more func-
tionalities (QoS, security, etc.) in addition to the simple L2 and L3 forwarding. In either case,
a new protocol or a new functionality may lead to the design of a new chip whether that is not
supported by the latest hardware. The latter operation is a few-year long process which slows
down the adoption of a technology at best, or discourages it at worst. Since the introduction
of new protocols and functions seems to be more and more commonplace, several chip designs
for high-speed reconﬁgurable packet processors have been proposed [153, 79, 154]. Novel pro-
grammable packet processors come together with new programming languages to express the
network behavior into an easy and reusable way [153, 80]. Among those languages, the Pro-
gramming Protocol-independent Packet Processors (P4) [80] has gained notable traction since
its inception in 2014.
As explained in detail in the previous chapters, an ICN network layer routes content requests
toward nearby content sources using their content identiﬁers rather than speciﬁc host addresses.
In NDN/CCN-like networks, routers feature the three functional blocks, namely PIT, CS, FIB,
working on named data. The NDN data-plane involves new and unconventional processing to be
performed at line-speed. For each NDN packet, several lookups on variable length names may
be required, further, some related state has to be stored and/or updated. The design of NDN-
enabled routers turns to be challenging because of two main issues: i) the algorithmic challenges
that still need to be solved [155, 156, 84], ii) the evident lack of adequate hardware support
to describe this data-plane behavior [157, 96]. Existing designs of an NDN router have been
engineered by leveraging speciﬁc features of the target software/hardware platform. As result,
those designs cannot be easily shared and leveraged for either further research or operational
deployment.
We believe that the emergence of a new generation of fully programmable forwarding elements
represents an opportunity to advance the research on ICN. In fact, if the next generation of
programmable networking devices has the right feature set to fully describe any ICN packet
processing, then there will be more chances to showcase the potential beneﬁts of ICN architec-
tures. More broadly, we consider the advent of this technology as an inﬂection point [158] for a
conﬂuence between the Software-Deﬁned Networking stream of thought and the ICN one.
To promote the description of ICN protocols in a uniﬁed open-source way, which would made
the related designs sharable and re-usable, the work NDN.p4 in [81] has ﬁrst been conducted.
NDN.p4, which is presented in this section, has been the ﬁrst attempt to implement an ICN
protocol using the P4 language for packet processors. Sec. 5.2.1 introduces the P4 language, the
main syntax and the related programming model. Sec. 5.3 describes the implementation of the
91
Chapter 5. Alternative "defense" mechanisms
NDN protocol in P4. Finally, Sec. 5.3.6 recapitulates the main lessons learned during the design
of the NDN.p4 solution.
5.2.1 The P4 language
P4 [80] is a programming language to conﬁgure the data-plane of network forwarding elements.
The aim of the P4 language is to abstract how packets are processed by diﬀerent devices in a
high-level target-independent description. Then, target-speciﬁc compilers are supposed to map
and optimize the high-level description in a P4 program to the low-level intricacies of the respec-
tive target architectures. The idea behind the language was ﬁrst proposed in [80] and since then
collaboratively developed by a rich community made of academics, network equipment vendors,
telco providers under the umbrella of an open non-proﬁt consortium [159].
Since the ﬁrst language speciﬁcation, called P4_14, the language has considerably evolved and
become mature in a new language version, called P4_16. P4_16 is not backward compatible
with P4_14. Both language speciﬁcations are available at [159]. However, NDN.p4 was imple-
mented in P4_14, so the description of the language which follows refers to that early version.
A P4 program conﬁgures the supported protocols and the packet processing operations in a
forwarding element. A forwarding element which can run P4 programs is called a P4 target or
simply a target. The P4_1413 language speciﬁcation is based on a speciﬁc abstract model of a
forwarding element. The forwarding model is composed of a programmable parser, a buﬀer for
packet headers and metadata, an ingress and an egress pipelines of match-action tables as shown
in Fig. 5.2.1 (the processing pipeline of this model mimics the commonplace design of some of
the latest fully-programmable forwarding devices [79, 160]).
Figure 5.1  The abstract forwarding model for the P4_14 language speciﬁcation.
13For the sake of clarity, from now on until the end of this section, the abbreviation P4 is used whenever the
text refers to the P4_14 language speciﬁcation.
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Usually ﬁve parts are needed to describe the behavior of a forwarding device in P4: the headers,
the parser, the actions, the tables and the control ﬂow. Those parts compose the yellow and
red blocks in the abstract model [161] reported in Fig. 5.2.1. A small snippet of code for each
program block is illustrated in Table 5.2 where a simple P4 program is dissected. The illustrative
program in Table 5.2 describes the behavior of a simpliﬁed IPv4 router which parses Ethernet
and IPv4 headers in incoming packets and then forwards those based on their IP destination
addresses. Finally, the P4 program rewrites the packet's MAC source and destination addresses
based on the output port the packet is transmitted to.
The headers are the deﬁnition of protocols that the P4 target uses to parse the incoming bit
stream to identify the protocols in a packet and extract the ﬁelds necessary to the processing. A
P4 header contains a list of ﬁelds and ﬁeld widths in bits arranged in a C struct-like layout, as
shown in the A cell of Table 5.2 where the structure of an ethernet header is speciﬁed. Headers
represent types that can be instantiated and initialized once found and parsed in packets, as
shown in the B cell of Table 5.2.
The parser is a ﬁnite-state machine that determines and extracts the protocols seen in a packet
according to the headers deﬁnition. The parser is made of parser states whose transitions can be
determined according to header ﬁeld values (e.g., the Ethernet's ethertype ﬁeld in our example).
A simple parser for the ethernet and IPv4 protocols is shown in the cells B and C of Table 5.2.
Actions are language primitives to express common packet editing tasks, like modifying header
ﬁelds, selecting output ports, adding/removing headers, etc. Primitive actions can be combined
in bundles to create compound user-deﬁned functions. For example, the set_nexthop action in
the D cell of Table 5.2 combines the two primitive actions, modify_ﬁeld and subtract_from_ﬁeld,
to perform the packet editing necessary to forward the IP packet to the nexthop and decrement
the TTL count. Compound actions are meant to be linked to table entries.
P4 tables are logical tables used to trigger the activation of actions for packets. The table in
the F cell of Table 5.2 speciﬁes a longest preﬁx match type on the IPv4 destination address to
activate either the set_nexthop action or the on_miss one. The table in the G cell translates the
information about a next-hop to an output port and re-writes the packet's MAC addresses based
on the selected output port. Table deﬁnitions in P4 programs only specify the logical skeleton
of the table. Table entries are then populated at run-time by a control plane logic. A run-time
insertion command ﬁlls a table entry with speciﬁc values for the matching ﬁelds, an indication
of the action to associate to the entry and possibly some optional parameters.
The control ﬂow deﬁnes the program execution path. The programming model in Fig. 5.2.1
includes two pipelines, one for the ingress stage and another one for the egress. The ingress
pipeline contains a sequence of match-action tables to be executed sequentially and/or according
to some branching conditions. The ingress pipeline produces an egress speciﬁcation in terms of
output ports and number of packet copies. The egress speciﬁcation is later used in the egress
pipeline to correctly forward the packets. The illustrative P4 program of Table 5.2 has a very
simple control ﬂow, illustrated in the H cell, which consists of the application of the two deﬁned
tables. First, the table ipv4_ﬁb_lpm is applied in the ingress pipeline to select the next-hop
address. Then, the table forward selects the output port and rewrites the MAC addresses in the
egress pipeline.
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Table 5.2  Snippets of code showing some of the P4_14 syntax.
A - Header Deﬁnition and Instantiation B - Parser part 1
header_type ethernet_t {
f i e ld s {
dstAddr : 48 ;
srcAddr : 48 ;
etherType : 16 ;
}
}
header ethernet_t e the rne t ;
parser s t a r t {
return parse_eth ;
}
parser parse_eth {
extract ( e the rne t ) ;
return select ( e the rne t . etherType ) {
0x0800 : parse_ipv4 ;
default : i n g r e s s ;
}
}
C - Parser part 2 D - Action deﬁnition 1
parser parse_ipv4 {
extract ( ipv4 ) ;
return i n g r e s s ;
}
action set_nexthop ( nexthop ) {
modi fy_f ie ld ( standard_metadata . egress_spec ,
nexthop ) ;
subtract_from_fie ld ( ipv4 . t t l , 1 ) ;
}
action on_miss ( ){
no_op ( ) ;
}
E - Action deﬁnition 2 F - Table deﬁnition 1
action rewrite_macs ( smac , dmac) {
modi fy_f ie ld ( e the rne t . srcAddr , smac ) ;
modi fy_f ie ld ( e the rne t . dstAddr , dmac ) ;
}
action no_rewrite ( ){
drop ( ) ;
}
table ipv4_fib_lpm {
reads {
ipv4 . dstAddr : lpm ;
}
actions {
set_nexthop ;
on_miss ;
}
s ize : 5000 ;
}
G - Table deﬁnition 2 H - Control Flow
table forward {
reads {
standard_metadata . egress_port : exact ;
}
actions {
rewrite_macs ;
no_rewrite ;
}
s ize : 64 ;
}
control i n g r e s s {
apply ( ipv4_ fib_lpm ) ;
}
control e g r e s s {
apply ( forward ) ;
}
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5.3 NDN.p4
NDN.p4 is the ﬁrst implementation of an ICN protocol in P4. The NDN.p4 contribution was
two-fold: i) showcasing for the ﬁrst time how ICN protocols and the related network behaviors
could be implemented and tested on the next-generation of programmable data-planes, ii) high-
lighting some of the limitations of the P4 language in describing non-standard packet processing
operations. NDN.p4 had to face the constraints of the P4's early language speciﬁcation, so it does
not provide a fully functional NDN router rather a partial implementation featuring the basic
NDN Interest-Data exchange. Additional features, e.g., in-router caching and Data multicasting,
have not been implemented because those did not meet the two following requirements:
• a P4 program fully compliant with the language speciﬁcation, that is, no new constructs
have been added to the language,
• no assumptions about the existence of target-speciﬁc components.
As a result, the NDN.p4 program can be used to program any P4_14-compliant target. For
example, the P4 software switch at [162] has been the reference target to validate the NDN.p4
design. The target is programmed as a forwarding element able to perform the basic NDN
Interest-Data exchange. More in detail, at the Interest reception, the programmed target parses
the Interest name and forwards the Interest according to its FIB-like records. For every for-
warded Interest, the target registers a pending request in a PIT-like table. At Data reception,
the target parses the Data packet and extracts the name. If the PIT-like table contains any
pending request for the same content name, then the Data is forwarded downstream to the reg-
istered output interface; if not, the Data is simply dropped.
The correctness of the program logic has been evaluated through native NDN applications com-
municating over the software target programmed by the NDN.p4 code. The experiment simulates
two NDN applications, ndnpeek and ndnpoke, exchanging Interest and Data packets through the
P4 software-switch [162] as if it was a real NDN forwarding daemon. The ndnpeek application is
a basic consumer of Data packets which can generate Interests with speciﬁc content names. The
ndnpoke application is a basic producer of Data which can serve requests for contents under a
speciﬁc preﬁx name. The experiment has also been made available on the mini-NDN [163] fork
of the Mininet platform for network emulation. The source code of the NDN.p4 router and the
instructions to reproduce the experiments are free available at https://github.com/signorello.
The NDN.p4 router program consists of less than ﬁve hundred lines of code written in P4. In
the following, the main components of this P4 program are described through the illustration
of partial snippets of code where needed to highlight distinctive features of the implementation.
Finally, this section also presents some insightful lessons learned throughout the implementation
of the NDN.p4 solution.
5.3.1 Headers & Parser
NDN packets are made of nested variable-length Type Length Value (TLV) blocks. Those blocks
contain the header ﬁelds and the payload according to the packet speciﬁcation [59]. For example,
a dissected Interest packet is shown in Fig. 5.2. The outmost TLV of the Interest, here named T1,
contains all the Interest ﬁelds. T1's Value contains two more TLVs, TN for the name and TNo for
the nonce. In turn, TN 's Value contains a sequence of four TLVs, denoted TNc, each containing
95
Chapter 5. Alternative "defense" mechanisms
  
C1: named-data.net
C2: publications
C3 : ndn_ccr
C4: file.pdf
Type
Length
Value
header_type fixedTLV_t {
  fields{
      tlv_code : 8;
      tlv_length : 8;
      tlv_value : *;
  }
  length : tlv_length + 2;
  max_length : 255;
}
header fixedTLV_t components[MAX_NAME_COMPONENTS];
TI
TN
TNc
TNo
TI Interest
TN Name
TNc Name component
TNo Nonce
Interest packet
Nonce TLV
Name TLV
Name Components TLVs
P4 header definition for
   name components
header smallTL_t small_tlv0, small_name;
header fixedTLV_t nonce;
Assigned Type values
Figure 5.2  Interest for ndn:/named-data.net/publications/ndn_ccr/ﬁle.pdf
a name component Cn . NDN TLVs follow a variable length encoding. Type and Length may
be encoded in either 1, 2, 4 or 8 bytes while the Value size is indicated by the Length value. All
the Type codes currently used by the NDN protocols are encoded in a single byte, so NDN.p4
assumes to deal only with TLVs of ﬁxed-size Type.
P4 header deﬁnitions can contain one variable-length ﬁeld at most per header. However, NDN
packets feature several variable-lenght TLVs. Yet, some TLVs serve as containers for further
nested header ﬁelds (e.g., the Name TLV is the container of all the name components TLVs).
Therefore, NDN.p4 uses several headers to reproduce the structure of the NDN packets, which
could not be described by a single header deﬁnition in P4. First, four header types for all the pos-
sible Length sizes are deﬁned assuming the Type encoding is ﬁxed (smallTL_t, mediumTL_t,
bigTL_t, hugeTL_t). Those headers extract Type and Length of TLV containers leaving the
Value for further inspection. Second, the TLVs with only variable-length Value are represented
by the ﬁxedTLV_t header type. For example, the Type and Value ﬁelds of the T1 and TN TLVs
in Fig. 5.2 are parsed as a separate headers of the type smallTL_t (see this and all the other
available header deﬁnitions for Type and Value blocks in Fig. 5.3). Instead, name components
TLVs are instances of the ﬁxedTLV_t header type (hence are of header type described in the
lower ﬁne-dotted box in Fig. 5.2). Name components TLVs have a 1-byte Length ﬁeld encoding
and a variable-length Value according to the component size.
Further, NDN.p4 assumes both Interest and Data packets contain a maximum number of name
components Cn, which must be known at compile-time. For that purpose, P4 provides a ﬁxed-
size array-like construct, namely the header stack. A P4 header stack allows the programmer to
have a concise representation of multiple consecutive headers of the same type. A header stack
is used in NDN.p4 to deﬁne an array of ﬁxedTLV_t headers for the name components, as shown
in the lower ﬁne-dotted box of Fig. 5.2. The header stack maximum size must be a constant
value (e.g., the constant 'MAX NAME COMPONENTS' in Fig. 5.2).
The parser code inspects incoming packets and extracts header ﬁelds according to the header
deﬁnitions. State transitions in the NDN.p4's parser occur either by : i) reading the Type
value of the next TLV when the length of the current TLV block is known (as done in the
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parser parse_ndn {
    return select(current(8,8)) {
        EN_2B : parse_medium_tlv0;
        EN_4B : parse_big_tlv0;
        EN_8B : parse_huge_tlv0;
        default : parse_small_tlv0;
    }
}
…...............................................
…...............................................
parser parse_afterName {
return select(current(0,8)) {
        NDNTYPE_IS2 : parse_isha256;
        NDNTYPE_NON : parse_nonce;
        NDNTYPE_MTI : parse_metainfo;
        default : parse_error p4_pe_default;
    }
}
header_type smallTL_t {
  fields{
    tl_code : 8;
    tl_length : 8;
  }}
header_type hugeTL_t {
  fields{
    tl_code : 8;
    tl_len_code : 8;
    tl_length : 64;
  }}
header_type bigTL_t {
  fields{
    tl_code : 8;
    tl_len_code : 8;
    tl_length : 32;
  }}
header_type mediumTL_t {
  fields{
    tl_code : 8;
    tl_len_code : 8;
    tl_length : 16;
  }}
Type check
Length check
Figure 5.3  Some parser states and header deﬁnitions in NDN.p4
parser_afterName state of Fig. 5.3) or ii) determining the Length value of the current TLV
block to select the header to be extracted in the next parser state (as done in the parse_ndn
method of Fig. 5.3). For example, the value of the Length of the outmost T1 in Fig. 5.2 is read
before proceeding with the extraction of a header of type smallTL_t, as shown in the upper
part of the central box of Fig. 5.3. If the Length value indicated a bigger encoding, a diﬀerent
header would be extracted among the available header deﬁnitions: mediumTL_t, bigTL_t and
hugeTL_t.
The parser also includes a special state to extract the name components, which loops on a counter
initialized with the total name length. After a name component is extracted, its total length is
subtracted from the counter; the parser loops until all the components have been extracted.
5.3.2 Pending Interest Table (PIT)
PIT entries are created and updated by incoming Interest and Data packets. By consequence,
PIT modiﬁcations happen entirely in the data-plane. Nevertheless, P4 tables can just be edited
by the control-plane (as better explained in the Subsection 5.3.5). Hence, the NDN.p4's PIT
table is implemented on registers. P4 registers represent stateful memories which keep state
across multiple packets and can be updated in the data-plane. The complete PIT behavior
is simulated by also using three match-action tables: the hashName_table, the pit_table and
the updatePit_table. The hashName_table computes the index of the PIT entry as hash of
the packet name and writes that to the name_hash metadata ﬁeld. Then, the pit_table uses
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name_hash to read the indexed register location14. Finally, the update_Pit either creates a new
PIT entry or records a new incoming interface in the existing PIT entry. In summary, the actual
PIT table is stored in registers, while the match-action tables are responsible for addressing and
eventually updating that register block.
5.3.3 Forwarding-Information Base (FIB)
FIB entries associate preﬁx names to one or many output interfaces. The algorithm that de-
termines the FIB entry matching a content name is a Longest-Preﬁx Match (LPM) on name-
components. An LPM on name-components prioritizes the entry whose preﬁx name has the
longest-preﬁx in common with the Interest name over the entries having smaller ones.
P4 tables feature standard match types like exact or ternary match. Of course, an LPM on
name-components is not natively supported by the P4 table construct. So, NDN.p4 implements
this kind of match by using some other native match types and a speciﬁc set of table entries. The
designed algorithm is better explained through an example which is reported in Fig. 5.4. The
FIB of the example has the two entries A="/a/b/c eth1" and B="/a/b eth4", made of three
and two name components respectively. At the reception of an Interest named ndn:/a/b/c/d,
the A entry must be selected.
At that stage of the control ﬂow, the full hash of the Interest name and the hashes of all the
smaller name-preﬁxes are already available as metadata, as illustrated in the top-left box of Fig.
5.4. The ﬁb_table (in the top-right box in Fig. 5.4) includes the total number of name compo-
nents, the full hash of the name and the hashes of the shorter preﬁxes as matching ﬁelds. The
route A for the preﬁx "/a/b/c" is made of a number of table entries equals to
n−m + 1 m ∈ [0, n],
where 'm' is the number of components in the preﬁx and 'n' is the maximum number of name
components that the target is programmed to parse. Those entries allows the program to match
Interests with a number of name components equal or greater to 'm' for that FIB entry. Since
multiple table entries correspond to a single FIB entry, then a further selection mechanism has
to be applied. Thus, ternary matches on the metadata ﬁelds "comp_metadata.cx" are used to
match on the right hash combination for the preﬁx-name. For example, to match against a FIB
entry that is made of three name components, e.g., route A in Fig. 5.4, the fourth match-ﬁeld
of the related entries in the ﬁne-dotted green box , that is, 'h(a,b,c)&&&1', contains a full mask
to perform an exact match on this ﬁeld. All the other hashes have a zero mask, so not match is
performed to those. However, Interests for ndn:/a/b/c/d would match the second and the ﬁfth
entry of the rule-set that correspond to route A and route B, if only the number of components
and the hashes of the route preﬁx-names were considered. Hence, these FIB entries include an
additional value that speciﬁes the priority with which they must be applied, i.e., the last value of
each entry of the rule-set. A lower value gives higher priority to a matching entry. For example,
the 2nd entry has higher priority than the 5th entry, and so route A is ﬁnally the matching entry
for the Interest /a/b/c/d.
Two shortcomings of this algorithm are: i) the number of records to be inserted for a single FIB
entry depends on the number of name components of the related preﬁx name, ii) the priority
assignments have to be predeﬁned by a control plane logic.
14The reader should be aware that the name is produced as a hash and so the register suﬀers from collisions.
However, in this preliminary implementation, no mechanism has been designed to prevent this issue.
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table fib_table {
    reads {
        name_metadata.components : exact;
        comp_metadata.c1 : ternary;
        comp_metadata.c12 : ternary;
        comp_metadata.c123 : ternary;
        name_metadata.name_hash : ternary;
    }
    actions {
        set_egr;
        _drop;
    }
}
Interest ndn:/a/b/c/d
Route B: /a/b    to eth4
table_set_default count_table _drop
table_add fib_table set_egr  4 0&&&0 0&&&0 3..4&&&1 0&&&0 0&&&0 => 1  1
table_add fib_table set_egr  3 0&&&0 0&&&0 3..4&&&1 0&&&0 0&&&0 => 1  1
table_add fib_table set_egr  4 0&&&0 2..5&&&1 0&&&0 0&&&0 0&&&0 => 4  2
table_add fib_table set_egr  3 0&&&0 2..5&&&1 0&&&0 0&&&0 0&&&0 => 4  2
table_add fib_table set_egr  2 0&&&0 2..5&&&1 0&&&0 0&&&0 0&&&0 => 4  2
Route A:  /a/b/c    to eth1
c1= h(a)
c12 = h(a,b)
c123 = h(a,b,c)
name_hash = h(a,b,c,d)
Matched entries Selected entry
Figure 5.4  Deﬁnition of the ﬁb_table and FIB entries for two preﬁx names.
5.3.4 Control Flow Code
Fig. 5.5 schematizes the program execution path of the ingress pipeline where Interests and Data
are processed. That ingress pipeline contains six match-action tables, a register block to simulate
the stateful PIT behavior, some temporary metadata. In P4, an action cannot be directly called
in the control ﬂow program rather its activation goes through the application of a match-action
table. Thus, some of the tables in the ingress pipeline are only meant to perform computation
on the packet ﬁelds and store the results in metadata for further operations. Those tables are
executed independently from any matching condition on the packet ﬁelds.
After the parsing stage, the count_table is applied to count the total number of name compo-
nents in the current packet. As explained in the section describing the FIB implementation, this
number is later used by the LPM algorithm to select the right FIB entry. The hashname_table
is applied to compute the hash of the full packet name, i.e., h(a,b,c,d), as well as the hashes of
all the shorter preﬁxes, i.e., c1=h(a), c12 = h(a,b) and c123 = h(a,b,c). The full name hash is
needed to address the PIT, while the hashes of the shorter preﬁxes are required to perform the
Longest Preﬁx Matching (LPM) on the FIB table. In sequence, the pit_table reads a register
indexed by name_hash and copies it in the isInPIT metadata ﬁeld. If the register value indexed
by the full name hash equals zero, the target has no other pending Interests for this name and
so a FIB lookup must be done to determine the next-hop. If the register is not empty, the
Interest is dropped and eventually the register is updated. After applying the pit_table, the
control ﬂow has a conditional branch based on the packet type, that is, either Interest or Data.
In case of an Interest packet, Flow_metadata.isInPIT contains the list of the interfaces where
the target has already received an Interest for this content. A PIT entry is represented as a
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Figure 5.5  Illustration of the control ﬂow of the ingress pipeline of the NDN.p4 program.
bitmask. For example, the PIT entry '00000100' encodes information about 8 interfaces whose
interface number 2 has already seen an incoming Interest for this content name. So, if any of the
Flow_metadata.isInPIT bits is set to 1, the target has a pending entry for that name and does
not forward this Interest upstream. If not, then the ﬁb_table is applied to lookup the next-hop.
The ﬁb_table performs the LPM algorithm described in Sec. 5.3.3. If the LPM returns an entry
for the Interest, then the updatePit_table is applied to create the related PIT entry. The PIT
entry is created by marking the incoming interface in the bitmask. The so-created entry is ﬁnally
stored in the register cell indexed by the hash of the full Interest name.
The execution path for a Data packet is similar to the one for an Interest except for the code
executed after the conditional branch on the packet type. The action associated to the pit_table
entry for Data packets reads the register value to load the interfaces out of which this Data packet
must be forwarded downstream. The same action cleans the read register since the current Data
packet is supposed to consume the related PIT entry. In case of a Data, the routeData_table is
applied last. This table reads the downstream interfaces this Data must be forwarded to from
the isInPIT metadata ﬁeld. The actions associated with the routeData_table's entries set the
output interfaces on the standard metadata egress_spec that will be read by the egress pipeline
to forward the packet out of the selected switch port.
5.3.5 Control Plane
All the tables deﬁned and used in the NDN.p4 program are initially empty. These tables must
be ﬁlled by a control plane application to perform the deﬁned packet processing logic. In P4
targets, the control-plane communicates with the data-plane via some interfaces which are par-
tially deﬁned by the P4 programs too. The P4 software switch in [162] oﬀers an application
programming interface (API) to the P4-programmed data-plane for managing entries in tables.
Software tools are available at [159] to write control plane programs for the P4 switch too.
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table count_table {                                                                 
  reads {                                                                           
    components[0] : valid;                                                          
    components[1] : valid;                                                          
    components[2] : valid;                                                          
    components[3] : valid;                                                          
    components[4] : valid;                                                          
  }                                                                                 
  actions {                                                                         
    storeNumOfComponents;                                                           
    _drop;                                                                          
  }                                                                                 
  size : MAX_NAME_COMPONENTS;                                                       
}
table_set_default count_table _drop
table_add count_table storeNumOfComponents 1 0 0 0 0 => 1
table_add count_table storeNumOfComponents 1 1 0 0 0 => 2
table_add count_table storeNumOfComponents 1 1 1 0 0 => 3
table_add count_table storeNumOfComponents 1 1 1 1 0 => 4
table_add count_table storeNumOfComponents 1 1 1 1 1 => 5
action storeNumOfComponents(total) {
    modify_field(name_metadata.components,total);
}
Matching fields
   Action
parameters
Rule set
Figure 5.6  Deﬁnition of the count_table and related table entries
A glimpse of the syntax to modify the match-action tables in NDN.p4 is provided in Fig. 5.6
where the count_table of the ingress pipeline and the rules used to ﬁll it are reported. The
count_table counts the number of name components in a name. More precisely, the count_table
counts the name component TLVs in a packet through a validity match. A validity match returns
false if a header is not present, true otherwise. Therefore, the table contains as many matching
ﬁelds as the maximum number of name components that a packet may have. For example, an
Interest name with two name components will have the validity bit set for both the component[0]
and component[1] headers and clear for all the other header components. In this case, the table
needs a rule that translates the two valid headers in the packet to a counter value, that is, the
third rule of the rule-set presented in Fig. 5.6. Further, every table needs a default rule to specify
the action to be performed in case of table-miss. The default rule for the count_table is the ﬁrst
rule of the rule-set in Fig. 5.6, which calls an action to drop the packets without any valid name
component header.
A rule has the following syntax:
command_type table_name [associated_action] [match_ﬁelds_list] [=>] [parameters_list].
The command_type indicates the kind of operation, like add, delete or modify a table en-
try. The associated_action indicates the name of the action bound to this table entry. The
match_ﬁelds_list are the speciﬁc value of the table matching ﬁelds for this entry. Finally, an
action may or may not accept parameters. When present, the action's parameters follow the
symbol '=>' as parameters_list.
5.3.6 Lessons learned and future development
When the NDN.p4 design was ﬁrst tackled, the P4_14 language seemed to have a limited set
of constructs to fully describe the NDN data-plane. This could have led to the premature con-
clusion that the language was not complete enough to express certain network behaviors and so
language extensions were strictly required. Although enhancing the language syntax could have
been easy and convenient in a ﬁrst stage, on a long term it could have hampered the program
portability. Further, it would have been a worthless eﬀort since the language speciﬁcation was
101
Chapter 5. Alternative "defense" mechanisms
still premature and a clear direction for the language evolution had not been set yet. This latter
observation was later conﬁrmed by the release of the next language speciﬁcation named P4_16
where, instead, the basic syntax has been reduced to a small core set to be complemented with
libraries to express operations and components which could be more target-speciﬁc.
NDN.p4 overcomes some of the language limitations by making speciﬁc assumptions on some
packet ﬁelds. For example, some assumptions about the NDN's headers length have made it
possible to parse a variable-length TLV header although the language only allows one variable-
length ﬁeld per header.
The P4_14 language version has turned to be very tied to the reference abstract forwarder model.
Indeed, the language was made to encompass a wide range of diﬀerent targets, while the control
ﬂow of P4_14 programs allows developers to express execution ﬂows by mainly stacking match-
action table calls. Although architectures featuring match-action table pipelines are widely used
to implement fully-programmable line-speed switching chips, those do represent neither the only
target of the language nor a generic enough architecture. As a further evidence of this language
restriction, the "architecture-language separation" has become a key concept of the P4_16 lan-
guage speciﬁcation.
With regard to potential language extensions, NDN.p4 has taught us the importance of ap-
proaching the language design community with "compelling" use-cases for new features to be
incorporated into the language. By "compelling", we refer to standard protocols implementing
a behavior similar to the targeted one. This kind of example better works as incentive for the
community members to discuss about and work on the design of prospective language features.
Here follow some examples:
• Parsing NDN TLVs: variable-length TLVs could be a common-place for the next-generation
of network protocols, since their ﬂexibility has already been adopted for optional ﬁelds of
well-established protocols, e.g., the IPv4's options [164] and the IPv6's extension headers
[165], or yet, the optional parameters in the BGP4's open messages [166].
• PIT table updates: there already exist packet operations which require table updates to be
performed in the data-plane because of strict latency requirements. For example, a MAC
learning algorithm stores the Ethernet source address and the incoming port of a received
packet in a table that the target uses to forward later incoming packets based on their
destination addresses. This table update operation might not bear the delay introduced by
an eventual communication with a control plane application as the current P4 speciﬁcation
envisages [167]. A solution for updating a tiny status in a predeﬁned table has been already
raised by the work in [168].
• Reading Data signature: Data packets carry signatures trailing the packet payload. Routers
may optionally verify signatures. Therefore, the signature ﬁeld may need to be parsed. The
latter operation would imply to skip a packet portion and move the parser pointer to the
trailing signature ﬁeld. However, P4 does not allow to skip the parsing of some packet
portions [169]. Analogously, this feature would be needed by the IPSEC protocol [170] in
tunnel mode, which is the protocol used for the traditional widespread setup of Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs).
5.4 Summary
This chapter explores two diﬀerent subjects: alternative forwarding mechanisms, at ﬁrst, and
design platforms, later, for the NDN data-plane. The need for this exploration originates from
102
5.4. Summary
the conclusions drawn by the contributions presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Those ﬁndings about
IFA countermeasures exacerbate the fear about the impossibility to protect eﬀectively the NDN
architecture from all the possible variants of this attack. Therefore, it is worth exploring, as
already witnessed by several recently-emerged related works, the design of diﬀerent forwarding
planes for the NDN. For that purpose, it is of foremost importance to establish both the cardinal
PIT properties to be kept by such an alternative forwarding plane and the ones that can be re-
laxed or lost instead. Along this line, this chapter has introduced a proper evaluation framework
and classiﬁed existing alternative forwarding proposals according to it.
Nevertheless, the comparison of alternative NDN data-plane designs is made diﬃcult by the
lack of open-source NDN router designs. In fact, existing NDN designs are tailored to spe-
ciﬁc software/hardware platforms and sometimes closed, hence, diﬃcult to share, evaluate and
modify. Hence, this work seminally has proposed to leverage the latest advances in the ﬁeld of
programmable data-planes to produce high-level and portable NDN router designs. Although
the NDN.p4 data-plane design was constrained by the P4 technology's infancy at the time it was
proposed, it has in any case outlined the potential of those emerging technologies to be leveraged
to ease the deployment and test of ICN solutions. As better explained in the last section of this
manuscript that presents the opportunities for future work, today's languages and platforms for
packet processors can be leveraged to improve the NDN.p4 design and ﬁnally transform that in
the originally envisioned platform meant for researchers to experiment with diﬀerent data-plane
designs for the NDN.
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The Named-Data Networking (NDN) concept has emerged as a promising clean-slate future
Internet architecture. The NDN retains the same Internet's hourglass model, but it replaces
the hourglass' narrow waist to achieve more eﬃcient content localization and retrieval. The
NDN's narrow waist supports content retrieval via a receiver-driven communication model, of-
fering data-centric security and in-network storage. Therefore, not only content distribution, but
content-centric security and consumer mobility are also naturally well served by the NDN design.
Despite the many potential beneﬁts, a set of open challenges still slows down a wide adoption
of the NDN architecture for further experimentation. Among the NDN-related open issues, the
security of the proposed architecture represents a major concern. The NDN architecture is im-
mune by design to several well-known attacks today's IP-based networks are aﬀected with, e.g.,
application ﬂooding attacks, reﬂection attacks and preﬁx hijacking. Nevertheless, NDN suﬀers
from novel architecture-speciﬁc vulnerabilities. Among the security threats to the NDN, the
Interest Flooding Attack (IFA) is a Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS) which capitalizes on
the state created by regular Interests in routers' tables. Because of the easiness of mounting
disruptive IFAs, the existence of a stateful component in the NDN's forwarding plane has also
started to be reconsidered [106, 142, 141].
This dissertation work strengthens the understanding about the severity of the IFA DDoS and
the potential of the countermeasures against it. As a ﬁrst contribution, we disprove that the
state-of-the-art IFA defense mechanisms are robust enough to mitigate any potential IFA. In-
deed, our work shows how the reactive nature of the most eﬃcient existing countermeasures
makes those vulnerable to a certain type of stealthy IFAs. In fact, reactive countermeasures
require to collect and analyze traﬃc statistics before triggering any mitigation strategy. There-
fore, reactive countermeasures introduce monitoring overhead and delayed reactions. We show
that both factors can be exploited by potential attackers in IFAs. Attackers can pollute metrics
collected by routers by dosing diﬀerent Interest types and circumvent observation time windows
in routers by changing target preﬁx name. The IFAs proposed by our work adopt both strategies
to successfully counteract existing reactive countermeasures.
As second contribution, we deﬁne proactive countermeasures against the IFA. This novel class
of countermeasures includes defense mechanisms which do not perform any traﬃc monitoring
to detect an attack. At ﬁrst, we conjecture proactive defense eliminates the monitoring burden
required and overcomes the vulnerabilities experienced by its reactive counterpart. Then, by
designing Charon, a proactive IFA countermeasure where NDN routers rely only on the Interest
name analysis to identify and drop fake Interests, we empirically prove proactive countermea-
sures counteract eﬃciently the latest stealthy IFAs. Further, the introduction of Charon opens
a totally new perspective on the design of new and/or reﬁnement of old IFA countermeasures.
As third contribution, we present NDN.p4, the ﬁrst information-centric data-plane written in
the novel high-level language for packet processors P4. Writing highly-portable and re-usable
implementations of the NDN protocols is a necessary step to advance the experimentation on
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the NDN architecture. The work done with NDN.p4 aims to show the foremost importance of
exploring programmable network platforms in the design and test of NDN data-plane behaviors.
NDN.p4 aims to leverage P4-targets in the long term as platforms to experiment with alterna-
tive forwarding mechanisms. Research on alternatives forwarding mechanisms for the NDN is
required to design an NDN data-plane preserving its original properties yet avoiding the intrin-
sic IFA vulnerability. Furthermore, the work in NDN.p4 has highlighted limitations of the ﬁrst
P4 language version and contributed actively to the discussion about the set of features to be
integrated in further language versions.
With regard to the future work, the work presented in this manuscript has delineated at least
three diﬀerent directions to pursue further research on. First, the thorough analysis of the
state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures has revealed a few promising options to design more ro-
bust defense mechanisms against this NDN-speciﬁc security threat. Proactiveness, as empirically
proven by this work, is a characteristic which can help improve existing defense mechanisms. As
purely proactive countermeasures could not be widely applicable to all the attack scenarios, those
could instead be embedded in hybrid reactive/proactive designs. This work shows how the IFA
mitigation strategy in Charon never aﬀects any legitimate traﬃc. So, Charon-like mitigation
techniques could replace the rate-limiting techniques generally applied by the existing reactive
countermeasures.
Second, among the so far proposed countermeasures against IFAs, the collaborative ones seem
to be the most eﬃcient according to the results reported in literature works [103, 114, 122]. Nev-
ertheless, the coordination of routers to apply collaborative defense mechanisms is achieved by
means of slowly converging message exchanges that may even require data-plane or packet format
changes. At the time being, there exist no standard interfaces between control and data-planes
in NDN. Yet a standard interface to the NDN data-plane could be used to design centralized
at the control-plane applications to mitigate IFAs. The deﬁnition of such an interface would
eliminate the need for ad-hoc protocol modiﬁcations required by the existing collaborative coun-
termeasures. Further, the need for an NDN monitoring plane has been advocated by several
other works [171, 172], so there could be the opportunity to partially leverage existing solutions.
Third, the P4 language has considerably evolved since the work in NDN.p4 was proposed. The
NDN.p4 design was in some parts constrained by the limitations of the P4 early language spec-
iﬁcation. Similarly, a study of the performance of the NDN.p4 solution was not done because
of the lack of hardware/software support for the P4 language at the time of its conception. To-
day, the original P4 language speciﬁcation [161] has been improved and features a more ﬂexible
programming model in a new language version [173]. Several P4 hardware/software targets have
also appeared, so oﬀering the possibility to conduct a performance evaluation of NDN.p4. The
NDN.p4 design can deﬁnitely beneﬁt from the new P4 language's feature-set and the related
hardware/software ecosystem. Indeed, NDN.p4 has already been leveraged for further work in
[174] with the aim to improve its design with regard to certain components (e.g., the parser,
the forwarding table) and measure achievable performance on real P4 hardware targets. It is
to be ascertained yet whether or not improved versions of NDN.p4 will be able to achieve the
same performance of platform-tailored NDN data-plane designs. Nevertheless, in our opinion,
this open question should not limit further research on this subject since future NDN.p4 versions
will oﬀer immediate portability on multiple targets and a simpliﬁed open-source design, beneﬁts
which no other state-of-the-art design so far features.
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Diﬀerences between CCN and NDN
This appendix reports some of the main diﬀerences between the CCN and NDN protocols at the
time of writing this manuscript. The main criterion for the selection of the presented diﬀerences
is their relevance to the topics covered in this manuscript.
Packet format:
The CCNx and NDN protocols follow a diﬀerent encoding and packet format. CCNx uses a 16-
bit Type and a 16-bit Length TLV structure. The length ﬁeld contains the length of the Value
ﬁeld in octets. Instead, NDN uses a variable length Type and Length TLV structure, where the
value contained in the ﬁrst byte of the Type and Length ﬁeld determines their bit length. The
CCNx's packet format is made of a ﬁxed header followed by optional TLV headers and then by
the body of the message. Instead, the NDN's packet format does not contain any ﬁxed header
rather it contains a variable number of TLVs.
Matching:
Since version 1.0, CCNx only supports exact match on Interest names. Meaning that if a content
with name /a/b/c.zip is required, only a Data packet with the same identical name can consume
that Interest. Diﬀerently in NDN, contents like /a/b/c.zip/v1/s100 or /a/b/c.zip/manifest.txt
are valid Data for the /a/b/c.zip Interest. Exact matches achieve faster forwarding and are
deterministic, that is, they always bring back the same content. Further, they avoid inspection
of caches by means of generic queries.
Selectors:
NDN and CCNx contain additional, sometimes optional, ﬁelds in the Interest packet header
which can be used to narrow the search to speciﬁc contents. NDN oﬀers a wider range of such
ﬁelds, called selectors. Their purpose ranges from limiting or excluding components beyond the
Interest preﬁx to specifying a speciﬁc publisher via a reference to its public key or asking routers
not to provide stale Contents. Conversely, CCNx has removed this feature in its 1.0 version
to achieve faster and more deterministic forwarding with exact match on the Interest name.
Nevertheless, CCNx has preserved two of those options, now called restrictions. CCNx Interests
can carry a keyIdRestriction ﬁeld to identify a speciﬁc publisher and/or a contentObjectHash to
guarantee the network delivers the right packet.
Fragmentation:
Contents may be bigger than the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) on certain links, so a
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mechanism may be needed to fragment and reassemble packets across the network. Fragmenta-
tion and reassembly of packets can be performed either in the network or at end-hosts. CCNx
performs end-to-end fragmentation, while NDN performs hop-by-hop fragmentation through a
link-layer protocol mechanism [175].
Negative Acknowledgments:
Special packets reporting feedback about packet transmission are widely used mechanisms to
generate error notiﬁcations in network protocols. An analysis, with a strong focus on security,
of pros and cons of Negative Acknowledgments (NACKs) in NDN/CCN networks is provided
in [133]. Therein, the authors deﬁne two kind of NACK packets for ICNs: content NACK
(cNACK) and forwarding NACK (fNACK). A cNACK is a negative acknowledgment generated
by a producer to indicate that a requested content does not exist. A fNACK is generated by
a router to notify downstream routers that it cannot forward an Interest packet because of
congestion or absence of route for that name. The work in [133] presents in detail the security
implications of NACKs concluding that network-layer NACKs are better avoided for security
reasons. In fact, the CCNx protocol provides NACKs only as special type of Content Type
and the NDN architecture delegates the NACK mechanism to a link-layer protocol (the NDNLP
[175]).
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Résumé
Ce travail illustre comment les tendances actuelles d'utilisation dominant sur Internet motivent
la recherche sur des architectures futures de réseau plus orientées vers le contenu. Parmi les ar-
chitectures émergentes pour l'Internet du futur, le paradigme du Information-Centric Networking
(ICN) est présenté. ICN vise à redéﬁnir les protocoles de base d'Internet aﬁn d'y introduire un
changement sémantique des hôtes vers les contenus. Parmi les architectures ICN, le Named-Data
Networking (NDN) prévoit que les demandes nommées de contenus des utilisateurs soient trans-
mises par leur nom dans les routeurs le long du chemin d'un consommateur à une ou plusieurs
sources de contenus. Ces demandes de contenus laissent des traces dans les routeurs traversés
qui sont ensuite suivis par les paquets de contenus demandés. La table d'intérêt en attente
(PIT) est le composant du plan de données de l'NDN qui enregistre temporaraiment les deman-
des de contenus acheminés dans les routeurs. D'une part, ce travail explique que le mécanisme
d'acheminement à états de la PIT permet des propriétés comme l'agrégation de requêtes, le
multicast de réponses et le contrôle natif de ﬂux hop-by-hop. D'autre part, ce travail illustre
comment l'acheminement à états de la PIT peut facilement être mal utilisé par des attaquants
pour monter des attaques de déni de service distribué (DDoS) disruptives, appelées Interest
Flooding Attacks (IFAs). Dans les IFAs, des botnets vaguement coordonnés peuvent inonder le
réseau d'une grande quantité de demandes diﬃciles à satisfaire dans le but de surcharger soit
l'infrastructure du réseau soit les producteurs de contenus. Ce travail de thèse prouve que bien
que des contre-mesures contre les IFAs aient été proposées, il manque une compréhension com-
plète de leur eﬃcacité réelle puisque celles-ci ont été testées sous des hypothèses simplistes sur les
scénarios d'évaluation. Dans l'ensemble, le travail présenté dans ce manuscript permet de mieux
comprendre les implications des IFAs et les opportunités d'ameliorer les mécanismes de défense
existants contre ces attaques. Les principales contributions de ce travail de thèse tournent autour
d'une analyse de sécurité du plan d'acheminement dans l'architecture NDN. En particulier, ce
travail déﬁnit un modèle d'attaquant plus robuste pour les IFAs à travers l'identiﬁcation des
failles dans les contre-mesures IFA existantes. Ce travail introduit un nouvel ensemble d'IFAs
basé sur le modèle d'attaquant proposé. Les nouveaux IFAs sont utilisés pour réévaluer les plus
eﬃcaces contre-mesures IFA existantes. Les résultats de cette évaluation réfutent l'eﬃcacité
universelle des mécanismes de défense existants contre l'IFA et, par conséquent, appellent à dif-
férentes contre-mesures pour protéger le NDN contre cette menace de sécurité. Pour surmonter
le problème révélé, ce travail déﬁnit également des contre-mesures proactives contre l'IFA, qui
sont de nouveaux mécanismes de défense contre les IFA inspirés par les problèmes rencontrés
dans l'état de l'art. Ce travail présente Charon, une nouvelle contre-mesure proactive contre
l'IFA, et là teste contre les nouvelles IFAs. Ce travail montre que Charon est plus eﬃcace que les
contre-mesures IFA réactives existantes. Enﬁn, ce travail illustre la conception NDN.p4, c'est-à-
dire la première implémentation d'un protocole ICN écrit dans le langage de haut niveau pour
les processeurs de paquets P4. Le travail NDN.p4 est la première tentative dans la littérature
visant à tirer parti des nouveaux techniques de réseaux programmables pour tester et évaluer
diﬀérentes conceptions de plan de données NDN. Cette dernière contribution classe également
les mécanismes alternatifs d'acheminement par rapport à un ensemble de propriétés cardinales
de la PIT. Le travail souligne qu'il vaut la peine d'explorer d'autres mécanismes d'acheminement
visant à concevoir un plan de données NDN moins vulnerable à la menace IFA.
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Abstract
This work illustrates how today's Internet dominant usage trends motivate research on more
content-oriented future network architectures. Among the emerging future Internet proposals,
the promising Information-Centric Networking (ICN) research paradigm is presented. ICN aims
to redesign Internet's core protocols to promote a shift in focus from hosts to contents. Among
the ICN architectures, the Named-Data Networking (NDN) envisions users' named content re-
quests to be forwarded by their names in routers along the path from one consumer to 1-or-many
sources. NDN's requests leave trails in traversed routers which are then followed backwards by
the requested contents. The Pending Interest Table (PIT) is the NDN's data-plane component
which temporarily records forwarded content requests in routers. On one hand, this work ex-
plains that the PIT stateful mechanism enables properties like requests aggregation, multicast
responses delivery and native hop-by-hop control ﬂow. On the other hand, this work illustrates
how the PIT stateful forwarding behavior can be easily abused by malicious users to mount dis-
ruptive distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), named Interest Flooding Attacks (IFAs).
In IFAs, loosely coordinated botnets can ﬂood the network with a large amount of hard to satisfy
requests with the aim to overload both the network infrastructure and the content producers.
This work proves that although countermeasures against IFAs have been proposed, a fair under-
standing of their real eﬃcacy is missing since those have been tested under simplistic assumptions
about the evaluation scenarios. Overall, the work presented in this manuscript shapes a better
understanding of both the implications of IFAs and the possibilities of improving the state-of-
the-art defense mechanisms against these attacks. The main contributions of this work revolves
around a security analysis of the NDN's forwarding plane. In particular, this work deﬁnes a more
robust attacker model for IFAs by identifying ﬂaws in the state-of-the-art IFA countermeasures.
This work introduces a new set of IFAs built upon the proposed attacker model. The novel IFAs
are used to re-assess the most eﬀective existing IFA countermeasures. Results of this evaluation
disproves the universal eﬃcacy of the state-of-the-art IFA defense mechanisms and so, call for
diﬀerent countermeasures to protect the NDN against this threat. To overcome the revealed
issue, this work also deﬁnes proactive IFA countermeasures, which are novel defense mechanisms
against IFAs inspired by the issues with the state-of-the-art ones. This work introduces Charon,
a novel proactive IFA countermeasure, and tests it against the novel IFA attacks. This work
shows Charon counteracts latest stealthy IFAs better than the state-of-the-art reactive counter-
measures. Finally, this work illustrates the NDN.p4 design, that is, the ﬁrst implementation of
an ICN protocol written in the high-level language for packet processors P4. The NDN.p4 work is
the ﬁrst attempt in the related literature to leverage novel programmable-networks technologies
to test and evaluate diﬀerent NDN forwarding plane designs. This last contribution also classiﬁes
existing alternative forwarding mechanisms with respect to a set of PIT cardinal properties. The
work outlines that it is worth to explore alternative forwarding mechanisms aiming to design an
NDN forwarding plane less vulnerable to the IFA threat.
Keywords: Information-Centric Networking, Named-Data Networking, security, Denial of Ser-
vice, Interest Flooding Attack.
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